FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JVLY

1968

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The poor gourmet's guide to Paris.

1 Rendez-vous des Camionneurs
72, quai des Orfèvres

2 Rougeot
59, blvd du Montparnasse

3 Moulin de Village
Cité Berryer,
25, rue Royale

4 Le Pot d'Etain
22, rue des Canettes

5 Le Quai d'Orsay
49, quai d'Orsay



6 La Petite Chaise
36, rue de Grenelle

7 L'Entrecôtier
12. rue du Colisée

8 Le Serail
10, rue de la Harpe

9 La Fontaine de Mars
129, rue
Saint-Dominique

10 Beaux-Arts
11, rue Bonaparte

11 Aux Artistes
63, rue Falguière

12 Mouff 5
5, rue Mouffetard

13 L'Assommoir
12, rue Girardon

14 Chez Vania
Cité Berryer,
25, rue Royale

15 Les Balkans
35, rue Saint-Jacques

16 La Vieille Trousse
6, blvd
Saint-Germain

17 Santa Lucia
13, rue des Canettes

18 Aux Trois Canettes
18, rue des Canettes

19 Fantasia
62, avenue Bosquet

20 Chartier
7, Fbg Montmartre

21 Brasserie
de l'Ile-Saint-Louis
55, quai de Bourbon

22 Vagenende
142, blvd
Saint-Germain

23 Le Procope
13, rue de
l'Ancienne-Comédie

24 Colbert
2, rue Vivienne

25 Drouot
103, rue Richelieu


26 La Talmouse
1, rue Laplace

27 Au Bougnat Blanc
5, rue Sauval

28 Louis XIV
1-bis,
place des Victoires

Voyage
ar Air France

makes no difference to us if u're traveling on a budget. e'll serve you a meal that would ve made Escoffier sit up and ce notice. We honestly think re's no better food served in sky. Eating is one of the rea- is people go to Paris. It's one of reasons they fly Air France. e know where you're going.

langer bien à Paris

e restaurants we suggest offer als for about 15 francs ($3), some of them a complete ner (what we call a menu) for siderably less than that. eck the prices, which are usu- posted in the windows of nch restaurants. And phone ad, to see if they're open that and to make a reservation.

'une bonne
outation (1-10)

at gives a restaurant a good name in Paris? Tangible things, like the good beef at L'Entrecôtier and the fish at Le Serail. Intangibles, like the charm of Le Pot d'Etain or the lively student crowd at the Restaurant des Beaux-Arts.

les Hang-outs
des artistes (11-13)

They're noisy, they're usually very cheap and always jammed. To find them, walk down any street in Montparnasse or Montmartre and look through the windows. You'll know.

la Mère Russie
à Paris (14)

Those haunted émigrés are disappearing from the Parisian scene, but the smell of blinchiki *lingers on. Relive the sad twenties at Chez Vania.*

Bistros étrangers (15-19)

Les Balkans specializes in shishkebab, so does La Vieille Trousse, which also offers an incredible dessert called Labrador *—cake, ice cream and Grand Marnier. Aux Trois Canettes is the highbrows' spaghetti house; Santa Lucia is a delightful family-run trattoria. Fantasia is one of the best places in the city for* couscous, *steamed balls of wheat flavored with different sauces. Algerians and Moroccans have made this as popular in Paris as Americans have made the hamburger.*

Restaurants
charmants (20-27)

From the street they usually don't look like much. But inside you might find the art nouveau *fantasy of Vagenende, the beautiful old Gothic cellar of La Talmouse, or a sense of history at Le Procope. It claims to be the oldest restaurant in Paris; Voltaire and Balzac and Ben Franklin ate there.*

Pour la grande nuit (28)

You owe yourself at least one big night out. Spend it at Louis XIV. For perhaps five or six dollars you can dine like a gourmet at a gourmet's favorite. One of the most respected wine cellars in Paris, a distinguished clientèle, an even more distinguished reputation.

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1968

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 46 JULY 1968 No. 4

IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL

By Herman Kahn

DESPITE the willingness of many Americans to settle for less than a satisfactory settlement in Viet Nam, and despite the possibility that events may foreclose the alternatives, it seems useful to examine just how "bad" a settlement we really are willing to accept and what the alternatives to such a settlement are. Despite heated discussion, some of the central issues involved in negotiations have not been debated—or at least not in sufficient detail and concreteness to make them clear. Indeed, so far each side is demanding victory on its own terms, the only difference being that we have offered North Viet Nam some face-saving devices, while Hanoi talks as if it is determined to humiliate us. Thus many people have dismissed these public positions as debating stances or meaningless rhetoric designed to raise morale or inspire confidence among allies and supporters —not serious approaches to settlement.

The problem, I suspect, is more fundamental. It is difficult to imagine that the United States will acquiesce in any solution in which those forces and elements in South Viet Nam which have been seriously committed to our side will be denied a major voice in the settlement or very reliable guarantees against molestation and discrimination after a settlement is achieved. They include two or three million individuals in the armed forces, the Government and the administration of the country—and their families. Our moral "wards" also include most of the million or so Montagnards, some major part of the one to two million adherents of the Hoa Hao religion, most of the 1.7 million Catholics, many of the 1.4 million Chinese (most of them seemingly neutral in the war rather than actively anti-Viet Cong), probably a majority of the million or so Cao Dai, almost all members of the Dai Viet and VNQDD political parties, and others.

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Even those Vietnamese whose anti-communism derives from their status as landlords, property owners, merchants, officers, civil servants, etc., are entitled to protection—at least in so far as they may find themselves in jeopardy because they supported the same cause we supported. In addition, many ordinary Vietnamese are strongly opposed to the Viet Cong and have aided us because of no particular ideological or religious commitment or other particularist characteristic, but simply because they reject communism as they have seen it in action, or have reacted against terrorism or specific atrocities.

This makes a lengthy list of people with a moral claim on the United States. While no one knows what would actually happen if the communists gained control of all of Viet Nam, we cannot—on the evidence of North Viet Nam's record after 1954—dismiss the possibility of political pogroms or a murderous purge of the régime's enemies and "anti-social" elements in the "new" South Viet Nam. Earlier this year in the city of Hue, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces assassinated more than a thousand people, most of whose names were on prepared lists. How we would feel about the possibility of the Hue atrocities being repeated on a nationwide scale is a matter that does not need elaboration.

What would be some of the other consequences of a dishonorable and humiliating settlement? In general, the international consequences, while by no means negligible, do not seem likely to be as important as the probable disillusionment, frustration, alienation and divisive recrimination in the United States. A "stab-in-the-back" legend on the right would compete with "military-industrial-complex" theories on the left. The alienated could argue that the stupidity, incompetence and immorality of the Establishment had now been proved; it was stupid in the way it got into Viet Nam, incompetent in the way it dealt with the war, and immoral *by its own standards* in the way it got out.

One can easily imagine a "backlash" based on a combination of those forces which supported Senator Goldwater in the 1964 election and dedicated to "ideological regeneration" of the United States. If we regard the 40 percent who voted for Mr. Goldwater as a hard core of support for such a cause, it seems by no means improbable that it could attain a majority. If it did assume power, it would be unlikely to support those "great society" programs which many opponents of the present Administration believe are inexcusably blocked by the Viet Nam war. Even if this rightist

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coalition did not achieve a majority, it could easily succeed in blocking such programs. In any case the bitterness in American life might be unprecedented.

It is often said that France got out of Indochina and Algeria without suffering permanent damage; actually the repercussions were severe. Many Frenchmen argue that if French Army rebels in Algeria had crossed into metropolitan France, they would have been opposed only by the communists; the rest of the country was too disillusioned and apathetic to care. But it is one thing for a country like France to go down to rock bottom and then come back. It might be a very different thing, both domestically and internationally, for a world power like the United States.

Before discussing whether our commitments *can* be met and examining the alternatives that may arise, it must be noted that one's attitude toward the Vietnamese war is often determined by one's attitude toward such specific issues as: the degree to which anti-white and anti-American feelings increase as more Americans come into the theater and the degree to which these feelings create empathy and support for the heroic little man in black pajamas and antagonism toward the white man in the B-52 bomber; the degree to which we are fighting nationalism in Viet Nam; the degree to which the forces behind the National Liberation Front (NLF), which tend to be dedicated, devoted, disciplined and honest, would be better guardians and leaders in the modernization process than those on our side who distressingly often are corrupt, partisan, self-seeking "peoples of the past;" the difficulty of identifying the enemy; the extent to which the Catholics are regarded as a foreign element; the degree to which the present Saigon Government has been discredited because it depends heavily on generals who served under the French against the revolution, and because it is backed by an outside white capitalist nation that supplies much of the actual fighting strength; the degree of passive support enjoyed by the NLF; and perhaps most important of all, the degree to which we are destroying the country.

I believe that the American and European consensus on every one of these nine points is almost completely wrong or misleading; if I did not, then I would have to acknowledge that much of what follows is either mistaken, misleading or irrelevant.[1]

[1] I discuss all of these issues reasonably fully in a recent book, "Can We Win in Vietnam?", by Frank Armbruster, *et al.* (New York: Praeger, 1968). In this article, I find myself in the somewhat uncomfortable position of presenting points without making the necessary introductory arguments.

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II

It seems reasonable, both logically and intellectually, to start with an examination of the pre-Tet situation. There were at that time at least three commonly held assessments of the state of the war. The first and most usual among the American public was that the Vietnamese war was a hopeless morass incapable of "military" solution. It would eventually find a political settlement, perhaps after a collapse of American and South Vietnamese morale.

In sharp contrast to this was the attitude held by many in the top command in Saigon. They believed that there would be clear signs of victory by spring of this year, and that those signs would be unmistakable by June. They did not necessarily expect a collapse of the communists, but they did expect a decisive change which would make an allied victory seem inevitable. This optimism was based on two theories. First was the assumption that "as soon as we show the North Vietnamese they cannot win, they will quit." The second can be called the "attrition-pressure-ouch" theory of victory. It holds that as American forces cause increasing losses to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, and in addition make life increasingly difficult and uncomfortable for them, the communists will eventually find their morale stretched to the breaking point; recognizing the hopelessness of their position and the extent of their losses, they will quit.

The obvious reply to the first of these theories is that Ho Chi Minh could equally say, "As soon as I convince *you* that *you* cannot win the war *your* morale will collapse. Would you care to compare biographies?" In partial answer to the second theory, as long as morale is not too eroded the NLF and the North Vietnamese clearly can replace their losses at the present rate for the rest of history. About 250,000 young men come of age each year in North Viet Nam and about 200,000 in South Viet Nam. In principle, the NLF could replace the 50,000 or so losses that it has been suffering each year, either by drawing on the rural half of this pool or by substituting North Vietnamese. North Viet Nam by drawing on its large pool not only can replace its casualties indefinitely but can also provide "recruits" for the NLF.

These may be the extreme positions of optimism and pessimism. There are also a whole series of what might be called moderate positions. There is, for instance, the one held by a group of

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analysts at Hudson Institute. In their 1967 assessment, the situation in Viet Nam was relatively promising, particularly when contrasted with 1965 and 1966; with no basic change in policies or programs, they foresaw the possibility of victory, or at least a decisively improved position, in two to five years—without assuming that morale on the other side would collapse. If substantial improvements were made in various programs, a more rapid military victory was possible and both a break in the enemy's morale and a successful political settlement would become more likely.

Does what happened during Tet change this assessment of the situation at the end of 1967? The first point to make is that an extensive improvement in the arms and equipment of the Army of North Viet Nam (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) occurred in late 1967 and early January and represented a very substantial escalation by the Soviets, Chinese and North Vietnamese; it is startling in retrospect how virtually unnoticed it was by the public and by many in the Government, even though it was detected and discussed in some detail by the press, which apparently got the information that U.S. intelligence had developed. As a result of this arming and upgrading, most enemy units now are about as well armed, except for lack of artillery and air support, as the corresponding American units—in some ways, better armed. They are a great deal better armed than the Army of South Viet Nam (ARVN), and incomparably better armed than the Popular Forces and Regional Forces. Furthermore, there are many more North Vietnamese now active in the South, both as members of the Viet Cong and as NVA units.

Second, the alleged failure of allied intelligence was not as great as usually assumed. Our intelligence estimates of the NVA/VC order of battle before Tet seem to have been reasonably accurate, though the full significance of the new armament, upgrading and increased infiltration was not appreciated. In particular, while many "new" units were used in the Tet operation, they seem in almost all cases to have been formed by upgrading existing units—*e.g.* by taking squads of local Viet Cong and putting them together, introducing some NVA personnel, giving them better armament, perhaps some augmentation by recent recruits and draftees and then using the resulting body as a new main-force unit. Finally, almost all the major enemy movements into position to attack were detected. The Tet offensive can be compared with

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Pearl Harbor; the intelligence was better than alleged; the interpretation and action were lacking.

A third important point about Tet is that it is difficult to overestimate the degree of relaxation that prevailed before the attack. Most curfew restrictions were dropped almost a week before Tet; while officially about 50 percent of ARVN personnel were given leave, the absentees in many cases amounted to 70 percent or more—despite the fact that the guarding of the cities and even many of the bases was the responsibility of ARVN units. Though American forces were put on alert, they too were often overly relaxed. Some of the effects of this were offset by warnings and indications of local action picked up in some cases a week or two before Tet, in others only a few hours before. Almost all units had either local intelligence warnings or alerts from headquarters which warranted major alert and other preparatory actions.

The failure of most units to react adequately can be explained if not justified. First, both the Americans and the Vietnamese had become used to past violations of the Tet truce in many areas away from neutral observers. Despite their protests, the world had given these violations a disbelieving or indifferent shrug. Further, the allied command did not believe that the enemy would violate the truce openly and explicitly in areas where foreign journalists and diplomats were present—particularly in view of the advantages Hanoi was deriving from applying political pressures to bring the United States to the negotiating table. In the event, of course, the world's indifference became positive annoyance that the Americans should accuse the enemy of perfidy; one can easily imagine the repercussions if our side had broken the truce. The point is not to sound a note of moral righteousness, but to observe that while communists often obey the form of an agreement and sometimes even the spirit, it does not cost them much, either internally or externally, to violate both.

It was relatively easy, then, for the enemy simply to walk or ride almost openly into the city of Saigon and other urban areas. The only limitation was that not all the personnel could be briefed on the operation in time, and therefore many could not participate. Either for this or political reasons, or both, almost all of the first-wave assault was by Viet Cong with perhaps some NVA reinforcement. It did not take much, if any, coöperation—even passive—on the part of the local population for this movement into Saigon and other cities to go largely undetected. It

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seems probable that, with the possible exception of Hue, there was really very little extensive long-range preparation among the population. Indeed in most cases local cadres were not notified of the attack in any specific terms. Another of the ways the Viet Cong seem to have achieved relative surprise despite the size of the attack was by using relatively untrained personnel. In many areas the tactics used were incredibly inept.[2]

Furthermore, the fact that the Viet Cong infiltrated into the cities were often those familiar with the area (who could most easily find sanctuary with relatives or friends or otherwise avoid attention) meant a very sharp limitation on the size of the initial wave. Partly because the first assault was so weak, partly because the ARVN resistance was unexpectedly strong, the reinforcing units outside the cities never did get a chance to attack during the first wave. There are other reasons why the enemy did badly, including, in many cases, bad luck. The relatively good performance of the ARVN has sometimes been overstated but, with a few exceptions, it was never catastrophically poor and was often excellent. This, plus the indifference of the people to the NLF/NVN propaganda, are two major gains in the Tet offensive.

There is a great deal of evidence that the attackers had been told that the ARVN would not fight, that the people would rise and that if they held for 48 hours they would be reinforced. Political units supposed to take over the local government accompanied the attackers. In some cases local cadres gave themselves away, and in many of the captured plans there was what we would call a "civil-affairs annex" on how to run the captured areas. The survivors of this effort are very likely to have some feeling of failure and of having been misled, particularly in view of the promises made to the communist troops last November of victory by spring, with an NLF-dominated coalition government in Saigon.

The mere fact that the NVA/VC could mount a major operation of this kind is of course a victory of sorts which itself benefits their morale. But the extent of their psychological victory seems much larger in Europe and in the United States than in Viet Nam, although the Vietnamese civilians were no doubt badly shaken. But the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong doubtless have a more balanced perception of their real gains and losses. They

[2] For example, there is only one place in the eight-block perimeter of the Presidential Palace which is virtually invulnerable to attack. This is where the blockhouse is located. The Viet Cong concentrated their entire attack on this point and failed to get into the Palace.

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suffered appalling casualties and all they can show for it are unspecifiable consequences of a psychological and political sort—all of which, while potentially important, are either uncertain or far less than the explicit or implicit promises.

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Tet offensive was its effect in the rural areas. It was announced that of the 44 provinces, 13 suffered severe setbacks in the attack, 18 modest setbacks and 15 were basically untouched by the communists. This sounds serious but not disastrous. Unfortunately, there seems to be some evidence that the 13 provinces which suffered most seriously included some of the most populous provinces where the greatest advances had been made by the Government in 1967. Large losses there could represent an enormous setback to the national pacification program. Many of the less affected provinces were the less populous, and some were under so little Government influence or control that to say they suffered little change is fairly meaningless. Many of the losses incurred in the countryside were probably unnecessary. The relatively long time taken by the US/GVN leadership before responding may have had serious effects and may be one of the major things for which it can be faulted.

Nevertheless, in my judgment it was the enemy that suffered the major defeat, at least in the period January 29 to February 2 or 3. The "psychological," "political" and "diplomatic" victory was won by the NLF/NVN—or rather lost by the United States—in the period from early February to March 28 when the Pegasus operation for the relief of Khe Sanh started. We appeared to hand victory to the communists by a widely publicized and (according to news stories) desperate request for two hundred thousand more men; by an emergency airlift of twelve thousand soldiers; and by the almost complete disparity between what was said by official U.S. spokesmen and by Saigon correspondents about the current situation and future prospects. All this made it simply impossible for many Americans and Europeans later to accept even the most reasonable explanations and statements coming from the Military Assistance Command in Viet Nam. It was the lack of a prompt counter-offensive and a quick return of our forces to the countryside, plus confusing news stories, that lost Tet. Now, clearly, the allies have started to regain the initiative, and the next few months will give some intimation of how successful they will be.

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The Vietnamese fence-sitters are more firmly in place than ever, but among the committed elements there seems to be a new spirit of energy and determination. It is, of course, easy to exaggerate this; some of it will wear off, some of it is purely rhetorical and some of it will be frustrated. It seems true, however, that the Government's mobilization is now faster and more expeditiously managed than it would have been otherwise, and that the arming and training of students, civil servants and others are being accepted with less protest than anybody expected. Those who are committed to the Government now appear to have a higher morale and better motivation than ever before. There is a new feeling of confidence and dedication in Saigon that arises both from a feeling of danger and paradoxically from the increasing realization of just how limited a success the Tet offensive was.

III

What, then, is the prognosis for the future? There is a new American management. Clark Clifford has replaced Robert McNamara; Abrams has replaced Westmoreland. This inevitably means some new policies, some new tactics, some new emphases. The withdrawal of Mr. Johnson as a candidate has changed in very important ways the President's relationship to the war and to domestic and international politics. For the moment, at least, he enjoys greater confidence and real authority. He is now in some degree "above politics," able to make choices and to create and live with situations which were impossible before.

What, then, can this new management hope to accomplish? Its first order of business will be the attempt to get a peaceful settlement in South Viet Nam and, failing this, a deëscalation of the conflict (perhaps by some kind of mutually limited or even unlimited withdrawal).

The simplest version of "agonizing compromise" would involve another partition of the country. North Viet Nam might be conceded one or two of the northern provinces of South Viet Nam (perhaps granting Hanoi its original goal of a border at the 16th parallel). In this case the North might retain de facto control of part of Laos or obtain some de jure concessions in that country. Such a territorial division would probably involve large-scale population movements between a truncated but still independent South Viet Nam and the North's newly annexed areas.

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Another plan for partition would be to establish a more or less independent buffer state between North and South Viet Nam, perhaps including areas touching Viet Nam's western border, thereby providing a buffer zone between South Viet Nam and Laos and Cambodia.

It should be clear that any proposal for partition would be vigorously resisted both by the South Vietnamese Government and the National Liberation Front, both of which would regard this kind of solution as a betrayal, as to some extent it would be. Yet even from their point of view such a "double cross" would be preferable to a settlement in which one or the other had no choice except emigration or submission to a hostile régime.

Another way to achieve physical security and preserve some degree of economic and political viability in the South might be to "balkanize" the country—dividing South Viet Nam into a large number of more or less autonomous federal districts, and allowing each of them considerable de jure and de facto autonomy (including the right to recruit and maintain local military forces). The whole would exist under loose central government, more of a confederation than a true union, but with various safeguards and international guarantees. The central authorities would have major responsibility for communication, transportation and the maintenance of the integrity of each of the districts. Such other governmental functions as education, health, etc., might be delegated to the districts.

There are other modes of settlement but none seems likely to work in practice, or to be negotiable even if they are theoretically workable. And even if they were negotiable they are unlikely to seem satisfactory to either the South Vietnamese Government or the NLF, and this alone could make them unsatisfactory to both Hanoi and Washington.

The other broad alternative is to set up some political-military process whose outcome is uncertain, thus giving to each side a "fair chance" for victory or compromise. Some kind of caretaker government could be established to attempt to conduct reasonably free elections in which both sides compete. A less plausible possibility involves establishing a coalition government among the NLF, the existing Government and possibly some other elements. This strikes me as somewhat less promising than a coalition between the Ku Klux Klan and SNCC to deal with integration issues in the United States, or an Israeli-Arab collaboration

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to deal with frontier problems in the Middle East, or a coalition of the United States and the Soviet Union to institute a viable world government.

A possibly more practical proposal is mutual withdrawal of troops by both North Viet Nam and the United States, each side thus agreeing to let the NLF and the GVN fight it out with only logistic support from the outside. Even if Hanoi did some cheating (but not too much), a Saigon victory would be quite possible (in contrast to what would have happened in 1965 or 1966, or perhaps even in 1967). But NVN seems unlikely to be willing to make such an arrangement unless they are more desperate for prompt settlement than they now appear to be.

Actually, almost all of the proposals just discussed are less likely in practice to represent an "agonizing compromise" than a "face-saving surrender" by one side or the other. But if they were negotiated in this spirit, the motive would be transparent. Even a settlement intended as an "agonizing compromise" would probably be taken by the outside world as a sellout if it involved any coalition between the GVN and the NLF. Most Europeans and Americans interested in these issues believe that any coalition which contains major representation of an armed communist faction will be taken over by that faction, particularly if it holds one or more key ministries. If the communist faction is disarmed and has none of the crucial ministries, the world would conclude that the communists' interests had been sold out. In the in-between case, both sides are likely to feel sold out. Therefore, even a settlement which really represented an agonizing compromise, where neither side could predict the outcome, might still look like a sellout to many.

It is also possible to touch off a process, unconsciously or deliberately, which would have the same effect as a sellout. If the South Vietnamese believed we were going to sell them out, it is easy to imagine the existing anti-Viet Cong coalition falling apart as various groups tried to make special deals with the National Liberation Front. Or more likely, some kind of a "neutralist" group would organize a coup against the current Government and then either try to make a deal with the NLF or, as its puppet, arrange for an "election," a "mutual" withdrawal of foreign troops, a "coalition" with the NLF, or similar "transfer" of power. One can imagine other processes begun in which concession followed concession, each one in turn weakening the posture of the

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side making it, and thereby provoking further demands leading to additional concessions.

Neither of these, I would judge, is really likely to occur—neither a settlement involving serious concessions by both sides nor a sellout, either deliberate or unintentional. Because we seem to be demonstrating our understanding of the need to maintain the confidence of the South Vietnamese anti-VC coalition during the negotiations, what we must consider seriously is the possibility that Viet Nam may be a conflict which can not be settled or halted or even deëscalated without considerably more fighting.

In passing, it should be pointed out that one of the worst situations of all may occur if the North Vietnamese feel that we are politically and morally defeated and that they can get anything they want. Under these circumstances their demands could be so stark and their negotiating technique so intransigent that they might destroy or discourage the "peace party" as an important movement in the United States, leaving only a "war party"—perhaps one which was willing to escalate in a reckless fashion. Short of this, they still could force the United States back to the battlefield in a dangerously intransigent mood.

IV

Let us assume for the moment that we cannot achieve a reasonably rapid settlement, or even start in motion a process which allows a fair degree of mutual disengagement. How may events then transpire? Under current (but recent) policies it seems likely that there will be a major and high-priority program to rearm, retrain, improve the leadership and otherwise upgrade the military and police forces of South Viet Nam. If we systematically use joint operations to retrain, test, evaluate and then correct weaknesses of the South Vietnamese forces, I believe that the result, even before the end of 1968, could be more thorough and effective than even the most friendly observers now believe. By making U.S. operations "leaner," and by transferring various responsibilities to the South Vietnamese in both combat and support, it should also be possible to begin withdrawals of American troops in January 1969 or soon afterwards; something like five to ten thousand men a month would be a reasonable rate to aim for. If for political and tactical purposes these figures were used as a lower and upper limit, it would put useful pressure on both the South Vietnamese and American authorities in Viet Nam

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without creating big risks. Of course, we would have to hedge against a major escalation by the North or an ineffective effort to upgrade the military.

It is quite conceivable that, if the competence of the GVN military and police can be increased, and if this can be accompanied by extremely rapid economic growth,[3] the authority of the South Vietnamese Government and its international standing would be so enhanced that both defeat and sellout would soon become impossible. This rough picture is not necessarily a completely accurate or even a likely prognosis of what will happen. It ignores many current problems and faults and many possible future difficulties and weaknesses. It is, however, as plausible as the more usual assumptions of "a hopeless morass" or "more of the same."

Certainly this is true if the United States itself improves its tactics, operations and programs in ways that are now reasonably clear to a large consensus of professionals, and if less of a "business-as-usual" attitude prevails in Saigon and Washington. Among the requirements are: longer tours of duty, at least for officers; accelerated promotions such as occurred in Korea and both World Wars; greater willingness to patrol, ambush and to fight at night; more effective intelligence collection and use; more widespread adoption of tactics which have been proven effective in particular units; and, most important of all, a more intelligent and selective intervention in the affairs of South Viet Nam. Equal in importance to these military and administrative changes is a much better formulation of our goals, strategy and techniques so that we ourselves understand what we are doing and the world gets a sense of competence and assurance on our part. In addition, we should reform some of our practices to meet higher standards than the usual rules and customs of warfare call for—particularly with regard to civilian damage.

Some will argue that the Saigon Government is too unstable and lacking in broad support to make these proposals practicable. The danger of collapse of popular support for the Government is probably less real than the possibility of renewed rivalry between Thieu and Ky resulting in some kind of coup or other illegality. It is also possible that Thieu and Ky at some point might attempt to assume an even greater degree of control over the

[3] Recent studies indicate that this could be achieved even during hostilities if something like 1967 levels of security were reëstablished.

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army and administrative apparatus generally, touching off another military coup. For a long time, too, there will be a possibility that religious, ethnic or other rivalry may explode, the most obvious being an already organized independence movement among the Montagnards (FULRO) and such groups as the Hoa Hao and the politicized Buddhists.

The danger can be made more acute in two ways: by a strong feeling among the South Vietnamese that the Government is going to be betrayed by the Americans anyway and so one had better do something in a hurry; or by a lessening of the sense of peril which would remove the pressure for unity and coöperation.

Although it may be true that Viet Nam is almost ungovernable, yet at the moment it is one of the most democratic and constitutional nations in Southeast Asia—even under the stress of war. It will be doing well merely to hold this position. One could hardly complain if South Viet Nam sustained a government about as decent and competent as that in, say, Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand or the Philippines. Only a maniacally dedicated and disciplined group is likely to give it greater unity in the foreseeable future.

V

In sum, it is obviously of the utmost importance that the United States take great care in its conduct of negotiations and in the settlement it accepts. The following series of steps and expectations might be a reasonable program:

1. Honestly pursue negotiations with the hope of achieving some kind of "agonizing but reasonable compromise." If this succeeds the outcome is not a victory, nor is it a defeat.

2. Do not pursue negotiations to the point of accepting a dishonorable or humiliating defeat or withdrawal, or of disguising a sellout as something else.

3. Develop a clear and acceptable alternative to settlement, for otherwise we may be too weak in negotiation, or the other side may be too excessive in its demands, or we may not be able to maintain the confidence of the South Vietnamese.

4. Such an alternative should include:

(a) Much better formulation and exposition of our goals, strategies and tactics so that we ourselves understand what we are doing, the world understands and many existing myths and misconceptions are clarified.

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(b) Improved tactics, operations and programs including an explicit and plausible "theory of victory" and proper plans for implementing it. The necessary ideas already exist but have not been applied.

(c) Massive upgrading of the armed forces of South Viet Nam, including the police, so that a major portion of the effort can be transferred to the GVN and the hope held out of eventually transferring full responsibility.

(d) A conversion of the war to a "just war," in part by suitable limitations on our tactics and operations, in part by adopting a reasonable theory of victory and a long-range program of economic and political development; and the clear exposition of all this to the international public.

5. Plan to reduce U.S. forces in the next two or three years to between two and three hundred thousand men.

6. Gradually shift greater responsibility to the GVN, while we ourselves display a greater willingness to risk heavy casualties for substantial gains.

7. The Viet Cong infrastructure is gradually destroyed and its recruitment ability greatly reduced, thus reducing Hanoi's capacity to fight in the South.

8. With air, artillery and logistic support by the United States, the South Vietnamese develop the capacity to cope with the declining level of hostilities.

9. Either the war peters out or there are renewed and successful negotiations. To deter a resumption of major hostilities, the United States stations two or three divisions in South Viet Nam for a considerable period.

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THE BASES OF ACCOMMODATION

By Samuel P. Huntington

A VIABLE political settlement in South Viet Nam will reflect and give some legitimacy to the balance of political, military and social forces produced by a decade of internal conflict and five years of large-scale warfare. A successful settlement can also inaugurate a process of political accommodation through which the various elements of Vietnamese society may eventually be brought together into a functioning polity. American objectives and American expectations of what can be achieved at the conference table and on the battlefield should, correspondingly, be based on the realities of power and the opportunities for accommodation.

Much of the discussion of Viet Nam in the United States, however, has been couched in terms of stereotypes and slogans which have little relation to the political forces and social trends in Vietnamese society. Critics of the Administration often tend to glorify the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front and to magnify the extent of their support. They see the war as a popular uprising against a military-landlord oligarchy dependent upon foreign military support. Hence they see little need for, or basis for, accommodation: if the United States withdrew, it is held, the Saigon régime would quickly collapse, and a new, broadly representative government would come to power under the leadership of the NLF but drawing support from Buddhists, workers, students and other groups.

Spokesmen for the Administration, on the other hand, have in the past underrated the strength of the Viet Cong and have ascribed to the Saigon Government a popularity which had as little basis in fact as that which the critics attributed to the NLF. They have bolstered their case with statistics on kill rates, infiltration rates, *chieu hoi* (defection) rates, hamlet pacification categories and voting turnouts. These figures may be reasonably accurate but they are also often irrelevant to the conclusions which they are adduced to support. At times key figures in the Administration have made statements which at least *seemed* to predict the imminent collapse of the Viet Cong. The misplaced moralism of the critics has thus confronted the unwarranted optimism of the advocates.

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The realities of the situation in Viet Nam will not please the extremists on either side. If properly perceived and accepted, however, they may provide some basis for accommodation and an eventual compromise settlement. The military strengths and weaknesses of each side are manifest in each day's news reports and will no doubt shape the outcome of the negotiations. The success of that outcome, however, may well depend on the extent to which it reflects the political and social strengths and weaknesses of both sides. These are less obvious but more fundamental than the military factors.

II

The overall proportion of the population that is more under Government than Viet Cong control has risen rather strikingly in three years from a little over 40 percent of the total to 60 percent or more. This change, however, has been largely, if not exclusively, the result of the movement of the population into the cities rather than the extension of the Government's control into the countryside. The two most important facts which an accommodation will have to reflect are, first, the continuing role of the Viet Cong in the countryside and, second, the declining role of the countryside in South Viet Nam as a whole.

Viet Nam is a plural society, whose regional, ethnic and religious differences are now widely recognized. But there is another sense in which there are at least four South Viet Nams, each of them present in every geographical region and in almost every province. The first consists of the urban population, which is now perhaps 40 percent of the total and which lives under more or less continuing control by the Government. The other three South Viet Nams divide the rural population in approximately equal shares: the rural communal population, roughly 20 percent of the total, who belong to a religious or ethnic minority and who at present are aligned with the Saigon Government against the Viet Cong; the hard-core Viet Cong, again perhaps 20 percent of the total, who in some rural areas have lived under Viet Cong control for many years; and the remaining 20 percent, which constitutes the population of the most heavily and continuously contested rural areas.

These proportions are very rough and, moreover, they refer to population control, not political support. Discussion of Viet Nam often revolves about the question: "Whom do the majority

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of the people really support?" This is a reasonable and practical question to ask in a stable Western constitutional democracy. For Viet Nam, however, it is unanswerable and, in large part, irrelevant simply because it is quite clear that no government or political grouping has been able to win widespread popular support—or seems likely to do so. The most one can realistically speak of is the relative ability of the Government and the VC-NLF to exercise authority and to control population. And even here, as the allied sweeps through hard-core Viet Cong areas and the Tet offensive amply demonstrate, each side's authority is nowhere beyond at least temporary challenge by the other side. In addition, an underground Viet Cong organization presumably exists in many areas where Government authority is normally exercised.

The crucial characteristic of the heavily contested rural areas is the absence of effective social and political organization above the village level, if even there. The strength of the Viet Cong is its ability to fill this vacuum of authority; the weakness of the Government has been the failure of its pacification programs to generate self-sustaining local organizations.

It is often said that the war in Viet Nam is a "political" war, and that consequently winning the war requires the Government to appeal to "the hearts and minds of the people" by promoting rural development, land reform, education, official honesty and other specific and usually material benefits. In fact, however, there is little evidence to suggest that the appeal of the Viet Cong derives from material poverty or that it can be countered by material benefits. The one systematic study of this question, focusing on land tenure, indeed came to precisely the opposite conclusion. Government control was found to be greatest in those provinces in which "few peasants farm their own land, the distribution of landholdings is unequal, no land redistribution has taken place, large French landholdings existed in the past, population density is high, and the terrain is such that accessibility is poor."[1] This seemingly perverse product of statistical analysis is bolstered by other substantial if less systematic evidence for Viet Nam as well as by much experience elsewhere. The appeal of revolutionaries depends not on economic deprivation but on political deprivation, that is, on the absence of an effective structure of authority. Where the latter exists, even though it be quite

[1] Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," *World Politics*, April 1968, p. 438.

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hierarchical and undemocratic, the Viet Cong make little progress.

Since the late 1950s successive Saigon governments have attempted to meet this need by a variety of pacification programs. None of these has been successful, with the partial exception of the current program of "Revolutionary Development," which was interrupted by the Tet offensive. Governmental control can be produced either by a massive military and administrative presence or by effective local political organization. In the past, forces have been inadequate to provide a substantial presence in a significant portion of the countryside for a significant length of time. The current pacification effort was mounted on a scale which dwarfs the earlier ones, but like them it has attempted to achieve security by the extension into the countryside of the military and administrative apparatus of the Central Government. In some cases, the successes of pacification can be seen in quite striking fashion. Voter turnout in the 1967 presidential election as compared with the 1966 constituent assembly election increased by 50 percent in Binh Dinh province, 23 percent in Phu Yen, 22 percent in Hau Nghia and 20 percent in Binh Duong. These changes were undoubtedly the result of the strong pacification efforts made in those provinces.

Yet these same provinces also illustrate the limits of pacification. When military forces were withdrawn from Binh Dinh and Hau Nghia, security rapidly began to deteriorate. The fragility of the whole pacification effort was reflected by the extent of its at least temporary collapse during the Tet offensive, despite the fact that the offensive was directed at the cities rather than the pacification cadres. The acid test of pacification is whether a locality develops the will and the means to defend itself against Viet Cong attack or infiltration. With a few exceptions, mostly among the communal groups, the current pacification effort has not as yet met this test. In some cases, the intrusion of national governmental authority from the outside may undermine the authority of the local village leaders; when the agents of the national Government move on, they may leave the situation worse than it was before they arrived. In those instances, the Government prepares the way for the Viet Cong.

It thus seems unlikely that the current pacification program will significantly change the pattern of political control—or lack of control—in the contested areas in the immediate future. If a

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cease-fire led to reductions in either the Government's military-administrative presence or U.S. forces in these areas, the way would be opened for the Viet Cong to move in and extend its control through political means. The only practical alternative, available in some instances, would be for the authority vacuum to be filled by some other social-political group with roots in the locality.

The security of that one-third of the rural population which is under a relatively high degree of Government control is in large part the product of communal—ethnic or religious—organizations. It is commonly assumed that rural security is the product of identification with and loyalty to the Government, which, in turn, is the product of the extension of governmental presence into the villages. In much of South Viet Nam, however, the sequence has not been: governmental control, national loyalty, internal security. It has been, instead: communal organization, internal security, governmental control. The exercise of governmental authority has resulted from internal security produced by other factors. Governmental authority is, in fact, most effectively exercised in those rural areas where the Government has come to terms with the local power structure and with ethnic or religious groups.

The relationships between these communal groups and the Central Government have typically evolved through four phases. First, the group develops social and political consciousness. In due course, the evolution of the group produces a challenge to central authority and a confrontation between the group and the Central Government, as with the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao during the 1950s or the Montagnard uprisings against more recent governments. Defeat by the Central Government leads to the group's withdrawal from the national political scene. Finally, however, there is a renewal of ties and an accommodation is worked out. At present, all of the rural communal groups—Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Catholic, Khmer and Montagnard—have reached such accommodations with the existing system, stimulated no doubt by shared hostility toward the Viet Cong.

The relationship between communalism and governmental authority in South Viet Nam today is thus almost precisely the opposite of what it is in most other Southeast Asian countries. In Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and elsewhere the ethnic and religious minorities are the principal sources of opposition to the

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political system. In South Viet Nam, in contrast, the religious and ethnic minorities are centers of support for the system, and the relatively unorganized rural majority—the ethnic Vietnamese with Confucian, Buddhist and animist religious beliefs—is the principal source of alienation and disaffection.

Rural areas which have been continuously secure are those organized by religious or ethnic communities. The most secure province in South Viet Nam is An Giang, in which there have been no major U.S. or Government combat units. The security of An Giang results from the political control of the Hoa Hao. The Hoa Hao in the surrounding provinces have achieved similar areas of security, as have the Cambodians elsewhere in the Delta. Catholic and Cao Dai villages tend to be more scattered geographically and hence more vulnerable to attack. None the less, many isolated villages belonging to one of those faiths remain relatively secure in otherwise highly insecure areas, simply because the Viet Cong know that they will be tough nuts to crack.

The ethnic and religious communities have thus played a crucial role in extending Government control into rural areas. They have done this despite the suspicion and hostility of at least some elements in the Government. After a cease-fire, these are the principal groups which will be able to compete with the Viet Cong in the political organization of the peasantry.

The remaining third of the rural population lives in "hard-core" Viet Cong areas, some of which have been almost continuously under Viet Minh and Viet Cong control since the 1940s. They include the Camau peninsula, much of the Delta coast, the Plain of Reeds, War Zones "C" and "D" north and west of Saigon, and portions of Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai in the central part of the country. In some villages an entire generation has grown up under communist rule. In some of these areas the VC-NLF has been able to develop a well-organized structure of government at the village and even district level.

To eliminate Viet Cong control in these areas would be an expensive, time-consuming and frustrating task. It would require a much larger and more intense military and pacification effort than is currently contemplated by Saigon and Washington. Consequently, effective Viet Cong control of these areas is a political fact which does not seem likely to change for some while, if indeed it ever does. In a politically reintegrated South Viet Nam, there would probably be a fairly steady population drain from them

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into more prosperous rural and urban localities. The achievement of such political reintegration clearly will depend, however, upon the recognition and acceptance of Viet Cong control of local government in these areas. It is here that accommodation in the most specific sense of the word is a political necessity.

The most striking feature of these varied patterns of rural political control—contested, communal and Viet Cong—has been their resistance to change. The French, Diem, the post-Diem régimes, the Viet Minh and Viet Cong have all tried, without significant success, to produce permanent changes in them. The huge current pacification program has been another effort to bring about a *political* revolution in the relations between the Government and the countryside. It may succeed where the others have failed, but as yet there is no conclusive evidence of this. On the other hand, the massive American effort is producing a *social* revolution in the Vietnamese way of life which will be of far greater consequence to the future of the country.

III

The most dramatic and far-reaching impact of the war in South Viet Nam has been the tremendous shift in population from the countryside to the cities. In the early 1960s it was still accurate to speak of South Viet Nam as 80 to 85 percent rural. Today, no one knows for certain the size of the urban population, but it is undoubtedly more than double and perhaps triple what it was a few years ago. A reasonable current estimate of people in cities of 20,000 or more would be about 40 percent of the total, or 6,800,000 of a total of 17,200,000. By this standard South Viet Nam is now more urban than Sweden, Canada, the Soviet Union, Poland, Austria, Switzerland and Italy (according to early 1960s data). Apart from Singapore, it is easily the most urban country in Southeast Asia. The image of South Viet Nam as a country composed largely of landlords and peasants—an image still prevalent among many Vietnamese intellectuals who continue to quote the 85 percent rural figure—has little relationship to reality.

The movement of people into the cities during the past four years is a nationwide phenomenon. In 1962 Saigon's population was estimated at 1,400,000. Today it is at least twice that, and the population of the Saigon metropolitan area is probably about 4,000,000, more than 20 percent of the entire country. The increases in population of cities like Danang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon,

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Pleiku, Kontum and Ban Me Thuot have been even more spectacular. Smaller cities and towns have also had extraordinary growth rates, with many provincial capitals doubling or tripling their population in two or three years.

The principal reason for this massive influx of population into the urban areas is, of course, the intensification of the war following the commitment of American combat troops in 1965. About 1,500,000 of the total increase in urban population is accounted for by refugees, half still in refugee camps and others settled in new areas. At least an equal number of people have moved into the cities without passing through refugee camps. The social costs of this change have been dramatic and often heartrending. The conditions in the refugee camps, particularly in I Corps, have at times been horrendous, although some significant improvements are now taking place. Urban welfare and developmental programs require increasing priority from the United States and Vietnamese Governments.

The immediate economic effects of urbanization are somewhat more mixed. Those who were well-off in the countryside often suffer serious losses in the move to the city. The rural poor, on the other hand, may well find life in the city more attractive and comfortable than their previous existence in the countryside. The urban slum, which seems so horrible to middle-class Americans, often becomes for the poor peasant a gateway to a new and better way of life. For some poor migrants, the wartime urban boom has made possible incomes five times those which they had in the countryside. In one Saigon slum, Xom Chua, in early 1965 before the American build-up, the people lived at a depressed level, with 33 percent of the adult males unemployed. Eighteen months later, as a result of the military escalation, the total population of the slum had increased by 30 percent, but the unemployment rate had dropped to 5 percent and average incomes had doubled.[2] In several cases urban refugees from the war refused to return to their villages once security was restored because of the higher level of economic well-being which they could attain in the city. The pull of urban prosperity has been a secondary but not insignificant factor in attracting people into the city.

In the long run urbanization will create major political prob-

[2] Marilyn W. Hoskins and Eleanor M. Shepherd, "Life in a Vietnamese Urban Quarter," Carbondale, Ill.: The Graduate School, Southern Illinois University, 1965, (updated in 1966 as a U.S. AID memorandum).

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lems. Typically, the second generation—the children of the slums, not the migrants to the slums—provides participants for urban riots and insurrections. After the war, massive government programs will be required either to resettle migrants in rural areas or to rebuild the cities and promote peacetime urban employment. In the meantime, while the war continues, urbanization is significantly altering the balance of power between the Saigon Government and the Viet Cong.

More than anything else urbanization has been responsible for the striking increase in the proportion of the population living under Government control between 1964 and 1968. The depopulation of the countryside struck directly at the strength and potential appeal of the Viet Cong. For ten years the Viet Cong had waged a rural revolution against the Central Government, with the good Maoist expectation that by winning the support of the rural population it could eventually isolate and overwhelm the cities. The "first outstanding feature . . . of People's Revolutionary War, as developed by Mao Tse-tung and refined by the North Vietnamese in the two Indochina wars," Sir Robert Thompson argued in a recent issue of this journal, "is its immunity to the direct application of mechanical and conventional power."[8] In the light of recent events, this statement needs to be seriously qualified. For if the "direct application of mechanical and conventional power" takes place on such a massive scale as to produce a massive migration from countryside to city, the basic assumptions underlying the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war no longer operate. The Maoist-inspired rural revolution is undercut by the American-sponsored urban revolution.

The full significance of the Tet offensive becomes clear against this background. This attack on the cities, like the subsequent attacks in May, was less of an offensive than it was a counter-offensive against the fundamental social change taking place in Vietnamese society. The war in Viet Nam is a war for the control of the population. If the Viet Cong are to compete effectively with the Government, they must be able to assert their power in the cities. If they can assert their control over the newly urbanized population in the cities as easily as they were able to assert their control over the rural population and win their support in the countryside, the movement of population will have been only a Trojan horse.

[8] Sir Robert Thompson, "Squaring the Error," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1968, p. 447.

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The Tet offensive produced several clear gains for the Viet Cong in Viet Nam, apart from the impact abroad. For the first time they significantly disrupted, albeit very temporarily in all cities but Hue, the security of the urban population, thus diminishing the principal attraction of the city to the country dwellers. With a decline in the differences in the sense of security provided by city and countryside, there may well be a decline in the rate of movement from one to the other. Secondly, before Tet relatively few military forces were committed primarily to urban defense. Most Vietnamese cities were virtually open cities with traffic moving in and out of them freely. The Viet Cong have now compelled the redeployment of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces from other tasks, such as rural pacification, to city protection. Thirdly, the Viet Cong cut many of the transportation and communication routes into the cities in an apparent effort to isolate urban areas from each other and from the surrounding countryside. The most notable action here concerned road and water communication routes between the relatively secure areas of the Delta and Saigon. The weeks following the offensive saw a sharp drop in the previous level of supplies moving over these routes. This caused some economic dislocation in both the farm areas and the cities, but not of either a prolonged or highly threatening character.

These were significant achievements for the Viet Cong, and their impact was notably heightened by their surprise. The real test of their urban offensive, however, is whether they can mobilize and organize sufficient popular support in the cities to substitute their authority for that of the Government. To invade the cities by stealth or by frontal assault is a relatively easy task. To seize and hold urban areas is something else again. It is reasonably clear that this was an objective of the Tet offensive. Viet Cong units moving in from the countryside appealed for a "general uprising" of the urban populace and brought with them the political cadres to set up block committees and a political structure in urban areas. In several cities such as Pleiku and Nha Trang the Viet Cong infrastructure within the city surfaced and was substantially destroyed.

No general uprising took place, however, and the invaders were quickly driven out of all cities except Hue. In several cities the people, in spontaneous and unprecedented fashion, organized themselves to defend their neighborhoods against the Viet Cong.

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In Hoi An (capital of Quang Nam province) the overwhelming majority of the students in the local high school rallied to the Government, requested arms to fight the enemy and helped to capture most of the Viet Cong cadre which had entered the city expecting to set up its own administration. Similar responses by students, labor-union members and civil servants elsewhere produced a rallying of support for the Government which had not been equalled since the early days of the Diem régime. The weak spot was not in the people's lack of hostility toward the Viet Cong but in the suspicion of many Government officials toward the people.

In the past the Viet Cong could expect to win the war simply by preventing Saigon from extending its control in the rural areas. This the Viet Cong can still do but it is no longer sufficient to achieve victory. Increasingly the Viet Cong must also demonstrate their ability to win support and to exercise authority in the cities. So far, they have been even less successful in these efforts than the Government has been in winning support in the countryside. In this sense, history—drastically and brutally speeded up by the American impact—may pass the Viet Cong by. Societies are susceptible to revolution only at particular stages in their development. At the moment the rates of urbanization and of modernization in the secure rural areas exceed the rate of increase in Viet Cong strength. At a time when the South Vietnamese Army is beginning to show signs of being able to operate on its own, the Viet Cong are becoming increasingly dependent on North Viet Nam for manpower as well as supplies. A movement which once had the potential for developing into a truly comprehensive revolutionary force with an appeal to both rural and urban groups could now degenerate into the protest of a declining rural minority increasingly dependent upon outside support.

In an absent-minded way the United States in Viet Nam may well have stumbled upon the answer to "wars of national liberation." The effective response lies neither in the quest for conventional military victory nor in the esoteric doctrines and gimmicks of counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country in question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power.

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Time in South Viet Nam is increasingly on the side of the Government. But in the short run, with half the population still in the countryside, the Viet Cong will remain a powerful force which cannot be dislodged from its constituency so long as the constituency continues to exist. Peace in the immediate future must hence be based on accommodation.

IV

During the past three years the pattern of the military conflict has been largely determined in Hanoi and Washington, which are also playing the dominant role in negotiations. The stability of the political settlement which eventually results in South Viet Nam, however, will depend primarily upon the extent to which it reflects the social and political forces within that country rather than on external influences, either military or diplomatic. Hence, there is good reason to encourage the early inauguration of a political process within South Viet Nam in which all significant political groups can participate and to allow that process rather than a diplomatic conference to have the lion's share in determining the future of the country.

It is often argued that this process should begin with the creation of a coalition government. There are, however, many disadvantages to such an approach. Neither the NLF nor Saigon wants a coalition with the other, and it is difficult to envision how the existing leaderships could work together. From the viewpoint of the Government such an arrangement would, as one moderate Vietnamese leader put it, simply allow "the wolves into the chicken pen." More specifically it would surrender to the Viet Cong a major share in the exercise of authority in urban areas, which is precisely what they have been unable to win through military means.

Conversely, it would be difficult for the NLF to enter into association with a group of men whom it has repeatedly denounced as puppets and traitors. Even if external pressure from the United States, Hanoi and the Soviet Union produced something in Saigon which could be labeled a "coalition government," it clearly would not be a coalition government in fact. A "coalition" implies sustained coöperation between autonomous groups. If there was a reasonable balance of power within the Government, however, it would be a government divided against itself, a temporary expedient which neither side would expect to endure; each

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side would be busily organizing its military and political forces for the final showdown. Alternatively, pressure from Moscow and Hanoi plus impatience in Washington might lead to a coalition weighted on the side of the communists. In this case, the "coalition" would not only be temporary, it would be a sham, with the political outcome a foreordained conclusion.

The rural-urban division of the country and the mixed pattern of political control in rural areas suggests that the process of political accommodation should start at the bottom and work up rather than the reverse. Some forms of local accommodation have, of course, existed for some time in parts of the country, particularly in the Delta. Most frequently they have involved "live-and-let-live" arrangements among local military commanders. To some extent they have also involved mutual tolerance of each other's revenue-raising activities. On the Government side, the weakness of its forces and the natural desire to remain in the towns and avoid the efforts and dangers of combat have provided incentives to accept these arrangements, while for the Viet Cong it has been a general war-weariness among local cadres, especially in the Delta. To expand these local accommodations substantively and geographically will entail many difficulties. None the less, this is the way to start a political process which will reflect the actual balance of forces within the society.

In some respects this pattern of accommodation would not be very different from that worked out between Saigon and the Hoa Hao. It would mean that the Viet Cong would as effectively dominate its hard-core areas as the Hoa Hao and Catholic organizations do in their villages and districts. To be sure, the indigenous Viet Cong clearly differs in important respects from the religious sects and the nationalist parties, but it also shares many characteristics with them. Up to a point, the evolution of relations between the Viet Cong and the established political system paralleled that of the sects and other parties. Like them, the Viet Minh developed organizational and political consciousness in the 1930s; it then came into conflict with the French and their puppet authorities; after 1954 it in effect withdrew and, like the other sects and parties, went underground during the period when Diem was attempting to centralize authority and eliminate local centers of power.

Unlike the other parties and sects, however, the Viet Cong began in the late 1950s to receive significant reinforcements in the

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form of returnees and supplies from North Viet Nam. Consequently, at that point the Viet Cong broke the pattern of evolution which it had shared with the other groups—consciousness, confrontation, withdrawal—and instead instituted a renewed period of confrontation. After 1963 the other groups reached varying degrees of accommodation with the Government while the confrontation between the Government and the Viet Cong intensified. Yet it is not unreasonable to assume that when it becomes clear that this confrontation cannot succeed, the indigenous Viet Cong will again move into a phase of withdrawal, which conceivably could then be followed by accommodation and incorporation into a restructured and expanded political system.

Initially, the practical needs for and benefits from accommodation are likely to be greater at the local than at the national level. Differing patterns of control will be possible in different areas, and concessions in one area can be traded for comparable concessions in other areas. If the cease-fire arrangements divide the country into military zones of control, political control in a village will in most cases be determined by the zone in which it is located. A large number of districts and the majority of provinces, however, will undoubtedly be divided between zones. At these levels, consequently, the functioning of government will require some coöperation between, and eventual integration of, local NLF and Saigon governmental structures. One means of accomplishing this would be to elect province chiefs and/or enlarged and strengthened provincial councils. Elections at the provincial level are likely to encourage political candidates and groups to appeal to both rural and urban voters and to promote coöperation among non-communist groups. They would give the VC-NLF the legitimate opportunity to enter the political process and to demonstrate their ability to win power at the grass-roots level. Provincial elections could also be suitably staggered so as to permit more effective supervision by outside observers and international bodies.

If accommodation worked in a majority of provinces, the way would be opened for its extension to the national Government. The next step would be the election of a new constituent assembly, perhaps in part by universal suffrage and in part by the provincial councils, to devise new basic laws and choose a new Central Government. If as a result of this process the VC-NLF secured control of the Central Government, the United States would

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obviously regret the outcome but could also accept it and feel under little compulsion to re-intervene.

In the interests of promoting widespread access to the Government and accommodation among groups, it would be wise for the constituent assembly to shift some authority from the Central Government to provincial and local governments. Centralization of authority in the national Government simply complicates the problem of accommodating Viet Cong and noncommunist forces. If all power resides in the Central Government, the struggle for control is all the more intense; coöperation becomes nearly impossible. Political integration from the bottom up will facilitate the loosening up of the political structure, and the loosening of the political structure will at the same time promote political accommodation, particularly at the national level.

Any suggestion for greater decentralization of authority in Viet Nam is always met with the charge that it will encourage "wardlordism," to which a strong Central Government is the only antidote. In actuality, however, as the earlier history of China, Viet Nam and even Western Europe amply demonstrates, warlordism is the product not of efforts to provide a structured decentralized authority, but rather of efforts to maintain a narrowly based, centralized authority where it is inappropriate to the situation. Warlordism is the illegal, disruptive and violent way in which a centralized system is adapted to the realities of dispersed power. Warlordism is the alternative to the formal decentralization of authority, not a product of it.

In the recent past, the French, Bao Dai, Diem, each in different ways, attempted to perpetuate centralized authority, and in every case they weakened it. To strengthen political authority, it is instead necessary to decentralize it, to extend the scope of the political system and to incorporate more effectively into it the large number of groups which have become politically organized and politically conscious in recent years. Such a system might be labeled federal, confederal, pluralistic, decentralized—but, whatever the label, it would reflect the varied sources of political power. In the recognition of and acceptance of that diversity lies the hope for political stability in Viet Nam.

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ONE THING WE LEARNED

By Bill D. Moyers

WHATEVER else we may say of the dissent to the war in Viet Nam, it has effectively reminded us that we are still a democracy. Some may demur that we did not need to be reminded so noisily, but the fact remains: so many Americans turned from indifference or passive skepticism to outright opposition that the policy had to be changed. There comes a time, in foreign affairs as in domestic policies, when "the people" will be heard.

The tradition of dissent, of course, has been upheld by those who were its targets as well as by those who, not always with the best of manners, exercised their right to be heard. Even when they would not publicly admit it, or admitted it grudgingly, most of the top officials I knew in Washington agreed with Woodrow Wilson's assertion: "We do not need less criticism in time of war, but more. It is to be hoped that the critics will be constructive, but better unfair criticism than autocratic suppression."

The preoccupation with the tradition of dissent, however, obscured another basic tradition of U.S. foreign policy, whose neglect has done more to turn public opinion against the war than any other factor. I mean the tradition of *consent*. Our system assumes a sense of participation by the people in the making of critical national decisions. When that sense of involvement is absent, when the public feels excluded from the judgments that are made in its name, a policy is doomed from inception, no matter how theoretically valid it may be.

There is a continuing tension in American democracy between the "will of the people" and the judgment of their chosen representatives. It was brought home to me during the week of crisis surrounding the march on Selma, Alabama, in 1965, as the President and his advisers met in the Cabinet Room to discuss alternative courses of Federal action. At a particularly exasperating moment, when no option appeared likely to succeed, one man exclaimed wearily: "If we only knew what the people of this country really wanted us to do about civil rights. . . ." The President studied his adviser for thirty seconds, then answered: "If we knew what they wanted us to do, how could you be sure that we should do it?"

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Presidents feel this tension acutely, for they are not only politicians responsive *to* the people, but chief executives and commanders-in-chief responsible *for* the people. They know, often too well for their own peace of mind, that the people may not know best, that democracy can become, in Oscar Wilde's words, "the bludgeoning of the people by the people for the people."

Presidents also know first-hand the frustrations of trying to divine public opinion toward foreign policy. For one thing, they realize that many people have more opinions than facts, and that the less some men know, the louder they shout. Americans are capable of a very high noise factor, especially when they take passionate feelings for pertinent information.

It is fashionable today to claim that we are better informed about foreign policy than ever before. No doubt that is true, but we ought not to assume that because we are better informed we are also well informed. Alas, we are not. At the White House, for example, we were impressed and discouraged by reliable studies which indicated how poorly informed many Americans really are.

One study by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, made for the Council on Foreign Relations,[1] revealed that one-fourth of the respondents were not aware that Mainland China was ruled by a communist government. A Gallup poll in 1964 revealed that two-thirds of the American people had paid little or no attention to developments in South Viet Nam, although the United States had been involved there for ten years. It is small wonder, then, that it took almost two years for a majority of people to know and react demonstrably to what was happening there.

These surveys are not isolated studies. They are substantiated in other examinations of public opinion by such serious students of American attitudes as Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril. Their recent study[2] is a thorough and illuminating analysis of the fundamental assumptions underlying the way Americans react to specific issues. I do not recommend it for those who believe that anyone can grow up to be Secretary of State. In one survey, for example, one in four respondents had never heard or read of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and only 58 percent knew that Russia was not a member. These and other findings led Free

[1] A. T. Steele, "American People and China." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

[2] Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, "The Political Beliefs of Americans." New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967.

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and Cantril to conclude that two-fifths of the American people appear to have too little information about international matters to play an intelligent role as citizens of a nation fully engaged as the major power in the world.

Public ignorance is not the only handicap a President must overcome in trying to determine what people will accept or support in foreign policy. Public opinion, as every President has learned, is a highly variable quantity.

President Truman discovered this during the Korean War. Two months after the commitment of American troops, 65 percent of the people interviewed in a Gallup poll said the United States had not made a mistake. Six months later, only 38 percent said we had not erred. By July 1951, not quite a year later, a majority of Americans wanted a truce under any circumstances. The undulating nature of public opinion was not lost on Lyndon Johnson. In December 1965, when Lou Harris reported that the "overwhelming majority of the American people—71 percent—are prepared to continue the fighting in Viet Nam until the United States can negotiate a settlement on its own terms," the President remarked to his associates: "An overwhelming majority . . . for an underwhelming period of time . . . wait and see." The wait was relatively brief. In March 1968, 49 percent of the people interviewed in a Gallup poll would say the United States had made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Viet Nam—a percentage that had steadily risen from 25 percent in March 1966. Seven in ten doves thought we were wrong to have become involved in Viet Nam, a Gallup poll reported, but, perhaps more surprisingly, four in ten hawks did so as well.

We were also aware that public opinion, in addition to being highly variable, is replete with incongruities. The example I most vividly recall concerned the attitudes of young people toward the war in Viet Nam. Samuel Lubell reported in 1965 that our policy there was supported by three out of four college students in New York State. Free and Cantril discovered in the same year that it was the young who most favored stepping up the war. Yet, as we have all seen, the core of the Viet Nam protest movement has been on college campuses. The age-group which provided the original escalation with its strongest support has also provided the most articulate and belligerent opponents to the war.

The phenomenon President Johnson has faced, of course, is that most Americans are both hawk *and* dove, a situation which has

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made the incongruities of public opinion all the more deceiving. Various profiles of public opinion, the most notable by Seymour Lipset,[3] have emphasized this aspect of American attitudes. Sixty percent of the people in one poll expressed opposition to bombing large cities in North Viet Nam, but 61 percent said they were for bombing industrial plants and factories. Three out of five, in other words, were for bombing but they were not for bombing cities. At first blush this seems to be inconsistent, but what it meant, as Lipset concluded, was that Americans wanted the war to end as soon as possible, even if escalation was the way to do it. This explains why the President's standing in the polls increased sharply after he ordered a bombing pause in late 1965 *and* after he ordered the resumption of bombing when the pause did not produce negotiations.

In a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, 84 percent of the respondents favored American negotiations with the Viet Cong if they were willing to negotiate, and a majority of 52 percent were willing to approve forming a new government in which the Viet Cong took part. But the same sample of respondents who were for compromise turned hawkish when asked: "If President Johnson were to withdraw from Viet Nam and let the communists take over, would you approve or disapprove?" There were 81 percent who disapproved, and 56 percent would not even agree to withdrawing our troops gradually and letting the South Vietnamese work out their own problems.

There is an explanation for this seeming contradiction, a hangover, no doubt, from the harsher ideological clashes of the 1950s. It is that "communism" as a word still triggers an almost visceral response in a majority of people. The better-informed public is aware of the growing divisions and dissimilarities within the communist world, but, as we saw earlier, most Americans are not *well* informed. For many, "communism" is an intelligible abstraction that subsumes much complexity. I remember one poll in which people were asked if they thought communists were deeply involved in civil-rights demonstrations. Of the people with college education 37 percent said yes, against 48 percent of the high school graduates and 54 percent of the grade school graduates.

What is the practical implication at the moment of this residual animosity to and concern about communism? It is what a scien-

[3] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Doves, Hawks and Polls," *Encounter*, October 1966, p. 39.

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tific study of public opinion reveals in depth—that most Americans want peace in Viet Nam, are prepared to accept some degree of compromise with the enemy, but will not accept an end result which is a conclusive victory for communism. Their objective is peace without the expansion of communism, a goal that scarcely lessens the difficulty of the talks in Paris. Every President learns to live with this ambivalence in public opinion. He knows that in his constituency are numberless legions of people who share the attitude of one respondent to a poll: "My hope is for peace in the world—and if not that, the complete destruction of both Russia and China."

II

So much for the tension between public opinion and public officials. It should be obvious that a President faces no quest more difficult than the search for an accurate reading of how far and how fast he can lead the people. As difficult as the task is, he must try. He must try because there are questions on which governments dare not act without evidence of genuine support. When policies and laws outdistance public opinion, or take public opinion for granted, or fail to command respect in the conscience of the people, they lose their "natural" legitimacy.

As with any rootless condition, the democratic experience then becomes infected with malaise. People feel estranged from their government, seemingly powerless to alter the way things are. They may challenge policy, usually in demonstrations, but their chances of changing policy are slim. Their impotence leads either to numbed apathy or, more dangerously, to outright hostility.

This is what happened over the last twenty-four months in this country as opposition to the war in Viet Nam swelled to an overpowering crescendo. It did not happen, in my opinion, primarily because some people thought the war immoral, and some thought it illegal and some thought it simply unwinnable at an acceptable cost. I think it happened because a majority of people believed the war undemocratic—waged in violation of the tradition of consent which is fundamental to the effective conduct of foreign policy in a free society. The war was begun, enlarged and is still being waged without a clear declaration of support by a majority of the American people. I do not suggest that a war can be justified merely because it enjoys majority support, but I am sure that in this day of mass and immediate communications it is im-

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possible to sustain successfully even a justified war to which people have not given their consent. Viet Nam has proven that good intentions on the part of a nation's leaders will not substitute for the conscious involvement of the people in the decision to go to war.

What happened to permit this war to grow to such consuming proportions without involving the people in an act of support? For one thing, what Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., called "the humane presuppositions of democracy" were at work in the beginning of this war just as they were in similar undeclared wars in the past. These humane presuppositions "tend to make both political leaders and people blink away the possibility of armed strife in the abiding hope that reason and mutual concession will prevail."[4]

American officials did expect reason and mutual concessions to prevail in 1964 and 1965, and they did not believe it would be wise to ask the public for a declaration of support for a war that did not at the moment seem inevitable. They believed that Hanoi would listen to reason, or be frightened off by the flexing of our muscles, or be tempted to share in the lucrative rewards of economic coöperation if war were averted. None of these hopes materialized, of course, but by that time we had edged into a major war on the mainland of Asia without fully alerting the American people to its potential dimensions and without seeking their direct consent.

War is clearly one of those questions on which a government—a democratic government—dare not act without evidence of genuine support. In this case, that support was not deliberately withheld—it simply was not sought. And it was not sought because few if any officials anticipated the war would ever reach the proportions that would require a declaration.

Closely related to this judgment is the other condition that permitted so wide a gap to separate public opinion from public policy—the persistent failure of American officials, in most of the wars we have fought, to prepare the public mind for the ordeal or to clarify in advance the issues of principle. One reason for this is the natural official penchant for secrecy. People are willing to go along with the withholding of information when national security is involved. But the moment secrecy is perceived as secretiveness there is likely to be an emotional reaction of intolerance.

[4] Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Paths To The Present," New York: Macmillan, 1949.

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There is also a natural tendency for people in positions of high administrative responsibility to develop great confidence in their own judgments. They feel more competent than others to survey situations and make the right judgments. This, of course, is their job. But when the public is involved, officials fail to realize that this confidence must be communicated with more than an announced decision. A chief executive cannot expect people to have confidence in his judgment simply because it is his. He must indicate what are some of the major considerations he has taken into account so that people will know that what he has decided is both the right and effective policy to pursue. The people will allow a President significantly more latitude with respect to means than to ends, but he must make them feel a part of his decision and a partner in the policy.

Winston Churchill, who had in 1909 defined democracy as "the occasional necessity of deferring to the opinions of other people," understood this as few wartime leaders have. He believed that people should be involved. When events turned, he went to the people to explain what had occurred and why. He was careful and patient to explain rather than simply to announce his policies, insisting that people not only pass upon the decisions through their elected representatives but that they take their share of the responsibility.

American leaders, on the other hand, are not in the habit of explaining themselves. As Walter Lippmann has said, "They announce, they proclaim, they declare, they exhort, they appeal, and they argue. But they do not unbend and tell the story, and say what they did, and what they think about it, and how they feel about it. Thus the general atmosphere is secretive and standoffish, which certainly does not warm the heart in time of trouble."

I think these words describe the inhibitions on dialogue and participation—the twin elements of consent—that caused some earlier wars to be as unpopular and as divisive as Viet Nam. The War of 1812 barely won the support of Congress—the resolution passed by a majority of but three to two of the entire membership—and even then was denounced by the Massachusetts Senate as "founded in falsehood" and "declared without necessity." In 1844 James K. Polk precipitated war by marching troops into territory claimed by both sides and announcing arbitrarily that the Mexicans had started the conflict. "War exists," he informed Congress, "and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists

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by the act of Mexico itself." The opposition was bitter, and after two years the House resolved by a vote of 85 to 81 that the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States."

It may appear from our Viet Nam dilemma that we learned little from those earlier experiences about the necessity of consent. I am more hopeful. The reaction to the war has been so fierce and sustained that I cannot see future decisions involving similar consequences being made without asking the people to share more fully in the responsibility. The day has passed, I believe, when the "functional equivalent of a declaration of war" will be tolerated after the fact. The foreign policies of our government must be squared with the long tradition written by John Adams into the Proclamation adopted by the Council of Massachusetts Bay in 1774: "As the happiness of the people is the sole end of government, so the consent of the people is the only foundation of it, in reason, morality, and the natural fitness of things."

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KEEPING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

By Carl Kaysen

THE Soviet Union and the United States are rival superpowers not simply because of their wealth, numbers, size, geographical position, social cohesion, strong government, but because they have translated these potentialities into overwhelmingly strong military forces which, measured on any historic or current standard, are comparable only with each other. For nearly fifteen years, the central strength of these forces has been their respective long-range strategic striking arms, each designed to be capable of a large-scale attack with nuclear weapons on the home territory of the other. Over the past decade, more or less, each nation has become increasingly aware that the chief utility of his strategic force was to prevent his adversary from using his own. This result was achieved primarily by offering the adversary the prospect that any attack by his strategic forces would be met by a counterblow so devastating as to convert a decision to attack into a suicide pact. So the strategic equilibrium commonly termed "mutual deterrence" was recognized.

For our (or the Soviets') strategic forces to provide effective deterrence, they must be in such numbers, of such nature and so deployed as to be capable of delivering the required counterattack *after* the other side has struck; thus effective deterrence is measured by the usable strength of the survivable second-strike force. We were perhaps earlier than the Soviets in recognizing this, but we were far from perceiving it from the first. Once we recognized the need, we sought survivable forces in different ways as technological possibilities changed over the period. Increase in the size of the force, geographical dispersal to increase the number of targets presented by a given force, active defense, hardening to survive attack, warning and movement capability to take advantage of warning, all played a part in the quest for a secure second-strike force. If surviving forces are to be usable, equally essential requirements are imposed for ensuring the survival of a complex network of reporting and communication facilities, command organization and commanders, all of which occasion their own technical and organizational problems. With missiles having displaced aircraft as the most important com-

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ponent of the second-strike force for both sides, hardening to ensure survival through an attack, combined with concealment and mobility for the sea-based portion of our force, provide our main means of ensuring survivability. The Soviets, with—at this moment—smaller and less effective seaborne forces, rely more heavily on hardening.

Strong and survivable long-range striking forces provide each superpower with something more in relation to the other than deterrence against direct nuclear attack, though the precise specification of the extra effect is difficult. First, they provide a substantial incentive for each nation to refrain from initiating any military action against the other, lest the conditions under which rational calculation can be expected to dominate decision and action disappear in one or both. These incentives become stronger the larger the forces and interests involved, thus leading to a kind of built-in brake on the growth of military incidents in situations where the military forces of the superpowers face each other directly, or could readily do so in their worldwide movements. By extension, the same incentives operate with respect to political confrontations that might in turn lead to military action, but more weakly the more remote the military steps appear to be in the chain of potential actions and reactions. Together these effects add up to a kind of indirect or second-order deterrence, which could tend to stabilize the behavior of the two superpowers in relation to each other over a wide range of actions, and deter unilateral attempts by either to change the status quo forcibly or suddenly. This might be called the self-deterrent effect of strategic nuclear forces.

However, the history of the last two decades makes the strength, steadiness and symmetry with which these incentives have operated questionable, and emphasizes their relation to broader military and political contexts. In the earlier part of the period, the Soviets seem to have acted at a higher margin of risk than the United States; more recently, the reverse appears to be true. These changes are not the simple consequence of shifts in the balance of strategic forces; on the contrary, any shift has probably moved steadily against the United States over most of this period. This is not the place to discuss the reasons for these apparent shifts in behavior, but they do illustrate the problems of delimiting the reach of the broader deterrent effects of nuclear striking forces.

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In analyzing the concept of effective deterrence and trying to understand on what relation of forces it depends, it is conventional and useful to examine it in the context of a spectrum of possible strategic purposes and the striking forces appropriate to them, that stretches from what might be termed a credible first strike at one end to a minimum deterrent at the other. A first-strike force would be one whose size, reliability, accuracy, control arrangements, etc., were such, in relation to the adversary's forces, as to make possible an attack that would, with a high degree of assurance, destroy essentially all of the adversary's force and still leave the attacker a substantial unspent reserve force. In this context, the sense of "essentially all" of the adversary's force is that whatever residual might escape destruction could not inflict major damage on the attacker or prevent his reserve force from being used to a very substantial extent. For a first strike to be further characterized as "credible," the relation of forces described above would have to be clearly perceived by both adversaries, and the "high degree" of assurance involved might have to be set at 99 percent or more. In such circumstances, it is just conceivable that the superior adversary could use this power for what has been termed "compellance," as opposed to deterrence: the threat of a strike used as a means of compelling specified behavior by the adversary. Just after the Second World War, when the United States still had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and expected to maintain it, there were some who argued in favor of policies based on "compellance." Whatever the wisdom of the policies, the forces then at our command were never such as to provide that power in relation to the Soviets; it is doubtful if there ever was a moment when they were; and it is as certain as any judgment in these matters can be that we cannot now or in the foreseeable future achieve it.

At the other end of the spectrum, a minimum deterrent force would be one which would provide high assurance of the survival, for use in a second strike, of an effective, usable force large enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary, defined in terms of some absolute level of expected casualties, urban and industrial destruction, etc.

Since 1961, under the guidance of Secretary McNamara, our strategic forces have been programed in terms of deterrence-plus. We have never sought a first strike-capacity, and indeed from his first budget message, the Secretary denied both the pos-

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sibility and desirability of attaining one: secure Soviet striking capacity was and would be maintained at a high enough level to make a U.S. first strike irrational. But, in the first two full budgets of the Kennedy Administration—which laid down guidelines governing the size of the strategic striking forces that are still in effect today—the programed missile and long-range bomber forces were larger in relation to projected Soviet forces than would have been required for minimum deterrence alone, even allowing for a generous margin of uncertainty on the growth of Soviet forces, their effectiveness and the post-attack performance of our own programed forces. The margin over deterrence was justified in terms of the idea of "damage limitation," should deterrence fail—a contingency that could not be ignored. Should sufficient warning of preparations for a Soviet strike or actual launching of one be available, U.S. missiles could be launched against Soviet missile sites and airfields, thus limiting to an extent depending on warning time the damage that the Soviet strike would inflict.

A large enough effort at "damage limitation" of course shades off into a first-strike posture; a small enough one becomes indistinguishable from the safety margin for deterrence. After the third McNamara budget, the emphasis on damage limitation vanished, to be replaced by deterrence, under the terminology of "assured destruction," referring to the capacity of our strategic forces to survive a Soviet attack and achieve with high probability a level of death and destruction in the Soviet Union that would rule out nuclear war as a rational policy for them.

The decisions of 1961 and 1962 called for the build-up by 1965 of a U. S. strategic force of nearly 1,800 missiles capable of reaching Soviet targets; somewhat more than a third were to be submarine-launched. In addition, some 600 long-range bombers would be maintained. This was projected against an expected Soviet force of fewer than a third as many missiles and a quarter as many bombers capable of reaching the United States. Further, the Soviets were expected to possess an equal number of shorter-range missiles and a much larger number of medium bombers that could be used against European targets. These decisions were taken by a new administration in the aftermath of the missile-gap argument that had been a prominent feature of the election campaign; it was a time, too, when American intelligence estimates of Soviet programs for their strategic forces were under-

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going sharp revisions, to the accompaniment of the intra-governmental controversy that such processes always entail. Whether, in another atmosphere, such a program might have been viewed as unnecessarily large for deterrence alone, and whether the articulation of an additional objective of damage limitation would have been avoided from the start is, of course, unknowable. Unknown, and perhaps equally unknowable at least for some time to come, is whether the Soviets' original force goals in 1961–1962 were as modest as our estimates of them at the time—or even more so—and whether their rapid recent build-up, discussed immediately below, was a response to the tremendous acceleration in the growth of our long-range striking forces that the Kennedy Administration brought about. In any event, until 1965 or even into 1966 it was possible for the Administration to deny any wider aim for its strategic posture than deterrence, to argue the futility of seeking to achieve a first-strike force, and yet to avoid the sharp edge of the question of whether we were maintaining "strategic superiority" over the Soviets.

Recent changes in Soviet deployments have given a new bite to this question; corresponding and anticipatory changes in our own have raised even broader questions of how stable our deterrent posture will be in the years ahead.

II

The last two years have shown significant changes in the Soviet strategic forces. The number of their intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles has grown rapidly. As of late 1967—as estimated by Secretary McNamara in his 1968 budget presentation—the number of land-based missiles had grown to 750, or nearly half our total, and most of the growth had taken place in the previous year. This indicates that the number might well continue to grow rapidly. The total number of Soviet missiles targetable against both the United States and NATO countries is already nearly equal to the total number of U.S. missiles that can reach Soviet targets. Further, there are some suggestions that the Soviets are currently building up their missile submarine fleet both qualitatively and quantitatively, so as to achieve—like the United States—a substantial force protected from a first strike by concealment and mobility.

In addition to these changes in offensive forces, the Soviets have deployed an anti-ballistic missile defense system around

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Moscow. They may be extending this deployment further, but if so, they are doing it slowly rather than rapidly.

So far, we have not responded to these developments by planning an increase in the number of our missile launchers. Rather, we have concentrated on programs for upgrading our present forces by replacing existing missiles with new ones designed to use present launching platforms. The new missiles will be superior to the old in three respects. First, they will be significantly more accurate, which means that a smaller warhead can be used to achieve a particular level of destruction against a specified target. Second, they will contain a variety of decoys and other penetration aids which will make more difficult the defensive task of an ABM system. Finally, and most significant, they will ultimately contain several independently aimed warheads within a single missile (MIRVs or multiple independent reëntry vehicles, to the trade). These, in turn, again make the task of the defensive ABM more difficult. In addition, they raise a new, and as we shall see, somewhat frightening possibility of multiplying greatly the number of warheads which one or the other side can launch, without changing the number of visible missile launchers.

In addition, of course, we have made the decision to deploy a "thin" ABM system, emphasizing primarily area defense against light attacks, a so-called anti-Chinese defense.

In themselves, none of these changes will significantly alter the strategic balance from one of mutual deterrence, if they do not go beyond their present limits. Neither the Soviet ABM nor the growth of Soviet missile forces reduces in an important way our capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union after a Soviet first strike. In his most recent budget presentation, Secretary McNamara estimated that, on the basis of projected force levels in the 1970s, a United States retaliatory attack after a Soviet strike against our strategic forces would result in over 100 million Soviet dead. Similarly, Soviet responses to our proposed ABM deployment, if they were like our own responses to theirs, would be readily within their capabilities and would leave them able to inflict over 100 million fatalities on us in a second strike. Were we to deploy much stronger and more costly defenses, it would remain within the Soviet capability to counter them by corresponding increases in the size of their offensive deployments—which could probably be made at significantly less cost than that of our increased defenses. The Russians would thus

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retain their capability to inflict high levels of fatalities on us in a second strike.

To be sure, the Administration asserts that our ABM system is being deployed to counter the possibility of a light Chinese attack in the coming years. The Chinese are testing thermonuclear devices and medium-range missiles; within the next decade they could achieve a modest ICBM force. In the same budget testimony, Secretary McNamara argued that the proposed ABM system might hold fatalities from potential Chinese attacks of varying plausible sizes in the next five to eight years to below a million; in the absence of such a system the figure could range from seven to fifteen million. But why deterrence, on which we have relied successfully for many years to restrain the powerful forces of the Soviets, is not expected to work against the small forces of the poorer and weaker Chinese is totally unclear. For some time into the future, at least as far as our present projections and calculations go, we shall have a credible first-strike capacity against the Chinese. In such circumstances, it is difficult to understand on what calculation the Chinese would throw away the only effective restraint on our nuclear force, the strong moral and political inhibitions we have against striking first, by launching an attack.

Only the proposition that there is a special danger of aggressive irrational behavior by some future Chinese Government would make sense of the official argument. Yet there is nothing in the recent record of the Chinese Government in its international relations that provides the basis for such an expectation. Accordingly, it is hard to take the Administration's rationale for deploying a thin ABM defense at face value, especially in the light of its own evaluation of the utility of not only the proposed defense system, but more elaborate, extensive and powerful ones. The decision is much more easily understood as the result of long-standing pressures within the military establishment and the Congress for an antimissile defense. When these were reinforced in recent years by the evidence of initial Soviet deployments, the demand for a "response" finally became irresistible.

While the recent and projected changes in Soviet and American strategic forces have not altered the fundamental strategic situation from one of mutual deterrence, they may have set in motion forces which will undermine the stability of the relation in coming years. Within the Congress, pressures are already be-

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ginning to mount for action to offset the large increase in numbers of Soviet missiles, so as to maintain a margin of "strategic superiority," rather than accepting "parity." As the planned deployment of the ABM system goes forward, Congressional and public pressures to upgrade it can be expected to rise; this would be done by adding local defenses of missiles and cities to the present area-defense system. The next Administration will then face the task of making the public case for the explicit acceptance of strategic "parity" with the Soviets, or in the alternative, giving in to these pressures and beginning a new set of developments in our strategic forces, with consequences that are unpleasant to contemplate.

The core of the case for accepting "parity" has already been put, but it bears repetition, and a little elaboration. In essence, we cannot expect with any confidence to do more than achieve a secure second-strike capacity, no matter how hard we try. This capacity is not usefully measured by counting warheads or megatons or, above some level, expected casualties. Whether the result comes about with twice as many American as Soviet delivery vehicles—as has been the case in the past—or with roughly equal numbers, or even with an adverse ratio, does not change its basic nature. Further, any significant change in deployments by either major adversary requires a long period of time, and announces itself, either explicitly or through intelligence means, in its early stages. The other, therefore, has notice and time within which to respond. The present level of research, development and production capacity for weapons of both superpowers is such that each has the power to respond to a change in the deployments of the other in a way that leaves it "satisfied" with its new position in relation to the adversary. Each, accordingly, must anticipate such a response. And so the arms race would go on. The expected result of the process can be no more than a new balance at higher force levels, larger expenditures and, most likely, even more unthinkably high levels of destruction in the event that the forces were ever used.

Moreover, there is another and even more troubling consequence of following the competitive path: the stability of mutual deterrence becomes far less certain in a rapidly changing situation. Deterrence is at bottom a political and psychological concept. It rests on the perception and interpretation of the military situation by political decision-makers; and it is as open to in-

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fluence by changes in their operating environment or the attitudes they bring to their perceptions as by changes in the hard technical facts. This inevitably marks it with a certain elusiveness. How great a capacity to wreak death and destruction on an adversary is enough? Can it be measured in absolute terms in millions of dead and acres of destruction, or only in the fractions of his population, industry and urban area? If one rival's destructive capacity grows while the other's remains constant at a high level, does this reduce the effectiveness of the latter's deterrent? Questions such as these clearly have no unique, well-defined answers that hold for all decision-makers in all circumstances. What is clear is that constant or slowly changing force structures, whose technical performance characteristics are reasonably well understood—subject, of course, to the important fundamental limitation that they have not been and never can be tested in a realistic way—provide a much more stable basis for mutual reliance on and acceptance of deterrence than a rapidly moving process of qualitative and quantitative competition.

The behavior of a whole defensive system in action is difficult to predict, since it depends heavily on specific details of design of both offensive and defensive weapons which are not likely to be well known to both adversaries. The effects of the interaction of two strikes, in which offensive and defensive forces on both sides are involved, multiply the uncertainties. Thus the "adequacy" of any particular second-strike force becomes harder to assure with confidence, and the impulse to compensate for uncertainty by building larger forces will make itself felt on both sides.

Further, current technical developments in weaponry present the possibility of introducing significantly new elements of uncertainty into the situation, which in themselves, even in the absence of further continuing change, would diminish the stability of deterrence. Anti-ballistic missile defenses constitute one example; another is the multiple, independently aimable warheads carried by a single missile. At present, each adversary has a reasonably clear idea of the other's deployments, with enough detail to permit a confident estimate of the balance of forces. Once MIRVs become widespread, it becomes much more difficult for each side to know how many warheads, as opposed to launchers, the other has. How great the uncertainty will be depends, of course, on the specific technical possibilities: two warheads per missile would create one situation; ten, quite another. In the

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absence of submarine-launched or equally mobile land-based missiles, the latter situation could give rise to the ugly possibility of each side's possessing a first-strike capability against the other, provided the accuracy of the independently aimed warheads permitted successful attack on hard targets.

III

These frightening possibilities still lie in the future. For the present, and the next year or two ahead, nothing that is currently happening or in prospect justifies anxiety for the continued effectiveness of the U.S. second-strike capability, or its continued power to perform its primary function of deterring the Soviets from using their nuclear forces against us. None of the evidence on the Soviet build-up points beyond an effort to move close to a crude equality with us in numbers of offensive missiles. There is no evidence of a wide program of ABM deployment; indeed, nothing beyond the Moscow system seems to be happening. This is certainly no more imposing than our own proposed defensive system, which we believe to be too weak to affect our calculation of Soviet deterrent capabilities.

The rapidity of the recent build-up in Soviet forces tempts some to project that build-up into the future, and see it as a race for "strategic superiority." The absence of official announcements of force goals by the Soviets—such as the Secretary of Defense makes in his annual budget presentations—reinforces the temptation; and the demonstration of the illusory nature of such a goal seems an insufficient response. Yet our past experience with the projected "bomber gap" of the early fifties and the "missile gap" of 1959–61 shows the problems of such interpretations. In both these cases we clearly over-reacted. In the first, the result was our concentration on the creation of a very large, expensive and vulnerable bomber force, while the Soviets moved on to missiles. In the second, the scale of our reaction has probably been the major factor in stimulating the current Soviet build-up. If our aim remains that of maintaining deterrence, we can clearly afford to wait for the event, rather than begin now to respond to our projections of the future.

Can our aim be more? Should we seek to exploit the opportunities of our new technology as rapidly as possible to reach beyond deterrence ourselves? There are strong forces in the military and the Congress always ready to urge this path. They are un-

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doubtedly supported, and their voices amplified to some extent, by the handful of large contractors who benefit from an increase in expenditures on strategic forces. What is many times more important, they reflect a deeply held and widely shared popular sentiment that our wealth, our power and our virtue entitle us to be "first," and any claim to equality by the morally and economically inferior Soviet Union is at best presumptuous, at worst dangerous.

The facts of weapons technology have long made the pursuit of "virtue" along this path vain and wasteful; now they make it positively dangerous. We are in a position in relation to our superpower adversary in which, for the present and near future, the balance of forces is such as to make possible new and far-reaching arms-control agreements. With not too widely disparate levels of offensive forces, and some deployment of defensive forces on both sides, the possibility of an agreed "freeze" in further deployments of strategic weapons looks more favorable than it has for some time. Such an agreement would clearly present a host of difficult problems, centering around how much control of technical improvement in existing vehicles and warheads was sought, and by what means. No risk-free solution of these difficulties is likely to be found, even in concept, much less in terms of negotiable arrangements between the two countries. Yet, the alternative risks arising from the uncontrolled forward thrust of technical change in weaponry are much greater. The more successful the development of MIRVs in terms of both the number of reëntry vehicles carried by a single warhead and the accuracy with which they can be directed, the more difficult it becomes to be confident about the security of a deterrent force. Wider deployment of ABMs compounds the difficulty by adding to the uncertainties of both sides as to the effectiveness of their own and their rivals' forces. Under such circumstances, arms-control agreements in turn may become much more difficult to reach, since an atmosphere of mutual distrust and fear will hardly promote the success of what will at best be difficult negotiations.

All signs point to the coming of a time when the stability of mutual deterrence can no longer rest reliably on mutual watchfulness and forbearance, without explicit arms-control agreements over strategic weapons deployments. We should do nothing to hasten its arrival, and everything to take advantage of whatever respite we have to move forward to such agreements.

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MOSCOW AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

By Curt Gasteyger

"THE Russians seem to me more bent on taking ports in the Mediterranean than in destroying Bonaparte in Egypt." So wrote Horatio Nelson in 1799. Whether "Bonaparte" is regarded as a synonym for President Nasser or for the Sixth Fleet, these words could hardly be improved upon as a reflection of the present state of Western consternation about Soviet objectives in the Mediterranean. Do the beginnings of a Soviet naval presence there mark the end of an era during which the Mediterranean has been dominated by a succession of single powers?

The Mediterranean, the meeting place of three continents and the melting pot of even more civilizations, has, unlike continental Europe, never enjoyed a lasting power balance. The Pax Romana was followed by centuries of Islamic rule, which in turn was gradually replaced by an uneasy relationship between the Porte and the emerging British Empire, occasionally challenged by France. The opening of the Suez Canal changed the Mediterranean from an inland sea to the main link between the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, and thus made it an important commercial and military artery. After World War II the importance of the Mediterranean as a strategic nexus between East and West was further enhanced. As a key area in the Western system of deterrence which encircled the communist world from the North Cape to Okinawa, it remained under the influence of the Atlantic powers; for the first time it was an external power, the United States, which provided the principal instrument of dominance, the Sixth Fleet.

It now seems that this fourth phase of one-power predominance in the Mediterranean may also be the last. Since the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 the Soviet Union has established a political and military presence on a larger scale than before, and shows no intention of withdrawing. It has thus succeeded in escaping from the role of a distant observer who could defend or promote its interests in the area by verbal declarations only. Much of the West's alarm seems either excessive or premature; but it would certainly be shortsighted to deny that the new Soviet presence will have considerable political and military effect.

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The importance of the new Soviet engagement in the Mediterranean is magnified for two reasons: it can be related to a change in Soviet strategy and it is taking place in an especially sensitive area of the world. Quite apart from the third Arab-Israeli war, a number of other recent developments make the Mediterranean vulnerable to a Soviet challenge. They include the imminent British withdrawal from "East of Suez;" the military coup in Greece; the still unsettled Cyprus crisis, with its attendant Greco-Turkish tensions; Britain's dispute with Spain over Gibraltar; France's withdrawal from NATO, her withdrawal from naval bases in Tunisia and Algeria, and her attempt at "reëngagement" in the Middle East; the uncertainties of Italian domestic politics; and the manifold tensions between the West and the Arabs. In theory each of these situations could be exploited by the Soviet Union. But this is to assume that the Mediterranean littoral is a political and strategic unit which a great power like the U.S.S.R. can influence according to its own will. At present there is no evidence that such a possibility exists, as the United States found out in the 1950s after bitter experience.

The fifteen Mediterranean countries have little in common. They have widely different political backgrounds and are at varying stages of economic development. Consequently, they are less likely to form a distinct community of interest than almost any other constellation of states, except perhaps the countries bordering the Indian Ocean. It is, therefore, doubtful if any external power could hope for more than a modest degree of influence in the entire Mediterranean area. It is true that there are communist observers who see events like the fall of Ben Bella, Sukarno or Nkrumah, the Arab defeat of June 1967 and the military putsch in Greece as part of a "CIA conspiracy," aimed at weakening the "progressive" forces in the world, and more especially in the Mediterranean area. President Tito seems to have been influenced by this theory when he came out so strongly for President Nasser during the June war. Fearing that his last and best friend in the nonaligned world was in danger, Tito took the unusual step of urging the Soviet leaders to come to Nasser's defense. To achieve this, he was even prepared to grant overflight rights to the Russians and accept an almost complete alignment with their Middle East policy. In so doing Tito may have helped to save President Nasser. At the same time he undoubtedly helped to bring the Soviet Union into the Mediterranean even more quickly

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and on a larger scale than he could have wished and the Russians could have expected.

II

The Russian drive for warm-water ports and outlets to the oceans, including the Mediterranean, has a long history. Although the recent rapid build-up of the Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is more the result of exploiting a series of accidental events than the execution of a master plan, this is not to say that the Soviet Union came to the Mediterranean by accident. Its present policy had its origins in the mid-fifties when, after several years of relative inactivity, it resumed, but with different methods, a policy unsuccessfully followed by Stalin both during and shortly after the war. The Russian Navy had, in fact, a submarine base in Albania until 1961; and the present naval build-up goes back to 1964 when a special Mediterranean unit was formed as a part of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.

More important than the much publicized build-up of the Soviet navy is the fact that the U.S.S.R. has obviously decided to commit itself to the Mediterranean on both a politically and strategically important scale and to stay there for good—with all the consequences this may entail. It seems to reflect an important change in Soviet strategic thinking. Following World War II Soviet strategists were confronted with "worldwide Western encirclement." For almost two decades their strategy was designed for the defense of their "inner front." Western, and especially American, defense policies relied on a series of distant bases that were both politically and militarily vulnerable, while the Soviet Union could organize its defense on its own territory or within its immediate sphere of influence. Humiliating experiences in Cuba and during the June war demonstrated the importance of having a naval force that was both mobile and credible. This may have convinced Soviet strategists that the long-term advantage of an "inner front" had gradually changed into a net disadvantage. For concentration on the "inner front" had prevented the Soviet Union from developing a powerful navy, which in the light of the growing importance of both seaborne strategic deterrence and a capability for long-range intervention has now become an essential attribute of great-power status.

There are many indications that the U.S.S.R. is now developing a strategy better suited to its ambitions as a superpower and

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to the support of its friends in time of crisis. A consequence may be that it will feel increasingly tempted to deploy its newly acquired military capabilities in areas where it has not previously made its presence effectively felt. By breaking the American naval hegemony in most maritime areas, including the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union may try to establish regional balances in strategically important areas so as to complement, at lower levels, the existing global balance between itself and the United States. In this way, the Soviets would hope to prevent their opponent from taking unopposed actions against what they could consider their own interests or those of their client states. Clearly, the United States today could not, with the same equanimity, undertake an action similar to its intervention in the Lebanon in 1958, even if it wished to do so.

Before examining the political and strategic implications of the Soviet effort to establish a strategic balance in the Mediterranean we may appropriately look at the three forms which the Soviet military presence has assumed in the eastern part of the Sea and the adjacent Middle Eastern area.

First, there is the remarkable expansion of Soviet arms deliveries to the Arab and other Mediterranean countries, ranging from such "traditional customers" as the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Sudan and Algeria to South Yemen, the Yemen Republic and, surprisingly, Morocco, which (to Algeria's embarrassment) is reportedly to receive light weapons from Czechoslovakia. Further, the Soviet Union has since 1958 replaced the United States as Jugoslavia's main source of supply. The case of Jordan, which briefly appeared on the list of new Soviet customers, shows, however, that Moscow is more cautious than it sometimes appears. In refraining from delivering arms to Jordan it was moved less by ideological reasons than by a sober assessment of the undesirable consequences such a step could have: Israel and Saudi Arabia would find themselves hemmed in by countries dependent on Soviet assistance, while the United States would lose one of the few remaining possibilities of exerting influence on Israel's neighbors. This could lead only to a further polarization of forces and thus render still more difficult a viable coëxistence between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Second, the Soviet Union has noticeably increased its technical-military assistance to certain Arab countries, particularly as regards the number of instructors, technicians and engineers sent

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to the U.A.R. Exact figures are not available, but estimates vary from 1,000 to 2,000 men. More important than the correctness of these figures, however, is, as we shall see, the way this Soviet commitment is affecting relations between the two countries.

Finally, the Soviet Union now has a navy of some 45 ships in the Mediterranean, which constitutes its most conspicuous presence in the area and is intended to have the greatest possible psychological effect. In mere numbers it may be compared with the 50 to 60 ships in the U.S. Sixth Fleet. But it has nothing to compare with the two powerful American aircraft carriers, each with 100 strike aircraft, or with the Polaris submarines. (Incidentally, it is often overlooked that the Italian navy exceeds the Soviet Mediterranean fleet in terms of both numbers and modern ships.) Above all, the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean still lacks any kind of sustained air cover, having neither an aircraft carrier nor an airfield sufficiently near. In the Mediterranean, with its relatively short distances, this may not be as disadvantageous as it could be elsewhere; however, it is an unsatisfactory situation which the U.S.S.R. will probably try to rectify.

One way of achieving this is to establish permanent naval and air bases in friendly countries. The Soviet Union has made some progress in both respects. At present, it uses three ports of call—Alexandria and Port Said in the U.A.R., and Latakia in Syria. There is no evidence, however, that it has taken over the Algerian port of Mers-el-Kebir from the French, and, barring a major change in the politico-military situation, there is little likelihood of this occurring in the foreseeable future. One cannot say that the Soviets are using the above ports as permanent military bases or are in fact pressing to take them over. The term "base" has often been misused in this context; given the greater mobility of modern navies and their increasing self-sufficiency both in terms of supply and communications, the importance of highly complex bases has decreased. Therefore, it is more appropriate to talk about technical facilities. And no doubt the Soviet navy is increasing its use of these harbors for refueling, refitting and repairs. In so doing it has been careful to avoid assuming the appearance of a neo-colonial power. But it is difficult to see how it can escape this charge if it simultaneously reëquips its client states with modern weapons and acts as their overall protector.

At this early stage the greatest effect of the Soviet build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean is psychological. Looking further

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ahead, however, we can see a number of developments which may affect the political and military situation of the entire area. The Soviet presence is likely to arouse diametrically opposite reactions on the part of the countries involved. They may readjust their foreign and defense policies, either because they see the Soviet presence as a threat to their own position or because it seems to strengthen it. Whether such a polarization will actually take place will depend on Soviet behavior, as well as on the reactions not only of the local countries but of the external powers to what could become another area of great-power confrontation. NATO or some of its members may well react or even over-react to a further growth of Soviet influence by increasing their own forces, by reinvigorating the present alliance systems or creating a new inter-allied force.

The fear that the Soviet Union could "outflank" NATO seems exaggerated, for it is difficult to see what the U.S.S.R. would achieve by such an attempt, let alone how it could carry it out with the present capability of its Mediterranean fleet. One could, however, argue that during a crisis its present position would make it easy for it to cut important supply lines to Europe. Thus the possibility of a new front in the south of Europe cannot be altogether dismissed. In particular it is a contingency that Turkey must take into account; it has always had the Soviet navy on its northern coast, but now it must reckon on being threatened also from the south. The U.S.S.R. might also be able to interfere, in time of crisis, in Western air communications between NATO and CENTO. And so long as there are British troops East of Suez, this could also affect British positions in Asia.

Thus the U.S.S.R. is in process of obtaining new strategic options, which it may be able to use better once its presence in the Mediterranean has become firmly established. How far it can get is a different question. The Soviet navy will for a long time remain vulnerable in at least two respects: its inferiority to NATO's Mediterranean fleets and the vulnerability of its supply lines. The Sixth Fleet, originally linked to the American strategic deterrent and gradually turned into a powerful instrument of American diplomacy, is well equipped to check a Soviet threat. It is difficult to see what the Soviet Union might expect to achieve under these circumstances without risking a major confrontation.

A further consideration is that the Soviet Union has no direct control over Gibraltar and the Dardanelles. The new Soviet pres-

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ence in the Mediterranean does lend added importance to the question of who controls these two main access routes. Precisely at this moment, too, Britain and Spain are at odds over the future status of Gibraltar, with the United States as an uneasy observer wishing to maintain its close relationship with the former and also anxious to prolong its base rights in Spain. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, made no secret of its preference when it joined the curiously mixed group of countries which supported Spain's case in a U.N. resolution violently critical of British policy on Gibraltar.

In the case of the Dardanelles, Moscow has shown considerable restraint since its two abortive attempts to obtain a revision of the Montreux Convention at Yalta in 1945 and again in 1946. As long as the passage of its ships is in no way obstructed, the Soviet Union obviously prefers to improve its relations with Turkey rather than press for a change in the present status of the Straits, however inconvenient and unsatisfactory this may be. It even may not feel absolutely sure of retaining its hitherto unchallenged control over the Black Sea, where until now it has been able to use Bulgarian and Rumanian ports at will. Present developments in Rumanian policy suggest that this facility may not last forever. Although a further disintegration within the southern tier of the Warsaw Pact may not seriously affect the Soviet naval posture in the Black Sea, it may considerably hamper Moscow's further build-up in the Mediterranean.

Here, then, lies the other weakness of the Soviet position in the Mediterranean. As long as the U.S.S.R. has no military control over the two entrances to the Mediterranean, Gibraltar and the Dardanelles, and slight hope of ever getting it, Soviet supply lines remain vulnerable. Equally, political changes in Southeastern Europe may in one way or another weaken the Soviet position in the Black Sea.

III

The greatest factor of uncertainty for the Soviet Union will be the future policy of her Arab client states. Though Jugoslavia's policy of nonalignment has lost much of its strength, being largely neutralized in the Mediterranean countries by Soviet presence, it would be wrong to pretend that the days of nonalignment or noncommitment in the area are over. If the Arab-Israeli conflict is ever resolved into a mutually acceptable coëxistence, the desire

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for a better-balanced relationship with each of the two superpowers may revive once more. There is already a growing uneasiness in some Arab countries about their one-sided relationship with, or even dependence upon, the Soviet Union. Algeria, the Sudan and the U.A.R. have reëstablished diplomatic relations with Britain, and Cairo is cautiously moving toward a rapprochement with Washington. Nasser may also be willing to resume diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany if this does not raise the awkward question of recognizing East Germany—something the Soviet Union would no doubt press for. But no Arab country, and least of all the U.A.R., dares to antagonize the Soviet Union, let alone dispense with its support. This dependence is, of course, a function of their conflict with, and fear of, Israel. As long as this conflict lasts the Soviet Union has a welcome pretext for continuing both its presence in the Mediterranean and its influence in the Arab world.

The main focus of the Soviet objectives is the U.A.R., not only because it is the leader of the "progressive" Arab States, but because it provides a key to Africa and, via the Suez Canal, to the Indian Ocean. Without Cairo's consent the Soviet Union would otherwise find it much more difficult to maintain a permanent influence in Africa, and practically impossible to exert an influence in the Indian Ocean. Moscow is no doubt exploiting its present advantageous position to secure its rights to use Egyptian naval and air bases, which are also important for reaching destinations like Nigeria or Aden.

This brings us to the Suez Canal as the third door to the Mediterranean. Its closure has brought home different lessons to the various parties concerned. The European countries, with the possible exception of Britain, have realized that the Canal has lost most of its strategic and much of its economic significance for them; it will lose still more as long-range transportation costs around the Cape decrease, as the sources of oil become more diversified and as the increased size of both tanker and dry cargo vessels make their use of the Canal impossible. With the obvious exception of the U.A.R., the other Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, also appear to be little affected by the closure; some of them may even profit from it.

If, on the other hand, our assumptions about Soviet long-term strategy are correct, then the Canal must become an increasingly important factor in Moscow's future ability to implement it. Its

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attempt to build up a long-distance capability to intervene may point to still more far-reaching objectives. The Soviet Union is already seeking closer relations with South Asian countries, in particular with India. Especially after Britain's withdrawal East of Suez, this could become an important Soviet asset if China's influence grows as a consequence of the changing politico-military constellation in Viet Nam. But besides the potential strategic threat from China, the Soviet Union seems increasingly worried about the possibility of Chinese infiltration of various liberation movements (such as Al-Fatah in Palestine and the newly created NLF-type underground organization in Kashmir) which are active in some of its client states.

As its ports on the Pacific coast are too far away and ice-blocked for several months each year, the Soviet Union will find it difficult to fulfill its commitments without freedom of manœuvre in the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. The Soviets thus seem about to repeat British history, which has shown that whoever wants to have a strategic relationship with India must ensure passage across the Middle Eastern landbridge—that is to say, through Suez. More than this, in order to secure both its supply lines and the permanence of its presence, the Soviet Union will have to dominate or seek good relations not only with Egypt, but also with the littoral states of the Red and Arabian Seas, and possibly also of the Persian Gulf. There are already indications that Moscow is in fact making its first probings in precisely that direction. For example, it has dispatched substantial air support to aid the Republican régime of Yemen against the Royalists. It has built a harbor at Hodeida on the Yemeni coast, and it is helping the Somalis to build a new port at Berbera. At the same time it is giving substantial military assistance to the newly created South Yemen Republic. It has also improved its relations with Iran and Pakistan, thus turning an area which used to be the northern tier of Western defense into an open field of East-West competition.

The realization of these far-reaching Soviet objectives still seems rather remote, if only because there is little chance of an early reopening of the Canal. Surprisingly enough, the Soviet Union has done little to change this situation, which, after all, must run against its own interests as well as those of the U.A.R., for which every day of closure means a financial loss. While Moscow may not be able or even willing to enforce a quick settlement

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of the whole Arab-Israeli conflict, the present situation would certainly enable the U.S.S.R. to press for negotiations on the future of the Canal, perhaps offering its navy as "guarantor" of free passage; Israel would find difficulty in challenging such a proposal and many countries, above all Egypt, might welcome it.

But the realization of Soviet objectives may be obstructed by other obstacles. On the basis of available evidence we must assume that there are sharp differences within the Soviet leadership itself. The more cautious elements no doubt realize that pursuit of so far-reaching an aim as a permanent presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean will put a heavy strain on the Soviet economy, while adding many unknown risks and long-term commitments which no government can easily take upon itself without compelling reasons. In addition, such a policy develops its own momentum, which later Soviet governments might find difficulty in controlling, as the British and American governments have found. Armed with the recent lessons of American over-commitment in Asia, with Eastern Europe in ferment and with immense economic problems at home, the advocates of a cautious and pragmatic policy possess strong arguments. They can also point out that such wide commitments could easily be counterproductive: the Soviet Union might find itself with responsibilities it never sought, and whose only reward would be alienation from the countries it has tried to support. By now it may already have found out that tensions between Soviet instructors and Egyptian soldiers are the inevitable side-effect of its presence there—magnified by an Ambassador in Cairo who behaves like Lord Cromer in the 1890s.

Much, then, will depend on how Moscow defines and pursues its interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Perhaps the Soviets merely want to have the best of all worlds, namely to gain influence by exploiting conflicts, to expand their presence and forward their own interests without taking on more responsibilities for the area itself; they may discover, however, that in a region as diverse as the Middle East and with partners as emotional as the Arabs they will get the responsibilities without the influence. Or their endeavor may generate a new cohesion in Western policy and evoke old resentments in the nonaligned world. But whatever Moscow does, it will find that taking over the British sphere of influence is hardly possible without also assuming the imperial burden.

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IV

The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean opens a new era for this region as well as for Soviet policy. It expands the confrontation of the superpowers beyond Europe, but on a different level and in a different way. There are various reasons why one must doubt whether this confrontation will eventually evolve into a more or less durable coëxistence. In fact, the opposite could happen.

First, the Mediterranean area lacks the political, economic and ethnic homogeneity which is essential for a process of stabilization. There is no clear delineation of spheres of influence that either side might feel obliged to respect.

Second, the Arab-Israeli conflict is particularly dangerous because the nature and extent of the Soviet and American commitments are different. It is precisely this asymmetry and the imbalance in their influence which could lead to a serious miscalculation in times of crisis. As a result of the June war Soviet influence in Egypt has grown far beyond that of the United States in Israel. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders make no secret of their intention to keep careful control over the use of offensive weapons which they supplied to the U.A.R. With Soviet instructors throughout the Egyptian armed forces, it may be assumed that the Soviet Union demands a say in the planning of Egyptian strategy and diplomacy. This makes it difficult to see how the Russians could allow President Nasser to undertake a major military action against Israel without making sure in advance that such action, first, is successful and, second, does not lead to a direct confrontation with the United States. It may well be that when the reëquipment and reorganization of the Egyptian forces has been completed, Soviet direct control will again be reduced. But it remains true that for the foreseeable future the U.S.S.R. will exercise incomparably more influence on Egypt and, to a lesser extent, on Israel's other Arab neighbors than the United States can ever expect or indeed want to have vis-à-vis Israel. In such circumstances the danger of miscalculations as to the intentions and actions of the other side is considerable.

Third, there is no such thing as a "naval balance of power," as was shown by the experience of the European powers earlier in this century. Two rival navies must no doubt constitute a serious deterrent to one another, but because they do not establish a physical presence within the littoral countries they cannot

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exert a significant influence there. Consequently, none of the Mediterranean countries feels either restrained or fearful of being dragged into a great-power conflict.

From this follows the fourth and probably most important difference between the superpower confrontations on the European continent and in the Mediterranean: now that the two superpowers confront each other on the sea they are partly neutralizing each other's influence on the surrounding territory. They must thus deter each other, but as long as they pursue conflicting interests they will hardly be able to deter the client states of the opponent. In consequence it is the small states of the area which gain a greater freedom of manœuvre in the pursuit of their interests.

So, paradoxically, the confrontation of the superpowers in the Mediterranean could well have the opposite effect from that in continental Europe. The greatest danger in the Mediterranean is not a direct clash between the superpowers but their lack of control over local conflicts, and the possibility of their eventually being drawn into them. Even more than in Europe they will sooner or later have to evolve a modus operandi based on the understanding that neither side is ever likely to have as much control over events as it has had for the last twenty years on the European continent, and that their control will become even smaller if they fail to coördinate their basic interests.

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THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION IN ASIA

By Lester R. Brown

FOR those whose thinking of Asia is conditioned by the food crises of 1965 and 1966, the news of an agricultural revolution may come as a surprise. But the change and ferment now evident in the Asian countryside stretching from Turkey to the Philippines, and including the pivotal countries of India and Pakistan, cannot be described as anything less. This rural revolution, largely obscured in its early years by the two consecutive failures of the monsoon, is further advanced in some countries—Pakistan, the Philippines and India—than in others, but there is little prospect that it will abort, so powerful and pervasive are the forces behind it.

That the agricultural revolution of the less developed world began in Asia is fortunate, since it is both densely populated and has a rapid rate of population growth. In this respect, Asia is unique among the world's major geographic regions. Western Europe is heavily populated but its population grows slowly; Latin America's population is expanding rapidly but as yet most of the region is sparsely populated. Fifty-six percent of the world's 3.3 billion people live in Asia; one-third of the world's population, an estimated 1.1 billion, live in Asia outside China. It is this part of the world and this third of mankind that this article deals with.

Historically, as Asia's population increased, it was supported by traditional agriculture on an ever-expanding area of cropland. As the postwar population explosion gained momentum in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the supply of new land was used up, but the productivity of land under cultivation increased little. The result was a slowdown in the rate of gain in food production and a growing concern that population growth and food production were on a collision course.

The gravity of the situation came into focus as the monsoon on the Indian subcontinent failed two years running, in 1965 and 1966. The United States responded by shipping the equivalent of nearly one-fifth of its wheat harvest, feeding sixty million Indians for nearly two years. This record shipment, the largest ever between two countries, was sufficient to stave off famine.

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As of mid-1968, both the food situation and food production prospects in Asia have changed almost beyond belief. The Philippines is self-sufficient in its staple food, rice, for the first time since 1903. Iran, with a substantial expansion in wheat acreage, is actually a net exporter of wheat this year. Ceylon's rice harvest climbed 13 percent above the previous record, as it both expanded the area under cultivation and raised yields.

Pakistan's wheat crop, harvested in April and May, is estimated to be 30 percent above the previous record. So is India's. The total Indian foodgrain crop, officially estimated at 100 million tons, is up 32 percent from last year's drought-depressed levels and, more importantly, up 12 percent from the previous record. Good weather has helped boost the harvest on the Indian subcontinent this year, but increases above the previous record are largely the results of solid technological progress—more efficient varieties, more fertilizer and better farm practices.

What has caused this remarkable turnabout? One factor is new political commitments at the top in several countries. Short-changing agriculture is no longer either feasible or fashionable. This new political climate has led to firm allocations of budgetary and foreign-exchange resources. India, for example, increased its budget for agricultural development by one-third in 1966–67; it is now using the equivalent of nearly one-fifth of its foreign-exchange earnings to import fertilizer and raw materials for manufacturing fertilizer. Turkey's imports of fertilizer may make up the largest single item in overall imports this year, exceeding for the first time petroleum and petroleum products. The availability of fertilizer in Pakistan is twice that of two years ago and several times that of 1960; it is expected at least to double again by 1970.

Many governments which heretofore neglected agriculture have been encouraged to give agriculture a higher priority by the "short-tether" policy of the United States, whereby food-aid agreements are of short duration and renewal depends on local effort and performance. The overall scarcity of foodgrains, particularly rice, in many Asian countries increased prices to the point where it suddenly became very profitable for large numbers of farmers to use fertilizer and other modern inputs.

While some factors contributing to the takeoff in agriculture are of recent origin, others have been long in the making. The agricultural infrastructure is capable of supporting current ad-

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vances because of several years of AID investment in farm-to-market roads, in irrigation projects and in agricultural research and training. Investment in irrigation systems over the years provides a vast acreage of well-watered land, much of it well suited to the intensive use of modern farm technology. Adequate supplies of water and fertilizer are needed to attain high yields. The training of some 4,000 Asian agriculturists over the past decade, sponsored jointly by AID, the U. S. Department of Agriculture and the Land Grant Universities, contributes to a corps of trained professionals capable of adapting and disseminating new technology.

The availability of fertilizer has increased severalfold over the past decade, partly as a result of expanding indigenous production and partly because of steadily rising imports. The financing of fertilizer imports is now a major AID activity, requiring a sizable portion of the agency's budget. Investment by fertilizer manufacturers and other supporting industries has helped to fuel the takeoff in agricultural production. Countries in which U.S. firms have built or are building fertilizer plants include South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, India, Iran and Malaysia. Fertilizer produced in these plants could increase the region's annual food-producing capability by an estimated 25 million tons of grain. Other agrobusiness activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and farm equipment are also contributing to the rapid growth in food production.

Perhaps the most exciting development is the rapid spread of new, high-yielding varieties of cereals. The Mexican wheats now proving so adaptable throughout Asia are the product of more than twenty years of work by the Rockefeller Foundation. Efficient new rice varieties are coming principally from the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, an institution founded jointly by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in 1962 and devoted solely to the improvement of rice production in the tropics and subtropics. Work on high-yielding varieties of corn, sorghum and millet is concentrated in India, where the Rockefeller Foundation is providing leadership for the program. Areas planted to the new varieties went from a few hundred acres in 1964–65 to about 23,000 acres in 1965–66, nearly four million acres in 1966–67 and over twenty million acres during 1967–68, the crop year just ended. Plans and expectations indicate a further expansion of up to forty million acres in the coming year.

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Several factors are responsible for this rapid gain in acreage. The new varieties often double yields of traditional varieties; their superiority is so obvious that farmers are quickly persuaded of their merits. This contrasts sharply with improved varieties made available in the past, which were only marginally superior to varieties being used. Another reason is the degree to which the high yields attained on the experimental plots are transferable to field conditions. There are reports of instances in which farmers actually attained higher yields under field conditions with large acreages than researchers did on experimental plots.

The availability of these new seeds has enabled many Asian countries to shorten materially the agricultural development process. The importing of numerous varieties in small quantities for testing purposes was in itself an effort to achieve a shortcut; food-deficit countries availed themselves of the results of plant-breeding work undertaken elsewhere. But they did not stop there. Once it was demonstrated that a given high-yielding variety was adapted to local growing conditions, large tonnages of seed were imported, thus eliminating the several years required to multiply and accumulate sufficient supplies of seed locally.

Pakistan imported 42,000 tons of seed wheat from Mexico during 1967, enough to plant 1.5 million acres. As a result, Pakistan now has enough seed to plant its entire wheat acreage to Mexican wheats. India imported 18,000 tons of Mexican wheats in 1966. This, coupled with *indigenous* multiplication of seed from the initial introduction of the same varieties, enabled Indian farmers to plant 8 million acres this year—the target acreage for 1970–71, and more than double the target of 3.5 million acres for the current year. Turkey, starting later than India or Pakistan but determined to catch up, imported 21,000 tons of high-yielding wheat, including some U.S. varieties, for use on a much smaller acreage. Both the import of samples of the new varieties initially, and the larger shipments later, represent a massive infusion of a new technology at a nominal cost, with potentially widespread application. They constitute a windfall gain in food production for many of the less developed countries.

The new varieties possess several distinctive characteristics. They are almost all short-stemmed, so they can absorb large quantities of fertilizer without lodging (becoming top-heavy and falling down); they are much more responsive to fertilizer at all levels of application. A given amount of fertilizer produces a much

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greater increase in yield than with the older varieties of grain. And unlike high-yielding varieties of cereals developed in the United States or Japan for rather specific growing conditions, these varieties are adapted to a much broader range of latitudes.

The new varieties of rice are early maturing, ripening in 120 to 125 days compared with 150 to 180 days for the older varieties. They are also rather insensitive to the length of daylight and thus can be planted at any time of the year if the prevailing temperature and water supply permit. With adequate water, some farmers in the Philippines and India are harvesting two or even three crops each year. Where water supplies are not sufficient to grow rice during the dry season, farmers grow high-yielding hybrid grain sorghums or hybrid corn. Triple-cropping of rice, or rice in combination with sorghum or corn, is resulting in yields under field conditions as high as 8 tons of grain per acre per calendar year. This contrasts with average yearly rice yields in Japan of just over 2 tons per acre and wheat yields in Europe of less than 2 tons per acre. The introduction of the early-maturing Mexican wheats in northern India and Pakistan is permitting the double-cropping of wheat and corn, with wheat grown during the *rabi* (winter) season and corn during the *kharif* (summer) season.

II

Introduction of the new varieties is changing not only the technology of production but also the economics. The potentially far-reaching economic implications of the agricultural revolution are only now becoming clear. Projected demand for agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, water and irrigation equipment must be recalculated. Many of the assumptions underlying current strategies of agricultural development must also be reëxamined. For example, in the short run, the profitability of using fertilizer will increase demand above what it would otherwise have been. Over the longer run, however, the demand for fertilizer may be lower than would otherwise be the case since a smaller amount of fertilizer will be required on the more responsive varieties to reach a given level of production.

High rates of return on investments in production inputs, reflecting a more favorable economic climate due to better prices for farm products and more efficient new technologies, are mobilizing rural savings not previously available for production

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purposes. Investment is on the rise not only in those things which increase output in the short run, such as fertilizer, but also in those which boost food-producing capability over the long run, such as tubewells and irrigation pumps. Over the course of five years, Pakistani farmers in the cotton and rice-growing areas of the former Punjab, where the water table is quite near the surface, have installed some 32,000 private tubewells, costing from $1,000 to $2,500 each. The value of the supplementary irrigation made possible by these wells is such that farmers characteristically have paid for them in two years. A large proportion were installed without government assistance or subsidy of any kind. The number of low-lift pumps installed in East Pakistan, totaling 2,200 in 1965, is expected to increase to 14,000 by 1969, greatly increasing the potential for double-cropping rice during the dry season. Similar high rates of return on small-scale irrigation investments are reported in India, where the number of wells is also climbing at an astronomical rate.

Early-maturing varieties of rice which ripen during the monsoon require mechanical drying before storage, since the time-honored method of spreading rice in the roadside to dry is not feasible. The demand for grain-drying equipment, now climbing rapidly, was not anticipated. Similarly, the use of pesticides, often uneconomic when average rice yields were 1,000 to 1,500 pounds of milled rice per acre, is suddenly very profitable on the new varieties, averaging 3,000 to 4,000 pounds. Growth in demand for both pesticides and application equipment such as knapsack sprayers and dusters will be closely associated with the spread of the improved seed.

The new varieties, with their potential for multiple-cropping, place a premium on fast preparation of the seedbed. Farmers planning to double-crop or triple-crop their land may no longer have several weeks to prepare the ground with bullocks or water buffalo; they may have to use power-driven farm equipment to prepare the seedbed quickly and plant the next crop. Even in some countries where new varieties are not yet widely spread, the profitability and feasibility of farm mechanization are being increasingly recognized. In Thailand, where the movement of goods from farm to market is largely by canal or river, rice fields are prepared principally by water buffalo. Under these circumstances, farmers are discovering it is more economical to hire someone with a tractor to plow the rice fields for a few dollars

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per acre than to feed and care for a team of water buffalo all year just to use them during a few weeks at plowing time. Some 20,000 to 25,000 imported tractors plowed an estimated one-fourth of the rice acreage this past year, mostly on a custom-hire basis—not unlike the way in which wheat is harvested in the Great Plains of the United States.

The more intensive farming methods associated with the new technology require more farm labor. The new varieties will not respond to the traditional practice of planting the crop and then virtually forgetting it until harvest time. Substantial amounts of additional labor must be invested in applying fertilizer, weeding and the like. Expansion of the area that can be multiple-cropped is also resulting in a more effective use of the rural labor supply, particularly during the dry season. In Asia, where underemployed labor constitutes one of the world's largest underutilized resources, this promises a major economic gain. For the first time, there is the possibility of significant labor scarcities in localized rural areas.

III

Changes associated with the new farm technology have a social as well as an economic impact. The exciting new cereal varieties are so superior to the traditional varieties and so dramatic in their impact that they are becoming "engines of change" wherever used. They may be to the agricultural revolution in Asia what the steam engine was to the industrial revolution in Europe.

Successful adoption of the new seed requires the simultaneous adoption of new cultural practices and the use of modern inputs. The seasonal rhythm of rural activity, once determined largely by the monsoon, is changing as farmers begin to double-crop and to introduce new combinations of crops. Farmers taking advantage of the new technology must enter the market; they cannot remain subsistence farmers. Rural Asians will change and innovate—when it is to their advantage to do so. Significantly, there may be some spin-off from this breakthrough in agriculture, this initial break with tradition. Family planners should take heart. As farmers learn that they can indeed influence their destiny, they may become much more susceptible to family planning and other equally "radical" departures.

Not all changes wrought by the new technology are desirable. In some areas, tenants are being reduced to farm laborers as

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landowners discover the profitability of the new technology in the current economic setting. Even though income to the landless may rise, the socioeconomic gap between the landowners and the landless may widen. Dissidents among the landless group in some states in India now form the nucleus of the opposition parties. Among those who own land, the income gap between those owning fertile, well-watered land and those with marginal land is also likely to widen. While many of the former may easily triple or quadruple output, the latter may not be able to employ the new technology at all. Those who can, and are thus permitted to enter the market, are likely to become more vocal and more interested in influencing the economic policies affecting their fortunes in the marketplace. Political activization of rural populations is an expected concomitant of the agricultural revolution now under way.

The leadership in most Asian countries is not unaware of the political implications of recent changes in rural areas. Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey feels strongly enough about the crash program in wheat production, initiated at his behest less than two years ago, to have it directed and monitored from his office. Some observers think President Marcos of the Philippines, who has brought his country to self-sufficiency in rice by emphasizing rural development, may be the first President of the Philippines ever to be reëlected to office. Former Prime Minister Maiwandwal of Afghanistan was so impressed with the production potential of the Mexican wheats and with the urgent need to arrest Afghanistan's growing dependence on imported wheat that he assessed each of the Ministries 2.5 percent of its current year's development budget to create a fund to launch an accelerated wheat-production program. Two years later, the Afghans appear to be progressing toward their goal of self-sufficiency in wheat. President Ayub of Pakistan shows a deep personal interest in the agricultural programs under way in his country and follows their progress on an almost daily basis. India's progressive C. Subramaniam, former Food and Agriculture Minister, took advantage of the food crisis to mobilize support for and launch the accelerated food-production effort responsible for much of India's gains.

Recent agricultural progress should not give cause for complacency. Many difficult problems lie ahead, especially in the fields of farm credit, water development, plant disease, foreign-exchange availability, marketing and price incentives.

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Purchases of farm inputs are often concentrated initially among the larger farmers who are able to finance their own purchases. The rate at which small farmers adopt new technologies is frequently determined by the availability of farm credit on reasonable terms. If, like the great majority of Asian farmers, they are dependent on the local moneylender for credit, often at interest rates ranging from 20 to 100 percent per year, they may not find it profitable to use modern inputs such as fertilizer. Available evidence indicates that fertilizer distribution in some parts of India and West Pakistan is beginning to slow because of a lack of credit.

Intensive cultivation of the new high-yielding varieties requires, in addition to an adequate supply of water, a far more sophisticated system of water control and management. At present not more than one-third of Asia's rice land is considered suitable for the new, short-stemmed rice varieties. Excessive and erratic flooding during the monsoon or rainy season is not conducive to the intensive cultivation of rice, which requires hand-weeding and the use of fertilizer and pesticides. Either too little or too much water can be damaging.

Associated with the massive introduction of exogenous varieties is the risk that some local insect or disease could suddenly wipe out the entire acreage, thus creating possible famine not unlike that occurring in Ireland more than a century ago. The worst of this threat may have passed, however, for the number of new varieties has already reduced dependence on any single one. Each year that passes should make the threat less dangerous.

Rice production during the dry season, once limited by the lack of varieties adapted to the off season, is now limited by a lack of water. This can be remedied either by developing underground water resources, which are quite abundant in some areas, or by using pumps to lift water from the numerous rivers and canals that flow through many of the rice-growing areas during the dry season. The exploitation of unused water resources will expand the acreage suitable for planting the high-yielding rices. Few, if any, developing countries are endowed with all the raw materials needed for manufacture of chemical fertilizers—phosphate rock, potash, sulfur and natural gas or naphtha. As the use of fertilizer expands, many countries, chronically faced with a scarcity of foreign exchange, are hard pressed to find enough hard currency for the required imports. For some individual countries, such as

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India, this scarcity of foreign exchange could effectively reduce the rate of agricultural progress.

Frustrating though these problems may be, the dominant constraint on agricultural growth is likely to be inadequate marketing systems and an overall lack of markets. The recent emphasis on agricultural development has been concentrated on the expansion of production; marketing has been largely neglected, with the result that some of the promising gains made in production may be negated. Over the past decade many of Asia's large coastal cities—Karachi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Colombo and Djakarta—have become increasingly dependent on imported foodgrains. To become self-sufficient requires not only producing a surplus in the countryside sufficient to feed these cities, but also having a marketing system capable of moving rural surpluses to the cities when needed. This means farm-to-market roads, storage facilities and a market-intelligence system to rationalize the movement of commodities.

Several Asian countries, such as Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey, could produce exportable surpluses of grain within the next few years, joining Thailand and Burma. If they do, they must develop the transport and storage facilities needed to move potentially large surpluses of grain from often remote rural areas into world markets. If exportable surpluses develop, there will be mounting pressure on Japan and the EEC countries—where cereal production is often subsidized at prices double the world market price—to reduce subsidies and permit imports.

IV

Problem areas notwithstanding, an agricultural revolution is under way in Asia. The new cereal varieties provide a means for tapping some of the vast, but as yet largely unrealized, food-producing potential of the tropics and subtropics, putting them on a more competitive footing with the temperate-zone cereal producers. The agricultural breakthrough occurring in several major Asian countries can be repeated in Latin America and Africa. Mexico, which once depended on imports for nearly half its wheat needs, is now exporting small quantities of both wheat and corn. Kenya, until recently a food-aid recipient, has produced an exportable surplus of corn, its food staple. Tunisia and Morocco are introducing the Mexican wheats. Much of the technology now being applied in Asia will also be applied in both

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Latin America and Africa, if the necessary top-level political support and proper combination of economic policies are forthcoming.

The farm sector now constitutes from one-third to one-half of most Asian economies. It is conceivable that the 2 percent rate of increase in food production prevailing during the early and mid-1960s could accelerate to 4 or 5 percent yearly over the next few years, provided markets can absorb the additional output. The additional purchasing power thus generated for both production and consumer goods will stimulate a more rapid rate of growth in the non-farm sector. The net effect should be a much more rapid rate of overall economic growth than would otherwise have prevailed. If the Asian agricultural revolution continues, it could well become the most significant world economic development since the economic rebirth of Europe following World War II.

This agricultural revolution is not the ultimate solution to the food-population problem, but it does buy some much needed additional time in which to mount effective family-planning programs. If food scarcity lessens as anticipated in some of the major food-deficit countries, governments recently preoccupied with real or impending food crises can again turn their attention to the business of development. Although the need for food aid is likely to lessen sharply within the next few years, capital needed for investment in the agricultural infrastructure is certain to increase. The need for technical assistance seems likely to rise as the problems generated by dynamic movement in agriculture increase. The need for foreign private investment in agrobusiness will also rise sharply as farmers clamor for the inputs they need to take full advantage of the new genetic potentials available to them.

The positive economic effects of an agricultural takeoff in Asian countries are quite evident. What is not so readily realized is that it will bolster the confidence of national leaders in their ability to handle other seemingly insoluble problems. It may also strengthen their faith in modern technology and its potential for improving the well-being of their people.

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FOREIGN POLICY PREMISES FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

By Henry Owen

ON January 20, a new American President will appear on the East Portico of the Capitol to speak, among other things, to the question: What lies ahead in foreign policy? The question will be posed not merely by the advent of a new administration; in greater degree than at any time since 1945, Americans are questioning the concepts which in recent years have shaped their country's role in world affairs.

The questioning reflects more than concern about specific issues. As James Reston pointed out in a recent column, there is a mood of unease in the country which cannot be wholly explained in terms of differences over individual policies—foreign or domestic. Nor is this mood confined to the United States. We see a somewhat similar phenomenon in other countries of the developed world.

This unease is characteristic of periods in which an old era begins to die before a new one has been born. Teilhard de Chardin speaks of "great unrest which . . . springs from a nobler and deeper cause than the difficulties of a world seeking to recover some ancient equilibrium it has lost. . . . What we are up against is the heavy swell of an unknown sea which we are just entering from behind the cape that protected us. . . . We are, at this very moment, passing through an age of transition."

This transition has many aspects, of which the social and cultural may be the most important. But it also has a political dimension. It reflects the breakup of a world order in which the nature of power and authority has seemed reasonably clear in the developed world. After the political and economic revolutions which convulsed that world in the first half of the nineteenth century, peoples looked increasingly to the nation-state to meet their security and economic needs—and to provide a set of values which would give meaning to their lives. Within the nation-state, they looked increasingly to the central government as the symbol of national identity and the fountainhead of power and legitimate authority. And among national states they perceived adversary and hegemonial relations which provided a congenial outlet for the aggressive impulses which Dr. Lorenz has so well

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described in animal species, as well as for the collective pride which seems so highly developed among humans.

Despite the misgivings of such prophets as Acton and Burckhardt, mankind seemed to have found—in the new order of strong, centralized nation-states—a framework for enduring progress. A golden era appeared to be at hand, as stable and timeless as the monarchs who presided over most of it.

World War I and the Great Depression marked the partial breakdown of this order. They showed that a system based on the notion of all-powerful, competing, national states simply would not work in an era of technological and economic interdependence. But this was not clearly seen at the time; instead, homeopathic remedies were applied: still more power to national states and governments and still greater isolation among them.

All this culminated in the catastrophe of World War II. In its wake, the West's prime concern was to avoid a recurrence of disasters to which the existing order had shown itself so prone: to fend off a postwar depression, and to deter another great war in the developed world. Wise and imaginative measures were directed to these ends. For the supreme crisis of the developed world came at one of those rare times when a fair number of men of unusual force and talent were at hand: Truman, Marshall, Acheson, Keynes, Monnet and Adenauer do not exhaust the list. As a result, the dangers which loomed so large in the developed world after 1945 diminished. Full employment was virtually attained; the threat of war among developed countries receded.

These successes were achieved in good part by innovations (the Marshall Plan, the International Monetary Fund, NATO and GATT) which recognized the bankruptcy of the old order and looked to new patterns of international action. But public understanding of this change was clouded. One reason was the dominant role of the United States; seen by some as simply a new variant of familiar hegemonial relations among nation-states, our influence both concealed and compensated for the structural deficiencies of the old order.

Twenty years after the war, our unnaturally large role is being constrained in response to the revival of strength in other areas, some waning of the Soviet military threat, our domestic concerns and a growing awareness that American national power cannot solve every problem abroad. As our role diminishes, it becomes evident that other states are unable to meet, through national

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action, needs hitherto fulfilled by the United States. Thus, the passing of the postwar era underlines not only the need for new policy, but also the nature of the shifts which have been under way during that era in the developed world.

It is now clear that the modern industrial nation-state is simply not adequate to the needs of the day—that the most important problems confronting these states will no longer yield to the powers through which their governments have traditionally made their will prevail: the sword and the public purse. In the present environment, none of these governments can assure their purposes, unless their authority and power are increasingly supplemented from other sources: new forms of international action and increasing involvement of the private sector. An example of this is the widening awareness of limits on effective use of the American Government's power abroad and the growing realization that action by even the most wealthy government, alone, cannot mobilize the external resources needed to aid growth in underdeveloped areas—whether in Asia and Latin America or in our own ghettoes.

Thus traditional notions of the power and authority of national governments no longer command—in the developed world at least—the allegiance that they did in times past. Symbols and slogans which derive from these notions are losing their force. Peoples grope for new concepts which will respond more directly to the needs of our day. The failure to find them as yet accounts for some of the unease and questioning which characterizes this transitional period.

Almost two years ago, in Warsaw, a philosopher suggested that the concept which would eventually replace past national slogans was that of "community." He was evidently using the term more loosely than the dictionary (which speaks of people living in the same place and under the same laws), to mean the coming together in common entities—without regard to national divisions—of people who have common purposes.

Of course, the concept of community is a vague one, but then many new ideas are vague when they first make their appearance. And perhaps the term "community" is not the best way to describe this idea; its use risks confusion between the experience of the European Community and other quite different and less ambitious forms of joint action. But if we look to substance rather than semantics and for broad direction rather than detail, I sus-

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pect we will find the philosopher's judgment sound as to what the current transitional period presages: the increasing emergence of institutions which permit like-minded people to direct their efforts to common ends, without regard to traditional limitations imposed by the sovereign prerogatives of national governments.

Increasingly, just such institutions are moving into areas formerly thought the province of these governments. Some widen national boundaries, as in the case of the European Community—the best example; others, like the World Bank and regional development banks, reach out beyond them; still others, like the multinational corporations, ignore these boundaries, to tap private resources. The strength and nature of these institutions evidently vary widely; the key point, in all cases, is that their scope is no longer defined or limited by old concepts of the power and authority of national governments. (One could make somewhat the same point about the domestic scene, where new institutions which are not tied to traditional notions of political authority arise to meet the problems of our cities.)

II

Recognition of these tendencies should play an important role in determining the future direction of American foreign policy—for the long term as much as for the next Administration.

In the developed world, it should lead to a realization of the necessity for a new structure of relations which will facilitate effective joint action, and thus offer an alternative to past notions of national rivalry and hegemony. Building a solid core of power within this framework—that is, among the United States, Western Europe and Japan—is evidently the key to many of the actions discussed below—and to a good deal more besides. For such a structure will also help in shaping a sensible relation between the growing power which postwar change has generated in the developed world and the increasing turmoil which it portends in the developing countries.

All historical analogies are highly imperfect, but there are at least two similarities worth remarking between the current revolution in these countries and the developed world's somewhat less abrupt entrance into the modern era two centuries ago. One is the awakening of these peoples to the fact that the physical environment can be changed for the better by human effort. Another is the raising of the nation to the highest place among popu-

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lar symbols. Remaining colonial authority, tribal and ethnic loyalties, religious attachments—all are subordinated to the symbols of nationalism. It is ironic that this change should take place in the developing world just when the limitations of national power are becoming increasingly evident in the developed world.

These two forces—nationalism and a belief in progress—must work to unsettle the outlook and physical surroundings of a large part of the Third World's population, even as a like transformation of attitudes set the West off on its explosive course in the late eighteenth century. Conceivably these forces may work themselves out into new patterns of stability, as seems to have happened in Mexico and Turkey. The obstacles are formidable, however.

For belief in progress arouses the nation to an increasing preoccupation with economic development, while the conditions for its fulfillment are at least partly lacking. And growing nationalism compounds the resulting instability, by bringing emerging nations into conflict with each other and by leading them to try to involve U.S. and Soviet and Chinese power in support of their national ambitions.

Thus the prospect is for continuing upheaval, as well as some progress, in much of the developing world. The question is whether this upheaval will result in cataclysmic and global violence analogous to that produced in the developed world by a century and a half of revolutionary change.

There is this great difference: modernizing Western Europe and Japan were centers of great power. When they experienced depression or succumbed to extremism or went to war, the impact on the rest of the world was evident. There are no comparable aggregations of strength in the developing countries. Predominant power remains where it has been: in the developed world. How that power is used will thus determine whether two key dangers which turmoil in the developing areas could pose to global peace and well-being lead to a real crisis:

First is the danger that the developing countries will become the Balkans of this era, generating crises and conflicts which drag the great powers into war. This danger has hung over us since World War II. During this period, conflicts in developing countries involved us twice in war and once in a major nuclear confrontation. The recent Middle Eastern crisis underlines the point.

Second is the danger that chronic poverty and hunger will

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hasten, in the world at large, the process that we are trying so hard to avert in America: widening division between an increasingly prosperous white community and an increasingly embittered, impoverished and undereducated multiracial "other world." Such a growing North-South division would not threaten America's power position; the developing countries are too weak to do us physical harm. But the moral values which are as much a part of our country as its physical resources could be eroded if we were content to accept the role of passive bystander in the face of deepening hostility and human misery abroad. Like the traditional rich landlord, we could wind up being corrupted by our isolation and alienation from those about us.

These dangers help to define two major tasks confronting the developed world—even as the changes in that world help to define new ways in which these needs must be addressed.

III

The first task is to meet peacekeeping needs in developing areas and to reduce the likelihood that these areas will become a focus for conflict among great powers. The long-term trend toward larger communities combined with the evident risks attendant on national military involvement of the great powers suggests that these needs should be met, where possible, by international action. Clearly this does not mean joint action by a "Holy Alliance" of the developed countries; on the contrary, the most viable world order is likely to be one in which these countries are able increasingly to hold aloof from most military crises in developing areas. The principle of joint action can be best expressed, in this case, through international instruments which lie beyond the direct control of the developed world: regional groupings of developing countries, and the United Nations. Both of these have grave deficiencies; the common institutions are weak, the common purposes tenuous. None the less, they may eventually provide a framework for meeting certain limited peacekeeping needs, through the common action of those members who share certain minimum goals.

Regional groupings cannot be expected in the near future to mobilize forces to repel direct major external aggression. Therefore there is still a need for the deterrent effect of an evident U.S. willingness to fulfill its treaty commitments. Implicit in the goal of keeping nuclear weapons from spreading in the Third World

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is a determination to do just this—to assure that countries which rely on our help in maintaining their independence against direct external attack do not find us wanting. The more likely threats to peace in developing areas, however, are of a lower order of magnitude—*e.g.* local disputes and infiltration of arms and men across frontiers. Here regional groupings may prove more important.

In this hemisphere, the Organization of American States has already met some limited peacekeeping needs. In the future, it should be able to meet others if they emerge, even though, as in the past, only the members most directly concerned may decide to participate in any given venture. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity has already played some part in helping to conciliate disputes. It has not yet developed any peacekeeping capability, but there is no reason to preclude this in years to come.

In East Asia, prospects are shadowed by Viet Nam. But few countries outside of Indochina will be as vulnerable to infiltration as South Viet Nam—a divided country with a history of colonial and civil war. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia local nationalism, reinforced by coöperation among countries of this area, could well prove an effective defense against limited threats to the peace—assuming that these threats have not been magnified by prior communist success in Viet Nam.

Two regional and subregional groupings now exist in East Asia: The Asian and Pacific Council, which includes Australia, Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam; and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which includes Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. Neither of these now plans to undertake peacekeeping responsibilities. Movement by ASEAN in this direction, however, may be foreshadowed by already existing bilateral coöperation—between Thailand and Malaysia, and between Malaysia and Indonesia—in meeting certain limited common security problems. The development of an effective regional or subregional peacekeeping capability in East Asia obviously lies far in the future, but with time it is possible. There and elsewhere, what happens will depend on the initiative and sense of responsibility of the countries most directly concerned. If they want to move forward the United States should do what it can to encourage them—both by being prepared to provide material aid and by not crowding them with too large a U.S. role.

The United States may also be able to play a more active part

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in strengthening the other alternative to great-power military involvement: U.N. peacekeeping. The U.N.'s capability to deploy effective peacekeeping forces has been shown in the Congo, Kashmir, the Middle East and Cyprus. A number of steps could be taken to strengthen this capability: more earmarking of national units for potential U.N. duty, new forms of international training, improved U.N. staff and command arrangements. The United States should do what it can to bring all this about. We should recognize, however, that success will depend more on tacit agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union than on these new initiatives. The United Nations cannot hope to meet peacekeeping needs effectively in the face of active opposition by either superpower.

In a rational world this opposition should not be too hard to avoid. The Soviets also have an interest in helping to prevent situations from arising in the developing areas which could fulfill the analogy of 1914. But their actions have so far reflected only spasmodic awareness of this fact: They helped to stir up trouble in the Middle East, then drew back when it exploded. Their policy evidently reflects both a desire to fish in troubled waters and a determination not to become militarily involved. The danger of miscalculation is evident. Clarity in U.S. policy may help to reduce this danger.

Perhaps in the wake of the shared commitments made in connection with the nonproliferation treaty, it may now be easier to obtain Soviet coöperation in strengthening U.N. peacekeeping. This is not to say that U.S.-Soviet competition in developing areas will soon abate; it is likely to remain intense, pending deep-seated and long-term changes in Soviet society. But we should none the less be clear as to the direction in which we wish eventually to move. In these enterprises, too, we should find increasing opportunities for concert with Western Europe and Japan. While their indisposition to deploy substantial military force to developing areas will probably persist, they may be prepared increasingly to join us in supporting regional and U.N. efforts to meet local peacekeeping needs. Over the longer term, this movement may well run with the grain of history.

All of this fits in with the main theme outlined earlier: that traditional uses of national power by developed countries are not likely to figure as prominently in the future as in the past; that the U.S. role, in particular, is likely to decline; and that multilateral

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groupings and coöperation offer the most promising—if still highly imperfect—way of filling the resulting vacuum.

IV

The other area where the power of the developed world and change in the Third World interact is that of economic development. The developed nations have an interest in hastening growth in the developing nations which goes beyond the powerful moral considerations discussed earlier. Economic progress will not insure against turmoil. Change and revolutions of one kind or another will be the order of the day in the developing world. But persuasive promise of material improvement may help to effect change somewhat more constructively. For economic development is likely, in varying degree, to cement national cohesion, to develop leadership groups with constructive objectives, to subordinate local and sectional differences, and to act as a partial political substitute for external quarrels.

It is also true, of course, that economic growth creates its own tensions. For growth can take place only as part of a social and cultural upheaval which overturns established patterns of thought and action. But these patterns can hardly endure in any event. The issue is not whether there will be change or a perpetuation of existing conditions; it is rather whether change will take forms which create a larger or lesser risk of the kinds of chaos and violence which could lead to military involvement of other countries. Thus economic growth can help, albeit indirectly and to a limited extent, to reduce the chances of great-power military confrontation.

Economic development means to transform societies—with all that this involves in the way of new attitudes, skills and institutions. For the most part, this must be accomplished by the developing countries themselves. Outside assistance in the amounts that are foreseeable will be only a marginal increment to any developing country's total resources. Marginal, however, does not mean immaterial. For the relevant comparison is not between aid and the developing country's total resources, but rather between aid and the very limited resources which that country can mobilize for investment after providing for minimum consumption. It has been estimated, for example, that in the 1950s external aid added more than one-third to the total internal resources available for investment in developing countries.

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Nor can the effect of aid be judged only in quantitative terms. Sensibly administered and complemented by wise counsel, it can help to tip the balance within a developing country in favor of those who argue for rigorous measures of self-help—hopefully encouraging long-range development planning, internal reform and a vital role for the private sector.

Study of individual countries supports the view that aid can play an important part in stimulating growth. John Pincus finds that the developing countries which have grown most rapidly have been favored by massive U.S. aid, where they have not enjoyed other fortuitous advantages (minerals, tourism or staple exports) which enabled them to strike it rich.[1] Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout describe four countries in which a "substantial increase in investment financed largely by foreign loans and grants had led to rapid growth of GNP followed by a steady decline in the dependence on external financing."[2] Edward Mason has suggested that the difference between Indian and Pakistani growth rates owes something to the difference between these countries' per capita external aid.[3]

In short, the general notion that developing countries are a bottomless pit simply does not stand up under close analysis. Some countries clearly are at a stage of development where large-scale aid would not be useful. Others are following such reckless policies as to make aid inappropriate. But for some of the largest developing countries substantial external aid can be useful in promoting growth. In the provision of this aid, the need for joint, rather than national, action is again evident. Although studies of the amounts of aid that are needed and can be put to good use in promoting growth in developing areas are necessarily inexact, they usually come to somewhat similar conclusions, and suggest amounts which exceed what any one developed country is likely to provide—or even what all these countries are likely to mobilize from public sources alone. The task for the developed world is thus one of concerting the sum total of its economic policies—in respect not only of aid but also of trade, monetary policy and private investment—in ways which will create an environment

[1] John Pincus, "How Much Aid for Under-Developed Countries," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, September 1967.

[2] Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," *American Economic Review*, September 1966.

[3] Edward S. Mason, "Economic Development in India & Pakistan," Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 13, September 1966.

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congenial to growth in the developing, as well as the developed, world.

Here is a task which can give substance to the concept of a community of developed nations made up of the United States, Western Europe and Japan. For only if these three industrial giants coöperate closely can the task be discharged. And it is hard to see how the West European nations can play their proper role in this concert, except as they come together increasingly in joint action and in joint institutions.

In all of this, the *relative* U. S. role will surely wind down, for reasons that have been discussed. The day when the United States could or should provide the lion's share of aid, or meet most of the world's need for international liquidity, is clearly past. The new forms of international action which hopefully will replace it should be addressed to four purposes, whose fulfillment would permit increased resources to be transferred to developing countries without a difficult and dramatic expansion in traditional programs of bilateral foreign aid:

(1) Providing increasing amounts of development assistance via multilateral aid institutions and programs: notably, the World Bank and its soft-loan affiliate (the International Development Association); consortia organized by the World Bank to deal with especially large and important needs (India and Pakistan); and regional development banks, *e.g.* in Latin America, Asia and Africa. These multilateral programs assure that the resources of many donor countries besides the United States are tapped, and that these resources are combined with outside counsel, which is sometimes received with better grace from an international institution than from individual developed countries. Centering aid increasingly about the World Bank complex and regional banks also helps to put it on a long-term basis, since this is the only basis on which banking institutions can operate. Of course, the pace at which the United States can move toward reliance on multilateral programs will hinge on the willingness of others to contribute. Until and unless that willingness greatly expands, large parts of our aid will have to continue to move through bilateral channels.

(2) Creating a monetary system in which international decisions, rather than those of the United States, fix the level of world reserves and from which the developing countries can draw substantial benefit. The Special Drawing Rights scheme

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agreed upon at Rio is a step in the right direction. Activating that system will not only mitigate recurring monetary crises in a period when other countries are no longer prepared unquestioningly to accept U.S. deficits and policies; it will also help to meet the developing nations' needs for additional resources.

(3) Reducing world trade barriers and affording temporary preferential access for developing countries to the markets of industrial nations. Here, too, only joint action can be effective; no single industrial country could reduce its barriers without inviting a disproportionate invasion of its domestic market. The resulting transfer of net resources might not be as large as some developing countries expect, but the attraction and stimulus of wider export opportunities could exert an effect on their economies which cannot be wholly measured in quantitive terms. It would not substitute for aid, but it could reinforce the effect of aid in bringing about needed structural changes, leading to more market-oriented and hence more efficient economies in the developing world.

(4) Stepping up efforts to encourage the flow of private investment (particularly in agro-industry) to developing countries. Boundaries between the public and private sectors, as well as between nation-states, will have to be breached; the requisite resources simply cannot be secured through governmental action alone. The notion that there is something wicked or exploitive in private foreign investment is coming increasingly to be recognized for the fiction that it is. There are opportunities for both developed and developing countries to find novel ways of encouraging it: guarantees, subsidies of interest rates, joint ventures, etc. Two international institutions—the World Bank's International Finance Corporation and the private multinational corporation—have a large role to play. Along with this might go new measures to encourage and assist borrowing by the developing countries in the private capital markets of the developed countries. There is some parallel in all this to the domestic scene in the United States, where the limitations on national governmental action in fighting the problems of urban poverty, the role and relevance of private resources in meeting these problems, and the need for new forms of public-private partnership to this end are becoming increasingly accepted as the ideological myths of the 1930s fade away.

Each of these four purposes is of at least as much concern to

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developing as to the developed nations and cannot be achieved without their coöperation; a concert of developed countries arrogating to themselves the task of deciding what is good for the world economy would be not only politically counterproductive but economically ineffective. Coöperation will have to occur, first, between developed countries and the emerging regional economic groupings of developing countries,[4] and, second, within global organizations that include both developed and developing countries: the World Bank, IMF, GATT and UNCTAD. Our eventual objective should be to see the Soviet Union and the East European nations also playing a constructive role in these international economic programs. This will be slow in coming, but over the longer term, perhaps the communists will learn—as we have—that the political advantage they seek through bilateral arrangements is short-lived and ephemeral.

The possibility of joint action by the United States, Western Europe and Japan to meet the needs of developing countries rests on the assumption that a more viable political base will be created in the developed world for continuing and growing transfers of resources to developing countries. This is an assumption whose importance is exceeded only by its optimism. A promising initiative now being taken in the developed world is the Exploratory Committee on Society, Development and Peace, jointly created by the World Council of Churches and the Vatican. This committee, which recently convened an international meeting in Beirut, will try not only to lay out proposals for action by the industrial countries to aid development, but also to create national and local constituencies in these countries to support such action. Economic development aid so far has lacked an active grass-roots constituency. Who could do a better job of creating it than the churches? And what more fitting ecumenical task than helping to relieve the suffering of a large part of the human family? Having seen the churches play a critical role in generating support for civil-rights legislation in this country, we should have a healthy respect for what they might do to give substance to Pope Paul's injunction that the "new name for peace is development."

[4] This will be the easier to achieve since, in both Latin America and East Asia, the relevant groupings (the Alliance for Progress and the Ministerial Conference on Southeast Asian Development) include the developed countries most importantly involved: the United States and Japan, respectively.

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V

This article has tried to sketch some of the ways in which alternatives to national action can be applied at danger points where power in the developed world and turmoil in the Third World converge and interact. Much is already being done to give content to joint action in these fields, by throwing American support behind regional organizations, by channeling our aid through multilateral programs and by otherwise strengthening institutions which permit common action to be taken effectively. When the record of the last few years is reviewed in all these respects, it will be found to be an impressive one.

As the war in Viet Nam abates, we will need to go much further. Our instinctive aversion to innovation, except in times of evident and desperate crisis, may be overcome if we contemplate not only the specific actions that are needed but also the underlying reasons for that need: the "nobler and deeper" causes of the present unease of which Teilhard de Chardin spoke and which he rightly attributed to the uncertainties generated by man's passage to new and larger forms of communal action. If we can thus understand better the era of transition through which we are passing, it may be easier to look beyond it to new types of international action in the next phase of American foreign policy.

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TAKING THE MONETARY INITIATIVE

By C. Fred Bergsten

A WORLD economy must be managed (de facto or de jure) by a mix of national dominance and international policy coördination. As the dominance of the United States shrank over the past decade—in fact if not in the consciousness of all U.S. policy-makers—some degree of integration of policy became necessary, at least among the major nations. The alternative was to risk the benefits of international intercourse by reverting to uncoördinated exercise of autonomous national policies.

The realization of this need, however, was fostered only by crises, such as the London gold flurry in 1960, the convulsions surrounding exchange-rate changes of major currencies in 1961 and 1967, increasing concern about the gold convertibility of the dollar, and most recently by the gold rushes of late 1967 and early 1968. Despite the successive deepening of these perturbations, policy integration progressed far enough each time only to satisfy the decision-makers that they could now avoid repetition of the previous outburst. The plans of the central bankers, like those of the generals, were usually directed to the last battle. It is the thesis of this article that fundamental decisions are needed to place the world economy on a foundation sufficiently firm to avoid fear of disruption by international monetary forces and to prevent the *next* crisis.

There is nothing new in a call for change in the international monetary system. Most of the proposals, however, have failed in at least one of three respects. Many have concentrated on only one aspect of the international monetary problem, such as the need for assured additions to total world reserves. Many have focused on the major industrialized countries and virtually ignored the problems of the rest of the world. And, most important, many have failed to recognize the very special role of the United States in the world economy and to allow for it systematically in any new monetary arrangements.[1]

The international monetary problem has three component parts: the *adjustment* of imbalances in individual countries' balances of payments; the amount of *liquidity* available in the sys-

[1] This third element is a common shortcoming in the proposals of many leading authorities in the field, including Edward M. Bernstein, Fritz Machlup and Robert Triffin.

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tem to finance such imbalances; and the maintenance of *confidence* in the ongoing stability of the system itself. The adjustment and liquidity problems are linked inextricably. Adjustment and liquidity are perfect substitutes for each other: the more that is available of one, the less is needed of the other. The crucial question is the tradeoff between the two. How much liquidity should the system provide and how much adjustment should it require?

The question cuts to the heart of the international monetary problem because a country has only three choices when faced with a payments imbalance, whether surplus or deficit. It can finance the imbalance, which for a deficit country generally means losing reserves—a response that can be carried on only so long. It can adjust the balance indirectly, through internal measures to affect the growth of the economy, interest rates, etc. Or it can adjust by acting directly on external transactions, by changing the exchange rate, instituting controls on trade or capital movements, or by changes in government expenditures overseas.

Either of the adjustment approaches may be painful, since the policies required to meet the balance-of-payments objective may conflict with those required to meet other national objectives. A surplus country with full employment (*e.g.* Germany in 1965) may not want to expand its economy further, in order to reduce the surplus, because of the risk of inflation. A deficit country with unemployment (*e.g.* the United States in the early 1960s) may resist depressing domestic demand, in order to reduce the deficit, because the unemployment problem would be exacerbated. A surplus country may not wish to let its exchange rate appreciate, in view of the unfavorable effect on its competitive position, while a deficit country may not wish to let its exchange rate depreciate because of the potential losses of national income (and prestige). And controls over international transactions are undesirable, since they reduce economic efficiency and hence overall welfare. Adjustment may thus be an anathema to *both* surplus and deficit countries and neither may want to adopt policies necessary to effect it. If adjustment does take place, however, both surplus and deficit countries will be affected, regardless of who initiates the action, since a deficit can be reduced only if the corresponding surplus is reduced at the same time.

Here enters the link to liquidity. If all countries resist adjustment, it is possible to finance imbalances over an extended period

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of time. However, excessive financing would permit deficit countries to drain real resources away from surplus countries and hence "live beyond their means" for prolonged periods. On the other hand, insufficient financing could force countries to undergo a major recession or institute controls over trade and investment flows, doing harm not only to their own national objectives but to the welfare of the world. A balanced international monetary system should thus provide enough liquidity to permit avoidance of undesirable adjustment policies but not so much liquidity that transfers of international resources are permitted to persist for lengthy periods of time. The definitions of "enough" and "lengthy" are of course the key components of the issue.

But the need for international liquidity goes further because most industrialized countries desire regular increases in their reserves. They want to increase their capabilities to avoid adjustment of future payments imbalances, since such imbalances are likely to rise as the scale of international transactions rises. Unless *total* world liquidity is rising, increases in one country's reserves can take place only if there is a corresponding decline in another's and no country is willing to see its reserves decline by any sizable amount for any sustained period of time. The universal desire for increasing reserves could thus generate a series of restrictive internal and external policies, such as the escalation of world interest rates now fully in evidence, with a consequent slowing of world trade and economic growth as happened in 1967. The situation would obviously be worse if liquidity were to decline through conversions of dollar or sterling balances into U.S. or British gold.

An insufficiency of liquidity can thus have a decidedly deflationary impact on the world economy by forcing precipitate adjustment of payments imbalances and even by encouraging policies to build reserves where deficits do not exist. Too much liquidity, on the other hand, can permit postponement of needed adjustment and hence promote inflationary tendencies around the world. A reconciliation between the two must be a major goal of any changes in the international monetary system.

The confidence aspect of the problem is simply the modern equivalent of Gresham's Law. When any monetary system contains more than one monetary asset, there is a possibility of shifts from one to another in ways that undermine the entire system. The present international monetary system is highly susceptible

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since it contains four such assets: gold, dollars, sterling and claims on the International Monetary Fund. The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) at the Fund will be a fifth. Since gold, dollars and sterling are also held by private citizens around the world, such shifts can occur beyond the reach of the monetary authorities, as evidenced so vividly by the recent series of gold rushes.

The present lack of confidence has been seriously affecting the liquidity-adjustment tradeoff. First, until mid-March, private gold purchases were draining gold from world monetary reserves so that the gold component of world liquidity was constantly being reduced and the problem of the adequacy of reserves intensified. Second, uncertainties about the continued convertibility of the dollar into gold at $35 per ounce jeopardized the potential contribution to liquidity of further increases in dollar balances, increased the possibility of actual reductions in world liquidity through conversion of dollars into gold, and hence increased the pressure on the United States to adjust. As far as the dollar is concerned, the confidence problem is purely a gold problem since no other currency rivals it for either private or official use. The two-price gold system adopted on March 17, which seals off all gold now in official hands and greatly reduces the likelihood that the monetary authorities will support the private gold price, was directed precisely at these problems.

The special nature of the U.S. role in the world economy extends far beyond this matter of confidence, however. The impact of international transactions on the U.S. economy differs greatly from their impact on any other noncommunist country. Exports of goods and services represent only about 6 percent of our gross national product, while the like percentages in other major countries range from 13 percent in France to 42 percent in the Netherlands. The United States would thus have to generate massive changes in its national income to affect significantly its external position; a large part of a whole year's growth would probably have to be foregone, and never made up in the future, to reach a zero balance solely through deflation. One consequence would be sharply increased unemployment. Such a policy would be a classic case of permitting the tail to wag the dog.[2]

[2] In the recent past the United States has permitted its economy to overheat and it should attempt to eliminate the excesses on domestic grounds alone. Success in these efforts would, of course, have favorable external effects, because it would help reduce the payments deficit from its recent excessive level and heighten foreign confidence in U.S. economic management. But this must be distinguished from deflationary policies undesirable from the purely domestic standpoint and undertaken solely to meet international needs.

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In addition, we bear an extremely costly foreign-exchange burden—about $1.5 billion yearly since 1960—to maintain troops in Europe to meet our NATO commitments.[3] U.S. troops are in Europe at the request of the host governments and in full accord with NATO strategy and political judgments. Our expenditures in this respect clearly respond to a multilateral decision. There is thus good reason for our NATO allies, at least, to be tolerant of this element of our payments deficit.

A third major difference is the U.S. role as the world's chief banker. The combination of our abundant national savings, our highly developed capital markets, the relatively underdeveloped capital markets in the rest of the world, the leadership of U.S. corporations in pursuing the multinational operations on which the world economy of the future may well rest and which today are important in helping to bridge the "technology gap," and the apparent preference of European savers for higher liquidity—all these have produced capital outflows from the United States which have contributed appreciably to our deficits. Their persistence, despite the presence of ever-tightening controls since 1963, clearly reveals the demand for them on both sides of the Atlantic. The anguished reactions of a number of countries when our controls were tightened on January 1 reinforce this conclusion. To the extent that foreign dollar holdings—and hence our deficit, as usually defined—rise along with increases in our long-term assets, we are simply performing a desirable international banking function which requires special world recognition if it is to continue.

But the uniqueness of the U.S. role goes far beyond these national characteristics. Our balance-of-payments position has been the core of the liquidity and adjustment aspects of the international monetary problem since 1945. During the first part of the postwar period—the era of "dollar shortage"—our payments position was unanimously considered too strong for the health of the world economy, although it was in deficit (under all present definitions) consistently after 1949. There was widespread agreement that the deficit was not large enough—it averaged about $1.5 billion annually—and that the disequilibrium was one of

[3] Any "offsets" that we may have achieved through sales of military equipment to our allies would probably have occurred even if our troops had not been there, perhaps on an even larger scale, since the Europeans would then have been more responsible for their own conventional defense. The financial offsets of the past year are simply a statistical exercise. The hugely significant effect of our present "offset" agreement with Germany will be discussed later.

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excessive dollar strength. Any necessary adjustment needed to be in the direction of increasing the U.S. deficit, and we obliged through the Marshall Plan, tolerance of foreign discrimination against our exports, encouragement of American travel and investment in Europe and promotion of foreign procurement under U.S. aid and military programs. Our deficits were the main source of increases in world reserves, providing an umbrella under which Europe could rebuild without balance-of-payments constraints and under which trade and payments liberalization (and the creation of the European Economic Community) could proceed.

Around 1958, however, the situation changed. The U.S. deficit increased sharply to $3 billion or more and fears of excessive availability of dollars began to be heard. The declining ratio between the U.S. gold stock and foreign short-term dollar holdings contributed to a deterioration of confidence in the dollar and hence in the entire system. However, the accumulation of dollars continued. This was because, first, as the volume of international transactions increased, businessmen needed to build their holdings of internationally acceptable money and no currency could begin to rival the dollar in this regard. Second, the supply of gold becoming available to monetary authorities remained insufficient to provide the growth in total reserves which was sought, so the dollar maintained its position as the main engine of reserve growth. Third, any greater conversion of dollars into U.S. gold would force us to adjust, and the measures involved would create intensely unhappy repercussions throughout the world. The United States had exported a depression in the inter-war period and other countries were wary of forcing us to do so again. They certainly did not want a devaluation of the dollar in terms of their currencies, for this would have improved further our already strong competitive position. And either of these approaches, if applied in the traditional non-discriminatory manner, would have hit hardest the other deficit countries which could least afford it.

Recent history thus displays the central role of the United States in the international monetary system. The dollar has provided the world with most of its desired increase in liquidity throughout the postwar period. The amounts, however, have seldom seemed quite right; they were too little at first, too much of late. Thus adjustment was called for between the United States and Western Europe. The United States did adjust when increases in our deficit were required and Europe fully acquiesced.

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But the reverse situation—a European surplus and a U.S. deficit—has remained intractable for a decade. The United States cannot effectively adjust through conventional means, because it would be disastrous for its domestic economy or ruinous to the monetary system, or both. Under such circumstances, reform in the system is inevitable; the question is "how."

II

The de facto reforms of the present decade have proceeded on two planes. At the perimeter of the system, the major industrialized countries have coöperated to the degree they felt necessary to prevent its total collapse. Most of their steps were aimed at immediate problems of confidence and did not deal with the more fundamental difficulties. In the early 1960s they set up the gold pool to preserve confidence in the fixed price between the dollar and gold; they established and subsequently expanded greatly the swap networks to offset short-term capital flows and thereby preserve confidence in the exchange rates of individual currencies; and they created the General Arrangements to Borrow to supplement the resources of the IMF when major currencies needed substantial financial support for a longer period. Most recently they agreed to adopt the two-price gold system to preserve existing liquidity and to try to convince the world that the official price of gold would not be raised.

This coöperation among the major countries at the perimeter can be likened to the coöperation in the military field between the United States and the Soviet Union. The nuclear superpowers can agree on such risk-limiting devices as the test ban treaty, the barring of nuclear weapons in outer space and the nonproliferation pact. But within those limits—where they seek to prevent a holocaust that would engulf them both—their competition rages unabated. Just as the whole world stood at the brink in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the monetary world stood at the brink on the Ides of March of this year, when the gold rushes threatened finally to overwhelm the monetary system. So far the perimeter defenses in both the monetary and nuclear fields have held, but neither can be guaranteed if the difficulties underlying them cannot be more fully resolved.

Within the perimeter, de facto monetary reform has been accomplished through evolution toward a tripartite world composed of a largely informal dollar area, an equally informal gold bloc

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and the more formalized sterling area. National membership in any of these groups can be judged by observing whether a country has financed imbalances in its payments position in dollars, gold or sterling. There are some borderline cases and a few countries have shifted from one group to another, but most are clearly in one of them.

A majority of countries have preferred to join the dollar area by building dollar holdings rather than converting them into U.S. gold and hence bringing pressure on the United States to reduce its deficits. Some of them have done so because their economies were so closely linked to ours that they had no real choice; among the major powers, Canada and Japan fit into this category. Others, however, have joined the dollar area despite the clear possibility of staying out. The most notable case—and one of the few formalized ones—is Germany, which in March 1967 agreed to continue indefinitely its policy of not buying gold from the United States. The pledge emerged from the trilateral talks among the United States, Britain and Germany concerning NATO troop levels and their balance-of-payments consequences; Germany clearly opted to provide financing for us rather than risk adjustment through a large withdrawal of American and British troops which would have jeopardized its national security.[4]

Canada and Japan had previously joined the dollar area to obtain special treatment under our capital control measures. The less developed countries have received special treatment under all of the U.S. balance-of-payments programs and most of them can be considered dollar (or sterling) area members. The favored treatment for the United Kingdom under our latest program, while primarily a recognition of Britain's own difficult financial situation, also reflects a tendency toward merger of the dollar and sterling areas in contradistinction to the gold bloc.

A few countries have drifted toward de facto creation of a new gold bloc. Not surprisingly, the charter members are the same countries which stuck to gold the longest during the 1930s: France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium. They have been joined by a few others including South Africa, Spain and Austria. When they have run large balance-of-payments surpluses, their desire for gold has brought pressure on the United States.

[4] Germany also agreed to purchase $500 million of medium-term U.S. bonds in U.S. fiscal year 1968. Such purchases are simply a shift from short-term to long-term dollar holdings. However, they do affect some U.S. balance-of-payments statistics, which have some importance for world confidence in the dollar.

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The world's liquidity arrangements are grossly inadequate as a result. Since the amount of gold available to monetary authorities is no longer rising, the gold-bloc countries can add to their reserves only by placing great pressure on the reserve centers or by joining the dollar area. The United States is in jeopardy as long as there are surpluses in the gold bloc, even though most countries consider moderate U.S. deficits to be in the world's interest, and our liquidity needs (beyond the dollars accumulated by dollar-area countries) have been met only through short-term expedients such as the swaps and IMF drawings, which must be reversed. Even the dollar and sterling-area countries face problems because the United States and the United Kingdom fear that any surpluses they run, although financed by dollar and sterling holdings, might at some point be transferred to the gold-bloc countries and hence exacerbate the basic pressure in the system.

The alternative, of course, is adjustment. Among the gold-bloc countries adjustment has been achieved essentially by management of the internal economy because there was no feasible alternative. Dollar and sterling-area members have been able to obtain financing from the United States and Britain as long as their credit lasted, which really meant as long as their domestic economic policies were adequate. They were forced to adjust only when their credit-worthiness came into question, which generally occurred when domestic adjustments were needed anyway.

The problem of the sterling area differed fundamentally from that of the dollar area because of the real weakness of the British economy and the fact that it was "living beyond its means;" this was finally settled by the devaluations of last November. But the "imbalance" between the dollar area and the gold bloc has remained, creating difficulties each time it has risen above $2 billion or so. The surplus countries of the gold bloc have been unwilling to take any initiatives toward adjustment and the pressure has inevitably fallen on the deficit dollar area, since reserves are finite. Thus, the United States has been forced to act.

When so forced, we have rejected deflation, beyond what was needed domestically, or devaluation for reasons already outlined. We have relied primarily on selective controls over external transactions: tied aid, Buy American rules for government procurement, export promotion devices, reductions in the duty-free allowance for returning travelers, the Interest Equalization Tax,

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and ever-tightening voluntary and then mandatory controls on private capital outflows. The more important measures have generally excepted dollar-area countries. Such favored treatment is quite rational economically, because the inability of most of these countries to withstand the adverse effects of our restrictions would have offset much of any gain in the U.S. payments position. (The latest program, announced by President Johnson on January 1, accelerated the trend toward both emphasis on controls and discriminatory application thereof.) In return, some of the dollar-area members outside the United States have begun to undertake transactions specifically aimed at improving the area's position vis-à-vis the gold bloc. Some have also shifted large portions of their dollar balances into assets which can be presented publicly as reducing the size of our deficit, enhancing world confidence in the dollar and reducing the pressure on us to adjust.

None of the U.S. measures, however, has been very effective in reducing the key international payments imbalance. The gold-bloc countries have imitated our tying of aid, adopted similar government procurement rules and export incentives, and let their interest rates rise to offset our increases. They have generally been unwilling to accept their share of adjustment, which by definition they must if the imbalance is to be reduced. And some of the money checked by our capital controls goes out through other uncontrolled channels and perhaps, since area-wide coöperation is only beginning, through exempted dollar-area countries.

Adjustment in the major imbalance thus has not occurred. What has become clear is that most countries do not want it to occur badly enough to sacrifice other national objectives. The United States is unwilling or unable to take unilateral steps to eliminate the deficit. The rest of the dollar area clearly prefers to finance our deficits rather than force us to adjust. The gold-bloc countries seem unwilling to go further than seems necessary to avoid a crisis of confidence. Such views are perfectly rational since balance-of-payments equilibrium—like a balanced national budget—should be only a means to other ends. But adequate adjustment has been absent as a result. With no agreement on financing or on the proper balance between adjustment and financing, the seeds of crisis have been planted and given due time to grow, which they most clearly have.

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III

Convincing changes are therefore needed if confidence in the system is to be regained and if it is to provide a safe basis for world growth and prosperity. The major countries must decide how to mix national autonomy, national dominance and international policy integration. The choice will reflect the several basic differences in views between the United States and the EEC: the greater impact of external transactions on European economies than on ours; the relatively higher priority attached by the most influential continental Europeans to price stability and the relatively higher priority attached by U.S. policymakers (and those in most of the rest of the world) to full employment and growth; the more global responsibility felt by the United States compared with the more insular views of the continental Europeans, which affects foreign military expenditures, aid and even liberalization of trade and payments; and the purely political objectives of each. Political considerations are important, since Europe has its strongest voice relative to the United States in the field of international finance, given the present "rules of the game." There is an obvious incentive for Europe to retain this advantage as a psychological offset to U.S. dominance in the strategic and other military fields and in economic size, technology and management.

On liquidity, two important steps have already been taken. Both move decisively away from international monetary reliance on gold, and an increase in the official price of gold—which would not in any case solve the basic problems—has thus become increasingly unlikely. The decision of the major central bankers to stop selling gold to meet private demand assures preservation of the present stock of that component of reserves. Much of the needed growth in reserves will come from Special Drawing Rights, 70 percent of which will be fully usable by participating governments to settle their international payments imbalances. Legislation has now been submitted to IMF member governments for ratification, and activation of this new international money is probable; but the crucial question is *how much* SDR will be created. This decision will be one of the next steps in the transatlantic monetary power struggle.

But the SDR, although they will be extremely helpful, are not the answer to the whole international monetary problem or

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even the liquidity aspect of it. For few observers would deny that world demand for dollars will continue to rise. Private demand certainly will, as businessmen of all countries seek to add to their working balances to finance the growing volume of international transactions. Many monetary authorities are likely to feel the same way and for the same reason. The higher yield on dollars will be decisive for many countries in determining the composition of their reserves beyond working balances. Some will wish to hold dollars in U.S. banks so that their nationals can borrow against them. The risk in holding dollars will continue to be nil for all countries so closely aligned to the United States that they would emulate any change in the dollar's exchange rate. And some will continue to want to hold dollars to finance part of any future U.S. deficits and thereby avoid forcing us to adjust. There will thus be widespread desire for the dollar to continue to play a major role in the international system.

But the U.S. deficits which might thus persist could continue to jar confidence in the system unless basic agreement is reached on how to handle adjustment and its relation to liquidity. The intra-area adjustment arrangements already developed can continue. For the basic imbalance, between the United States and Europe, there are essentially five possibilities.

First, the United States could reject hope of any coöperation and go it alone. We could unilaterally cut the link between gold and the dollar, declare ourselves ready to let our exchange rate fluctuate, and leave all the decisions up to the rest of the world. Other countries could then either accumulate dollars and finance any future U.S. deficits; or let the dollar depreciate with respect to their currencies, permitting us to improve the competitiveness of our trade position and hence adjust to any imbalance; or adopt measures to restrain their own surpluses, probably through the capital account, thus evading the other alternatives; or they could choose some mixture of the three. This approach might "work" in the sense of freeing the United States from external constraints—whichever option Europe chose. But it could undo the coöperation which has already developed, and if Europe chose the third option—as it well might, in response to such a unilateral U.S. step—it could generate a proliferation of uncoördinated national controls and possibly risk a breakdown of the international economy and even of transatlantic political relations. It is small solace to know that, in view of our greater

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economic and political independence, we would lose least from such a débâcle. This course can thus be recommended only as a last resort, although its availability should help persuade all parties to reach agreement on a more sensible solution.

Second, things might simply work out without any major new action. There are developments which suggest that the imbalance might be reduced to a low level and even eliminated: an end to the war in Viet Nam, the mounting return on U.S. foreign investment, the increasing attraction of U.S. securities for foreign investors, the possibility of some U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe and the inevitable improvement of European financial markets. However, these events can take place only over a considerable period of time. Even then, they could be offset by failure to keep our domestic economy on an even keel or by other developments adversely affecting our trade balance, increased aid programs, new Viet Nams or increased expenditures on foreign travel. This course is uncertain and very risky, given the fragile nature of confidence and the deterioration of our competitive position. It suggests indefinite retention of our present balance-of-payments measures and would add to the pressures to err on the side of conservatism in the management of our domestic economy at a time when full utilization of our resources is absolutely necessary to help cope with racial and urban crises. It can therefore not be counseled prudently if there are acceptable alternatives.

The third possibility is real coöperation between the United States and Europe through a mix of financing and adjustment. Some Europeans might have to swallow their objections to holding more dollars and assure the United States, as has Germany, that they would not try to unload them. We might have to accept more unemployment and Europe more inflation. Defense arrangements might have to change, or Europe might have to accept more of the foreign-exchange burden of our NATO costs. Agreement might be needed on a permanent reduction in the net flow of U.S. capital to Europe and coöperative steps taken to assure that market forces would not upset it. (Either side could of course "coöperate" unilaterally: the United States could "put its house in order" through draconian domestic measures, pervasive external controls or abandonment of basic foreign-policy objectives. This outcome is highly unlikely, as it should be.)

Even under such an arrangement, the United States could al-

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low the dollar to continue to play its central role only if modifications were made to protect us. Our modern domestic banking system can work effectively only because there is a lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve System, and also a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; similarly an international banking system based on a national currency is safe only with such support. It would thus have to be made publicly clear that the swap network, which now exceeds $10 billion and is thus large enough, is in fact the "lender of last resort," which would back the dollar to the hilt in any crisis; and the United States would have to provide insurance to monetary authorities by guaranteeing the gold value of their dollar holdings.

Both sides have so far resisted the various facets of this approach. We must not be misled by the present situation where the Europeans are "coöperating" in the adjustment process by pursuing economic growth policies wholly desirable for purely domestic reasons; it would not be prudent to assume that they will suddenly come to prefer full employment in the United States to price stability at home in order to help alleviate the payments imbalance. The fundamental differences in views cited above militate against the likelihood of its adoption.

An extension of present policy is the fourth alternative. At the perimeter, it would require maintenance of the devices presently in place. At the more fundamental level, it would lead to further evolution of the present tripartite world, probably with increasing formalization of the dollar area (perhaps joined by the sterling area) and the gold bloc. (Formalization of the dollar area between the United States and Canada is already virtually complete.) The other dollar-area countries, to maintain their favored treatment under the U.S. balance-of-payments measures, would begin more systematically to shift their external transactions in favor of area members and against the non-dollar world. The shifts would come first in capital movements and government procurement and might not go further—depending on who joined the area and on the magnitude of any imbalance remaining between dollar area and gold bloc.

When such area-wide preferences became necessary, European dollar countries—especially Germany, but also others such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, if the sterling area merged into the dollar area—would face acute dilemmas over which way to turn. The lure of the U.S. economy, U.S. capital and U.S.

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military power might prevail, particularly if full confidence in U.S. economic policy were reëstablished. Developments within Europe itself would be critical; if the EEC was thought likely to atrophy, for example, some of its members might be willing to assume a monetary relationship with an outside power. In such a situation, all but the most politically recalcitrant might be drawn in and a virtually global dollar standard would prevail once more.

Despite the political problems, this solution might be viable for quite a while, particularly if its development were handled skillfully. It could easily avoid the pitfalls of its forebear, the sterling area. The much greater size of the United States relative to the dollar area than of the United Kingdom to the sterling area, past or present, would enable us to meet the capital needs of the area's members as long as they assured us that dollars would not "leak" through them and improve the payments position of the gold bloc. The much greater independence of our economy from external transactions, once freed from constraints due to the balance of payments itself, would enable us to play a more independent role than was ever possible for Britain, and thereby fulfill one of the basic criteria for a reserve center.

Under such a system the United States would no longer worry much about its balance-of-payments position vis-à-vis members of the dollar area, which would be committed to hold any dollars which they earned, and could in fact redefine its "deficit" accordingly. Nor would we have to worry about the dollars already held in countries within the area; we should then, in fact, redefine our "liquidity ratio," the ratio between our reserve assets and liquid liabilities, to include only those liabilities outside the dollar area. Our responsibility would be to manage our domestic economy properly, through the pursuit of a reasonable combination of full employment and price stability, and to be sure that our foreign policy did not so antagonize important dollar-area members that they would shift to the gold bloc. To strengthen confidence further, the members of the area might wish to sell their present non-dollar reserves to us for dollars, as Canada has already done to some extent, creating a reserve pool. In return, the United States would offer all members of the area a gold-value guarantee on their dollar holdings. The members of the area would consult on how to distribute the "burden" of any necessary adjustment vis-à-vis the gold bloc.

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This arrangement, however, would clearly formalize U.S. dominance unless we were willing to accept a significant foreign voice in our domestic decision-making; and our unwillingness to do so is at the very heart of my pessimistic assessment of the acceptability of the third option. It could thus create underlying political dissatisfaction of great potential importance.

Fortunately, there is a final alternative which makes greater economic and political sense. It, too, would recognize that many countries wish to hold dollars and to maintain close links with the United States. But it would be based on the assumption of a steadily integrating Europe, perhaps beyond the confines of the present EEC, whose members will be increasingly dependent on each other and increasingly less dependent on countries outside Europe. It would achieve adjustment between the two major areas through greater exchange-rate flexibility.

It is well known that the majority of academic economists favor flexible exchange rates. It is equally well known that the majority of financial practitioners, private and public, abhor the thought of them. Both take extreme views. It is true that chaos might result if the exchange rates of *all* currencies were to fluctuate completely freely in terms of all other currencies. But a system of fixed exchange rates loses its value if it can be maintained only through increasingly tight restrictions on the very international transactions which it seeks to maximize. Such restrictions are clearly important now and are likely to proliferate unless alternative adjustment devices are developed. And unless policy integration proceeds very far indeed, countries will always resort to changes in rates anyway—with traumatic results, under the present system, as the British devaluation last November portrayed so vividly.

A middle ground is thus needed. Exchange rates would remain fixed within the dollar area and within "extended Europe," as they should in view of the high and increasing degree of interdependence among the economies in each. But the exchange rate between the dollar and the European currencies would be freed to fluctuate up to perhaps 5 percent on either side of their fixed parities, which would be retained. The impact on the two relatively self-contained economic units of changes in the exchange rate would be small, so neither should fear economic disruption as a result. Either could, in fact, prevent any fluctuation by the simple expedient of adding to its holdings of the currency of the

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other; Europe could prevent depreciation of the dollar (appreciation of its currencies) by acquiring dollars. Each side would retain the present choice to finance the other, but a functioning adjustment mechanism would be put into place in addition. In fact, the likelihood that Europe would prefer to prevent the dollar from depreciating very much is a key reason to think that a "band" of 10 percent around the existing parity might be large enough.

The response of some important countries to such a two-bloc world is difficult to predict. Britain, for example, might pursue its financial ties with the United States or its political desire to join Europe; or it might be tempted to remain aloof from both, at least at the outset. The other EFTA countries and the members of the present gold bloc would presumably "join" Europe for international monetary purposes. If the sterling area were to dissolve, its present independent members would probably either follow Britain's lead or divide between the dollar area (Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand) and Europe (perhaps India, Pakistan and some of the Middle Eastern oil countries).

In such a system the dollar would continue to play a dominant role within the dollar area. Financing and adjustment within each area would occur as at present. The United States, recognizing the widespread demand for the dollar, would be willing to have it continue to play an international role as long as protective safeguards were built into the system. Such safeguards would include a requirement that dollar-area members not convert their dollar holdings into U.S. reserves as long as they remain in the area. Perimeter coöperation between the dollar area and "extended Europe" could continue. The SDR would strengthen the reserves of each area; this would be desirable since they would still be needed when the limits of the exchange-rate "band" were reached and perhaps within it to smooth out fluctuations.

Inter-area adjustment would occur via the exchange rate and there would be no need for discrimination between the areas. Its relatively small fluctuations should not deter much trade or even direct investment, where long-term market position and profitability considerations should far outweigh the effect of rate changes. Countries would be under no political pressure to choose membership in any particular area. As long as certain rules were observed, they could even shift from one area to an-

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other if their perception of their interests changed. Our present balance-of-payments controls could be lifted and the threat of further American restrictions preëmpted. Domestic policy on both sides of the Atlantic would become freer to deal with domestic problems. An important source of strain between the two pillars of the Atlantic Community would be removed.

Such a solution would go far toward meeting the problems of liquidity and adjustment, and this in turn would help to solve the confidence problem. The redefinition of the U.S. "deficit" and "liquidity ratio" so as to treat dollar-area transactions separately would add to the restoration of confidence in the dollar. So would any reserve pooling within the dollar area. Potential difficulties always exist, however, when more than one reserve asset is in circulation; the system could thus be tidied up if special issues of SDR were made available to any country in exchange for assets which it was not prepared to commit itself to hold except when needed to finance deficits. Such an arrangement would help in the transition to the two-area system since some European countries might wish to convert some of their dollars and the United States would not then be hurt by such transactions. Present sterling-area countries could use the facility to retire their sterling balances without hurting the United Kingdom. If countries did not deposit their holdings of reserve currencies at first, they could do so at a later date and hence "opt out" of one currency area in favor of another without unduly pressuring the respective reserve centers. The arrangement could go even further and require the major countries to hold *only* the SDR plus necessary working balances. The United States, of course, would no longer pursue a policy of automatically converting officially held dollars into gold at a fixed price but would intervene in the exchange markets, when necessary, with assets of its own choosing.

IV

The choice among these alternative solutions to the international monetary problem will and should be based largely on political considerations, both domestic and international, although the economics must of course be right as well. It will turn largely on such domestic U.S. political considerations as the need to focus our resources on the problems of the cities and of race relations, the relative acceptability of unemployment or higher prices, and

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the compatibility of controls with the basic nature of the American economy and body politic. It will relate closely to such foreign policy considerations as whether the United States will turn inward in the wake of Viet Nam or maintain an active involvement in world affairs; whether our foreign policy will refocus on Europe or turn increasingly toward Asia; and whether our European policy will continue to support integration or back away from any further increases in power of a major rival.

It will also depend on the Europe which emerges: united or divided, dynamic or atrophied, enlarged or confined to the Six, in partnership with the United States or antagonistic toward us. All of these outcomes are possible; neither the EEC nor NATO can be assumed eternal. The reëmergence of strong leadership in Europe could generate dramatic changes in present trends. But two strains do run deeply there: the desire for unity and the desire for independence, meaning equality with the United States (with or without Gaullist overtones of transatlantic antagonism). Any reform of the international monetary system must recognize that two great powers—the United States and Western Europe—exist and that the major international monetary problem is the relationship between them. Dominance by one area over the other would be a dubious basis for lasting reform.

We are thus left with national autonomy and international policy coördination as alternative bases for transatlantic economic relations. The fruits of economic intercourse—comprised in 1967 of over $30 billion of trade in goods and services and over $5 billion in capital movements across the Atlantic alone, despite the existence of controls—are too great to forego. Neither side, however, is willing to subordinate its national objectives to international considerations, and properly so as long as these objectives differ and are believed sincerely by each to enhance the welfare of its citizens. Thus an arrangement is needed which will achieve the maximum gains of integration with the minimum costs of loss of autonomy.

Either of the last two alternatives would meet this objective. Either one would contain an element of dominance as well—of the United States in the dollar area and the EEC in a gold bloc or "extended Europe," but the alternative which would seek adjustment through the application of discriminatory controls would do so to a far greater extent. Either would provide an

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adjustment mechanism and meet the world's liquidity needs. The alternative providing for greater exchange-rate flexibility between the two areas would do so more efficiently, more decisively and with less prospect of damage to the overall political relations between the United States and Europe. It should thus be our first choice. In view of the dangers of continuing to temporize, which have become abundantly clear, we should seek to initiate serious discussion on it.

The new U.S. Administration will have an opportunity to do so. The decision must be made at the political level, for only there can the whole range of national interests which are involved be considered and reconciled. The negotiations with Europe must be carried on at the political level for the same reason. Such talks could provide the needed new initiative for both Atlantic relations and the European unity movement. At the outset of a new Administration in 1961, an American response to a newly vigorous trading Europe was both the seed from which grew the Kennedy Round and an impetus to solution of a whole range of problems within the EEC. Eight years later an obviously vigorous financial Europe may be ready for an American initiative that could be both the catalyst for constructive change in the international monetary system and a possible spur to the whole European movement.

Whatever path we decide to take, we must never forget the over-riding importance of psychology in matters monetary. We must make it clear that we act from great economic strength; that we can go it alone if necessary but prefer to coöperate to the maximum degree possible; that our dollar is the most widely used currency in history; and that its use is growing rapidly and will continue to grow unless *we* place impediments in the way. Our proposals must stem from confidence, not from panic; they must look to the longer term, not be expedients; and they must be presented in a coöperative vein without arrogance or intent to dominate. With the right posture and with the right policy we can once more lead the world toward new growth through coöperation.

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THE LIMITS OF DETENTE

By Robert Conquest

LIKE many other observers, Karl Marx noted that from the time of Peter the Great Russian foreign policy showed a general tendency not merely to expansionism, but to "unlimited" power. He put this even more strongly in a speech of January 1876, when he spoke of Russia's lodestar being "the empire of the world." Engels, too, wrote of her "dreaming about universal supremacy." They were referring not to any fixed plan, or wholly explicit intention, but rather to the spirit and character of the Russian State. The extent to which this general tendency (though, of course, with different content) still subsists, and the degree to which it is expressed in actual practice, are clearly central to any but a superficial estimate of Soviet foreign policy.

Even under the Tsars expansion was not constant. There were periods of stasis, even of withdrawal. The provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which limited Russian naval power in the Black Sea, were not repudiated until the opportunity at last arose in 1871. And comparably, the Soviet Union abandoned expansion for more than a decade before 1939.

The assurances given that this would be permanent were various and formal. In the sensitive matter of the Baltic republics, for example, a series of treaties provided against any conceivable Russian pressure. The renunciation of "all rights of sovereignty forever" in a treaty signed (to take the Lithuanian case) on July 12, 1920, was followed on September 22, 1926, by a nonaggression pact, twice renewed in the thirties, guaranteeing Lithuanian sovereignty in all circumstances. This was strengthened in 1933 by a convention defining aggression, which said that "no considerations of a political, military, economic or any other nature" would justify it. Even when, on October 10, 1939, Lithuania signed under pressure a "Mutual Assistance Pact," under which Soviet troops set up bases in the country, its Article 7 guaranteed that this would "not in any way affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their state organizations, economic and social systems, military measures and, in general, the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs." Annexation came the following summer (and is one of the "Stalinist" measures not repudiated by Khrushchev: "he wept but he

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kept"). In fact, of the multifarious pacts the U.S.S.R. signed with various neighbors, there was only one which was punctiliously observed, and that was with a power disposing of formidable military sanctions—the Nazi-Soviet Pact. "What have we done," Molotov justifiably complained when the German attack came, "to deserve this?"

This was all a generation ago, and there would be no point in raising it if it could be shown that the Soviet leaders have in principle abandoned the attitude to foreign affairs then prevailing; or that present circumstances have, regardless of any question of abstract good will, made it obsolete.

Stalin, in foreign affairs, might be described as a prudent aggressor. His moves against Finland and Poland in 1939, the attack in Korea in 1950, were made when he was, or felt he was, safe in making them. The Berlin Blockade of 1949 was conducted with a sort of brutal tentativeness and abandoned when failure pronounced itself. The Greek Civil War was allowed to go ahead in the likelihood that it would cause trouble to the West without leading to retaliation—even though Stalin himself (as Djilas tells us) saw that there was no real chance of victory.

On all the evidence, Stalin's heirs and pupils, Russia's present rulers, seem to be motivated in the same sort of way. They have not abandoned the principle of hostility toward the West. It is not to their own good will but to their prudence that our policies should be directed.

Their desire to avoid nuclear war is of course solid and genuine. The great expansion of industry has long been regarded as the régime's leading achievement. Pure dogmatists might perhaps be willing to suffer the vast economic and human loss that war would involve, if world revolution were to be the fairly certain result. But such certainty is, in any case, unlikely to be attained. The Chinese "dogmatists" have indeed been accused of willingness to sacrifice whole nations in such a war. But their stake is inevitably a smaller one. Not only is the dogmatism of the Soviet rulers considerably more attenuated, but they also see that a Soviet-U.S. nuclear exchange would end by reducing both countries to the level of China. As a leading Soviet defense commentator pointedly wrote, it is not merely that half the world's population would perish, but "moreover, the most active, capable and civilized portion of mankind would be wiped out."[1]

[1] Major-General N. Talensky, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, no. 10, 1960.

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For Peking, of course, the opposite consideration applies. If China cannot catch up with the advanced countries, here is a mechanism for bringing them down to the Chinese level.

Yet even on the part of the present moderate Soviet leadership there is no reason whatever to believe that all this represents more than an accommodation mainly based on a particular balance of weaponry. To be sure, this is something well worth having for its own sake. And, if we are very fortunate, it may harden into a permanent truce, with consequent erosion of the anti-Western certainties at present so deeply rooted in the minds of the Soviet leaders. But to misinterpret it, to overestimate it as signaling the abandonment of the very principle of hostility, must almost certainly lead to a relaxation of that vigilance and preparedness which is one of the fundamental conditions of the détente as we have it. "He's a good fellow and 'twill all be well" is not an adequate substitute for careful estimation of "his" real attitude and intentions.

It is sometimes said that because communism is no longer monolithic it no longer presents a threat. This seems to resemble the application of a linear equation to a problem requiring at least a quadratic. That Christianity was split by deadly feuds did not save the Saracens in the Crusades. The Tripartite Pact was by no means monolithic, but it contrived to present a most unpleasant threat to the rest of us. And so on. Splits and divergencies doubtless make such threats less effective, but they do not remove them.

It is true that to the Soviet Union some communist régimes are now illegitimate. But *all* non-communist states remain illegitimate. The solution proposed for "bad" communist states is the replacement of the aberrant leadership—and the success of plots and intrigues such as those of Marshal Peng in China and Admiral Sejko in Albania are all that are required to restore communist normality. A communist régime may indeed evolve into a "bourgeois-democratic" position, as Imre Nagy's did in 1956 and the Czechs seem to be doing now. And from our point of view this represents the hope of tempering the intransigent hostility of the movement. But this is a move from heresy into actual paganism; it is quite unlike the lapse of adequately despotic communisms into mere doctrinal and political error.

Of course, when we look into the detail more carefully, we can see that the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., like that of any other

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state, is not generally conducted with the clarity of intention and the consistency of action a political philosopher might think proper. It does not at a given moment take the form of a settled plan—even a flexible plan—being put into action; it is the product of various forces. Action is often plainly the result of compromise between various political tendencies within the leadership. Odd gestures of international amity, particularly in the field of cultural exchange, may accompany (and even distract attention from) hostile moves in more substantial spheres.

The evidence of a more aggressive trend in Soviet circles, even as to nuclear war, is clear.[2] Among the Soviet military considerable divergence of view was noted in 1961 and even earlier. But 1965–66 saw the frankest expressions of a "hard line." A whole series of articles in the military press argued against regarding nuclear weapons as a "threat to the physical survival of nations and states;" urged that victory in a nuclear war was attainable and depended on building up superior weapon strength; and suggested that to spurn the possibility of victory was to relapse into passivity and "fatalism."[3]

There is no doubt that these views (to be printed at all) were receiving some measure of political protection—and little doubt that this came from the "dogmatic" section of the leadership represented by Suslov, Shelepin and others. The Brezhnev-Kosygin majority reasserted itself in 1966, and such intransigence has ceased to be voiced. But in general the tone even of later pronouncements has a more militant tang than in Khrushchev's post-Cuba years.

More important is the fact that Soviet politics is in principle highly unstable. A single major setback—which would not be at all unlikely in Eastern Europe, for example—might at any time panic the lesser leaders on whom the present group relies for its majority, throwing them into the arms of the hard-line extremists. And other political issues, including internal ones, could also change the balance of forces in the Politburo and Central Committee. Whatever the reason, a differently aligned leadership would then face the West.

Of course it can be argued (and there is much to be said for

[2] See Roman Kolkowicz's "The Dilemma of Super Power: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition," Institute of Defense Analyses, 1967.

[3] *Krasnaya Zvezda,* December 7, 1965; *Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil.* no. 17, 1966; ditto no. 1, 1966; *Krasnaya Zvezda,* September 22, 1965; and *Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil.* no. 24, 1965.

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such a view) that a more extremist, dogmatic leadership might not necessarily be more imprudent. In a sense Molotov was more hostile and yet more prudent than Khrushchev. But the considerations make the matter not one of mere tactical prudence, but rather one involving a whole outlook on the present world situation. A policy of détente, the Soviet hard-line military have argued, serves the capitalists' interests by lessening their fears and giving them a margin for "aggressive" initiative in the Third World; at the same time it undermines the unity and the revolutionary dynamism of the communist countries. This is a serious argument, and to some degree a sound one from the communist point of view. It is certainly taken into account, if only partially, by the present leaders. It would be a formidable brief for a more intransigent set.

The Soviet launching of a "thin" anti-ballistic missile system in 1967 seems to have been in part a concession by the leadership to these more "activist" arguments. But one must accept as at least equally important a motive common to the United States and the Soviet Union: the desire to cope with the problem of proliferation, and in particular the growth of Chinese nuclear power. Even the U.S. response in the autumn, though attacked as a "useless escalation,"[4] was said by the Soviet press not to represent an obstacle to the discussions at Geneva and in the General Assembly on antiproliferation agreements.[5]

Soviet development of ICBMs has meant challenging the United States in a field where the decisive factors are advanced technology and material wealth. The Soviet Union's technical and economic resources, if strained heavily, can just produce an adequate, though inferior, counter to the U.S. nuclear forces. A crucial factor that has seldom been noted in argument about an ABM race between the two countries is that, costly though it would be for the United States, at a certain point it would probably strain Soviet resources beyond the breaking point.

II

Soviet policy remains a "forward" one in principle. In practice it is so only in areas where prospects seem promising and where the American interest and involvement are not judged sufficient to lead to a direct and dangerous confrontation (the peril here

[4] *Pravda*, September 24, 1967.
[5] *Izvestia*, October 4, 1967.

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being that the Soviet assessment may be incorrect). This tactical line was summarized by Brezhnev in September 1965: "We are striving to make our diplomacy vigorous and active and at the same time we exhibit flexibility and caution."[6]

All factions, it would seem, agree that an activist approach should be adopted where it is feasible and seems to involve no serious risk of world war. The dispute is rather about the degrees of risk in each case. Even Shelepin would doubtless not recommend an assault on England or the Low Countries; even Brezhnev would hardly refrain from at least some forward action in the Aden area.

To see how these distinctions work out in practice, we can divide the world into three or four areas of Soviet interest. In spite of occasional hopeful soundings of the trumpet outside the walls of West Berlin, there appears little prospect of serious political opportunities for the Russians in Western Europe, and military adventure is excluded by the guarantee of successive American presidents that any attack would automatically mean nuclear war. Perhaps the lesson here is that this is indeed a sound method of preserving peace. The real problem in Europe should be formulated differently: Will developments in Eastern Europe provoke fighting and Soviet intervention, as they did in 1956? And if there is a crumbling of communist power in Eastern Europe, what sort of political crisis may occur in the U.S.S.R. itself?

Latin America, too, seems not to be regarded as an area of opportunity. As with Stalin's attitude to Greece in 1948, the Soviets appear persuaded that the United States would not tolerate a serious thrust there. They are stuck with Castro's Cuba but their support is qualified. As we know, they oppose Castroite tactics elsewhere, and while not altogether abandoning a policy of exploiting advantages and footholds vis-à-vis China as well as the United States, they would prefer on the whole to keep the area subcritical.

In Asia, in the sphere largely influenced by the Chinese, Moscow has a special problem. Viet Nam in particular constitutes a most awkward and peculiar case. At one level the arguments are familiar: the U.S.S.R. enjoys having the United States entangled; failure to support Hanoi would weaken communist loyalty elsewhere; the testing of Soviet military equipment is a valuable bonus; and so on. On the other hand, the Soviets are no

[6] *Pravda,* September 30, 1965.

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doubt fearful of the danger of serious escalation. All these points have some validity, though as regards the communist ideological "commitment" all but a few disaffected Asian parties would certainly accept a Soviet-sponsored compromise. The difficulty is rather that Ho Chi Minh is not under control.

But more basic in Moscow's thinking on Viet Nam is its relations with China. The strongest argument of the pro-Soviet faction in China (usually in the army) is that modern arms are needed to defeat the Americans, and that these can be obtained only from Russia. The true Maoist view is, of course, that an American attack on China proper could effectively be met by retirement to the interior and resort to guerrilla warfare. Therefore, the more weapons the Russians can send to Hanoi, the bigger the object lesson in favor of the anti-Maoist thesis and the stronger the possibility of rallying a pro-Soviet power group to take over in Peking. This interpretation, originally put to me by Dr. Uri Rana'an, I find largely convincing. It raises the curious possibility that a blockade of Haiphong would have been in the interests of both the Americans and the Maoists.

And the new Chinese nuclear capability certainly complicates all these issues. Although it may be true that, as President Kennedy said, what the communists are quarrelling about is the best way to bury us, it does seem that for the Maoists the Soviet Union now appears as the most immediate threat. The whole area, in fact, is one in which the Soviet leaders face special—and perhaps temporary—problems of great intricacy, which to some extent confuse the issue of confrontation with the West.

With Europe, East Asia and Latin America taken as special cases, we are left with the traditional major area of Soviet interest—the area south of the national territory, in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

Africa south of the Sahara, the most distant extension of this area, is presumably not an immediate target. Soviet policy in Africa has been extraordinarily inept, partly in consequence of an attempt to impose Marxist class analyses on refractory material. The distances have been too great—as in the case of the Congo troubles—and the régimes supported by the Russians have been insufficiently solid, with the result that in one of the most advanced black African countries, Ghana, the people have now been effectively vaccinated against anything even remotely resembling communism. Though more sophisticated policies now

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seem to be emerging, it still appears unlikely that much can be achieved—unless the East coast is left in a power vacuum by British withdrawals.

The Middle East then, or rather an area centered on the Middle East and stretching from Morocco to the Gulf of Bengal, is the sector in which the activist element in Soviet policy receives its chief exercise. It is an area whose politics have long proved unmanageable and unpredictable to every outside power which has become involved. Nor does the U.S.S.R. appear to have a coherent policy, except to buy friends, keep the pot boiling and await any suitable opportunities. The political-military investment in Syria and Egypt has so far proved unremunerative. Moreover, throughout the area, the Soviet Government is faced with an old dilemma: Is it best to rely on indigenous anti-Western movements and régimes or try to replace them with reliable communists? The first choice usually leads eventually to divergence and hostility; the second throws the local nationalists into the arms of the West straightaway. The usual solution has been an attempt to combine the two, which leads to endless friction.

But there is also a special geographical difficulty in the area. The Soviet Navy cannot for the foreseeable future match the American, and its communications through the Dardanelles are vulnerable. In the air, the Soviets suffer similar difficulties. Turkey and Iran remain resistant obstacles to a real move south. Politically and economically, they appear to be growing stronger; to subvert their governments grows increasingly difficult. To attack them would be to take the ultimate risk. And so the prudential element in Soviet thinking dominates the scene in the Northern Tier, leaving activist elements the upper hand (though not exclusive control) in the softer but less accessible Arab lands. The extremist group in the Kremlin has tried to make the most of trouble in the Middle East, though serious disputes arose in the U.S.S.R. over the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, leading to the fall of Moscow party secretary Egorychev, one of Shelepin's associates.

From this we conclude, once again, that dangerous policies are given rope unless and until to develop them further would lead to a direct confrontation with the United States. In the 1967 war, the U.S.S.R. produced the maximum trouble compatible with this final precaution. The fact that one faction wanted to go further is not reassuring.

A most significant development has been the creation, par-

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ticularly in the last two years, of the ability to deploy conventional forces on a world scale—long-range aircraft like the AN-22 and a blue-water fleet, including tank- and troop-landing ships and helicopter-carriers. This force is not, or not yet, capable of challenging the great fleets of the United States, and to make it so would mean a further heavy strain on the Soviet economy for a perhaps chimerical advantage. The amount that must already have been allocated, however, is a strong indication that the Soviets want the ability to intervene in hitherto immune areas—or to deter the United States from doing so. It reflects an activist rather than a prudential policy and is the more dangerous because it tends to draw the Soviet Union into situations in which its leaders might prefer to avoid involvement.

Conversely, when we consider that the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania all were saved quite recently from military coups simply by the intervention of a few companies of British Marines (just as a small force of French paratroops has done the same for ex-French African states), the projected withdrawal of Britain from the Indian Ocean leaves an area where—unless and until the Americans accept responsibility—a couple of Soviet cruisers with a few hundred troops could play a decisive part in immediate crises.

III

What many observers overlook is that all the present leaders are the product of a specific tradition. Kosygin, Brezhnev, Suslov, Mazurov, Kirilenko and the others took the first big steps in their careers precisely during the great purge of the thirties, when only the most ruthless advanced, or even survived. Their subsequent careers have confirmed this. The political machine they now embody is precisely that created by Stalin, and their repudiation of certain Stalinist excesses has not meant abandoning the principle of strife against all other political entities. Understanding this party background is essential to any realistic assessment of the present leaders. This is not to say that no more moderate group than Brezhnev's can possibly arise within the *apparat*. A leader could conceivably come to power who would want to revert to the policy of noninvolvement. Recognizing that the U.S.S.R. could not outface America, he would retire his country from the competition temporarily, to concentrate on building up its economic, as well as military, capability. An intelligent despot

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might make such a decision. But it would be less easy to do so now than a generation ago. This is partly because of objective circumstances, like the existence of Mao's China. But it is also partly because an exaggeratedly confident spirit prevails among the Russian *apparat*.

Because the Soviet Union remains in principle in a position of permanent hostility to the non-communist world, the détente must inevitably remain limited, whatever the possibilities of a stable truce. Brezhnev put it flatly in his speech of March 29, 1968, to the Moscow City Party Conference: "Our Party has always warned that in the ideological field there can be no peaceful coexistence, just as there can be no class peace between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie." There cannot be, he added, "political indifference and passivity or neutralism" in this matter.

What will affect the stability of the détente is the firmness of the United States. It is only when the initiatives of the extremists in the Kremlin are thwarted, are shown to lead to the risk of serious confrontation, that they are overruled and defeated. It is also true that the U.S.S.R. must not be pushed into a situation where its rulers feel that there is no future for the régime *except* in nuclear confrontation. But for the moment the greater danger for Western policy is perhaps in encouraging the extremists by too complaisant an attitude to their adventures, thereby helping to ensure the rise of a dangerously imprudent leadership. One finds at present, in the Western press and elsewhere, a notion implicitly expressed that the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States is based not merely on a common interest in avoiding nuclear war but also on a growing Soviet tolerance—a complete misapprehension.

I conclude, then, that the present détente is real, sensible and vital from both Russian and Western viewpoints, and with some luck it might eventually develop into a genuine world peace; but that it is not based on Soviet acceptance of any basic principle of permanent coöperation or of pacific orientation; and that it is in practice ill-defined, variable and subject to instabilities. To exaggerate it is to do a disservice to peace, which cannot be secured on a basis of misunderstanding of fact and misconception of motive.

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THE COALESCING PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

By Ernest A. Gross

THE southern segment of the African continent includes: Angola and Mozambique, two vast Portuguese colonies whose peoples are in revolt; Rhodesia, a British possession whose government is in rebellion; the Republic of South Africa, officially committed to a racist ideology; and the international Territory of South West Africa, illegally occupied by the neighboring Republic. These diverse lands share a common attribute, which is both unique and menacing: domination by white minorities of black populations many times their number.

To the north, newly liberated nations are groping toward a fulfilment of freedom which they regard as the promise of history. The southern area, however, is besieged from within and without by demands for an equal chance and a free choice, conditions accepted everywhere else in the world as normal objectives of the social order. Southern Africa sometimes is depicted as a bastion of culture and progress. It is, to the contrary, the last refuge of a twisted concept of the relationship between the individual and society, one which allots opportunities and burdens according to the accident of race.

When demands for equality are pressed by those who are of the same race as their rulers, the consequences can be violent enough, as the colonial revolutions in our own hemisphere made clear. But the use of discrimination and colonial exploitation to further the interests of a dominant racial group multiplies the dangers, both to the area of repression and to the wider community of nations. Enforcement of a deeply resented status quo of racial or colonial privilege undermines the processes by which societies normally effect just change. When aspiration and dissent are denied a peaceful outlet, they generate volcanic forces which erupt into brutal and protracted struggles. In such societies, time runs toward chaos.

Racial discrimination, moreover, arouses emotions of anxiety and involvement on the part of all those, everywhere, who have known, or who fear, a similar experience. Combined with a universal tendency to correlate color with poverty, racial tensions infect the open wounds of a world divided between the many

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who are poor and the few who are rich. If race should come to assume a significant role in the politics of the international community, the divisive elements inherent in all societies would become dangerously fissionable, destroying the foundations both of domestic and international stability.

Such a development would compound the American racial dilemma. The United States has a vital interest in the just, prompt and orderly liquidation of the problems created by racial discrimination, both at home and abroad. Our traditions demand it; our tranquility requires it; our influence depends on it. We could not, even if we wished, reserve one standard of values for our domestic policies and apply another to the rest of the world, particularly to areas of racial and colonial repression.

To these considerations should be added the material interests of the United States on the African continent as a whole. Apart from the mineral resources required by our insatiable economy, the American people have a direct private investment on the African continent totaling some $2 billion. About two-thirds of this investment is in the states north of the Zambezi River. Moreover, two-thirds of U. S. exports to Africa—almost $1.5 billion a year—likewise are directed to the independent nations to the north. The huge economic stake of the United States in the rest of the continent frequently is lost to sight in the glare of highly organized South African public-relations efforts, stressing the values of trade and investment in the southern sixth of the continent, as if the remainder were of merely marginal concern.

This is not to say that our policies toward Africa should be determined by balance sheets of our relative economic interests in north and south. The point is that trade and investment everywhere depend upon the existence of functioning societies. If the spread of racial conflict should upset the precarious stability of newly liberated nations, we—as well as they—would suffer untold human and material loss. No greater threat to such stability can be conceived than the collapse of their efforts to build upon multiracial, or non-racial, concepts of the social order, and to achieve progress with Western aid and white participation.

For all these reasons, the policies endemic to Southern Africa threaten the entire community of nations. A survey of the particular problems will show that they are coalescing into a whole which is greater, and more dangerous, than the sum of the parts. It follows that a realistic strategy for dealing with them should be

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comprehensively conceived, rather than in fragmentary and disjointed terms as is now the case.

The policies of Portugal in her African colonies, of the rebel régime in Rhodesia and of the South African Government in the area as a whole tend to be mutually supporting while they flow toward common disaster. The combined thrust even of limited measures designed to induce each to moderate its course is certain to have a cumulative and interacting effect upon all.

It is essential to resist the tendency—common in the United Nations, as in all parliamentary bodies—to deal with problems as separate "agenda items," focusing on particular complexities and blurring their common elements. A more realistic approach would be to inscribe upon the agenda of U.N. bodies the "Question of Southern Africa," and to treat the subsidiary issues inclusively.

As a preface to consideration of specific issues and proposals for action, it should be observed that the African states themselves recognize that true national interest may be impeded if territorial boundaries are permitted to serve as barriers to cooperative action for economic progress and social development. Thus, the former High Commission Territory of Bechuanaland—now the independent State of Botswana—should not be deprived, as it is, of the natural outlets and affinities of South West Africa. Newly independent Lesotho, an enclave entirely surrounded by South Africa, should not be doomed to subjection by the latter. Zambia should be helped to find escape from its vulnerable isolation, which will be discussed below.

II

A survey of specific aspects of the Problem of Southern Africa appropriately starts with South West Africa—a Territory with a unique international status, and which is a direct responsibility of the international community. The United Nations General Assembly, with full concurrence of the United States and Great Britain, has ruled that, by reason of South Africa's serious violations of its obligations under the Mandate entrusted to it in 1920, South Africa has forfeited all rights of possession and administration in the Territory. Furthermore, the United States Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Goldberg, echoing the 1950 Advisory Opinion of the World Court, has declared that "apart from the Mandate, South Africa has no right to administer the Territory."

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In consequence, the General Assembly, in May 1967, established the United Nations Council for South West Africa. Its assigned function is to administer the Territory until independence, a goal which the Council was instructed to do "all in its power" to achieve by June 1968.

Despite these unequivocal pronouncements and actions, South Africa continues to assert and exercise administrative control over the Territory, in defiance of the Council's authority. South Africa, moreover, is fastening its grasp by virtual annexation of the Territory, coupled with intensified official policies of racial discrimination against the non-white population. With contemptuous disregard for the U.N. decision terminating its authority over the international Territory, the South African Government has gone so far as to convict, in South Africa, 34 non-white South West Africans for acts alleged to have been committed in South West Africa. Aggravating such usurpation of authority to adjudge the persons concerned, the accused were charged with offenses committed long before passage of the legislation under which they were tried.

The United States and the United Kingdom, as loyal members of the United Nations, have fervently denounced South Africa's unlawful occupation of South West Africa, as well as its racial policies in the Territory, which mirror those enforced in South Africa itself. But the United States and the United Kingdom, as the principal trading partners of South Africa, have not sought action, in or out of the United Nations, to match their denunciations. Except for an embargo on shipments of arms and military equipment—needs which are cheerfully supplied by France and others—the United States takes the stand that "consultation is preferable to confrontation." The South African Government, however, continues to rebuff all efforts on the part of the United States, or of responsible U.N. agencies, to arrange consultations on the basis of U.N. resolutions. Instead it is moving unilaterally toward implementation of a plan to partition the Territory into unviable "native homelands," leaving the developed modern sector to uncontested white control.

We hear much talk concerning the sanctity of our international commitments and the need to preserve a just and stable international order. Few risks and sacrifices are considered too great for the vindication of these objectives, at least in areas where our strategic interests are asserted, as in Southeast Asia.

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South Africa's continued occupation of South West Africa, compounded by its violations of the international rules prescribed to govern the Territory and to protect its inhabitants, has been explicitly and repeatedly condemned as a repudiation of law. The obligation of members of the United Nations to repress so clear a violation of their common Charter therefore is beyond dispute. The crucial question is: What practical measures can be devised and pursued with a determination commensurate with objectives which are universally professed?

The United Nations Council for South West Africa should be endowed with personnel and resources enabling it to guide and assist South West African leaders, many of whom now are in exile, to plan and shape political institutions appropriate to an independent state. The Council likewise should assure that independence is made meaningful by furnishing the means for education and training of those who for so long have been denied equal opportunities because of their color. Economic surveys by the Council, on a regional basis, should prepare the way for a viable new state, not wholly dependent upon South Africa. To this end, the Council might establish a presence in the area—preferably in Botswana—so that international assistance to both these contiguous lands could be jointly planned. If Botswana should regard this as unfeasible at the present time, other U.N. agencies concerned with economic and technical assistance in the area should take into account the regional, as well as purely national, requirements of coördinated planning and programing. Communication should be maintained by the Council, to the fullest extent practicable, with all communities within the Territory. In regard to diplomatic and political pressures on South Africa, a South West African government-in-exile should be fostered, and South West African passports, validated by the United Nations, should be honored in all countries.

A patent absurdity of colonial cartography is the long thin finger of South West Africa, known as the Caprivi Strip, which forms a corridor terminating at the junction of Zambia, Rhodesia and Botswana. At this point, and in violation of the Mandate's prohibition against militarizing the Territory, South Africa has built a large jet airfield. Access to it is prohibited, and its purpose remains obscure in the absence of verified information concerning the nature of the facilities presently installed in the base, or planned for the future.

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By virtue of this extended finger of South West Africa, Botswana is entirely surrounded by white-minority governments, except for a disputed crossing area at the junction of Botswana and Zambia. Newly independent Botswana, precariously dependent on South Africa for its economic survival, is striving to maintain a multiracial policy in its political, social and economic life.



Support for its development along the lines of its choice deserves high priority from responsible governments and private agencies, as well as the United Nations, which has commenced a technical assistance program there. Moreover, as has already been said, constructive planning for the region as a whole requires an end to the artificial and coerced estrangement of Botswana from South West Africa. Such a need is heightened by the recent discovery of important potential copper reserves in Botswana and the possi-

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bility that they may extend into both Rhodesia and South West Africa. These areas should have open lines of transit, communication and interchange of people, goods and ideas. The international community cannot afford to subsidize arbitrarily sundered ethnic and economic units, even though full weight should be given to national aspirations.

III

What of Rhodesia—and the inseparably related problem of Zambia? The role of the United Kingdom has, of course, been crucial and will continue so. Yet Britain's priority goals must be economic stability and a tolerably balanced foreign exchange, together with institutional entry into Europe. Drains upon her economy, resulting from involvements in Asia and Africa, will continue for some years despite scheduled withdrawal. At the same time, Britain's outlook and tradition impel a sense of responsibility for the preservation of Commonwealth relations in general and a just resolution of the Rhodesian conflict in particular. Above all, few responsible British leaders ignore the disastrous implications of a breakup of the Commonwealth in a furor of racial tension. There is, none the less, evidence of mounting public support in Great Britain for the rebellious white Rhodesians, as time passes without promise of a viable solution. In the United States, even though overtly expressed sympathy for the white Rhodesian minority is generally limited to extremist groups, widespread public apathy reflects ignorance of the political and moral issues at stake, as well as the potential dangers to peace.

When the U.N. Security Council, on December 16, 1966, adopted a resolution imposing selective mandatory sanctions on the rebel régime of Rhodesia, the United States made clear the reasons for its support of this unprecedented action. As viewed by our Government, the efforts of a small minority to suppress the political rights of a majority and to extend practices of racial discrimination were abhorrent to the United Nations and constituted a growing danger to peace. Hence the United States announced its commitment to apply the full force of law to implement action pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter, which gives the Security Council authority to order any measures, short of armed force, to enforce its decisions. The purpose of the Security Council action was, of course, to aid Great Britain, the administering power, to bring to an end the rebellion in Rhodesia.

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The Rhodesian challenge is particularly frustrating for Britain in light of the fact that Rhodesia, unlike other British possessions which have been decolonized with relative success, has never actually been governed from London. The white minority there always has controlled the full apparatus of government, including (at least since 1961) the military.

It is beyond argument that acquiescence in the demands of the rebel Rhodesian régime would be morally indefensible and would threaten the Commonwealth with the worst possible basis for splitting apart. At the same time, most observers agree that military sanctions—which might have been feasible at an earlier stage—now would create serious political and technical difficulties and, indeed, might precipitate hostilities which could expand into a race war in Southern Africa as a whole. This is one striking illustration of the interrelationship of problems in the area.

South Africa's policy in regard to Rhodesia reflects its own concerns on this score. On the one hand, South Africa is ideologically sympathetic with the aims of the rebel régime, and gives it material aid and even covert military support. At the same time, South Africa has given evidence of viewing Rhodesia's act of unilateral independence as a reckless one, and of placing little confidence in the stability of the present régime. As in the case of South West Africa, South Africa appears to be playing for time on the Rhodesian issue, hoping that world conditions will evolve so as to prevent a serious confrontation on any of the interrelated issues of Southern Africa, including, of course, its domestic racial policies as well.

Courses of action which are both practical and essential for dealing with the Rhodesian problem include at least three main lines of effort:

1. Insistent increase and tightening of economic measures and political pressures, both through the United Nations and by national policies.

In regard to the latter, it has been suggested that Britain, as well as other states, should freeze Rhodesian assets and should give serious attention to the legal question whether title to goods exported from Rhodesia can be validly passed to others without permission of Britain, the sovereign authority.

The Security Council resolution of December 1966 calling for sanctions was unprecedented only in that it was the first such decision taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, and therefore

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was binding rather than merely recommendatory. Fifteen years earlier, as an aspect of the Korean War, the General Assembly in May 1951 had called upon all states to embargo the shipment of arms and other strategic materials "to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities." The General Assembly action was taken upon the recommendation of an "Additional Measures Committee," which had been established several months before for the purpose of considering steps (in addition to military action) to be employed to meet the aggression against the Republic of Korea. In the embargo resolution, all states were asked to report to the Committee measures taken to comply with the resolution. The Committee, in turn, was requested to report to the Assembly on the general effectiveness of the embargo and to continue its consideration of additional measures, as necessary.

This precedent, and the experience gained, suggest that similar procedures might well be adopted in respect of Rhodesia. A Sanctions Committee should be created promptly and—unless it reports satisfactory performance in the application of economic sanctions already imposed—it should be asked to propose additional measures. The Committee should also be requested to consider how to improve the policing and enforcement of the mandatory program. Violations, as well as failure of members to report to the Committee, should be publicly exposed.

2. Decrease Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia. In this regard, high priority should be assigned to a projected arrangement between Britain and Zambia for a £15 million program for rerouting Zambia's road, rail and air links with the outside world. The stability and security of Zambia, moreover, would be enhanced if the United Kingdom gave guarantees of military assistance against incursions from Rhodesia or South Africa.

The United States should offer Zambia all necessary support, not only to revise its transport network, but to establish economic, political and social institutions which would link Zambia with eastern and central Africa and reduce its dependence upon its hostile neighbors. It is relevant, in this connection, to note that the importance attached by both Zambia and Tanzania to a rail route to the port of Dar-es-Salaam (the so-called Tan-Zam Railroad) has induced both countries, however reluctantly, to turn for support to Communist China, which is now financing and

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conducting a survey for such a road. As an element of unified strategy for dealing with the problems of the area as a whole, the United States should announce that it is according top priority to aid to Zambia precisely because of our commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa.

3. The tendency of the United States to defer to Britain's lead is explained, though not justified, by the latter's historic role and special responsibilities in the area. The unfortunate fragility of the British economy, however, imposes constraints upon timely and effective initiatives on her part.

Hesitation to announce explicit conditions of settlement—even in regard to so basic an issue as NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule)—arouses suspicion as to Britain's capacity and will to insist upon terms which would generally be considered acceptable. The history of sanctions, limited though it be, shows that their success or failure largely hinges upon the clarity of the ends they are designed to achieve. Freedom of manœuvre is a sound political tactic, but it is not to be bought at the price of uncertain purposes.

The American national interest in a just resolution of the Rhodesian crisis—consistent with a tolerable racial policy there as well as in the rest of the subcontinent—demands a well-conceived strategy, formulated by the United States and the United Kingdom in close concert. The friendly consultation which takes place between the two allies is gratifying. But the question arises whether a more formalized mechanism for achieving a joint strategy in regard to Southern Africa, including Rhodesia, is not essential.

In times of war, the United States and the United Kingdom have not hesitated to establish combined machinery for dealing with strategic, political and economic issues of common concern. Such procedures would not usurp Britain's special responsibilities; on the contrary, they would be designed to strengthen Britain's hand in the double task of overcoming the act of rebellion and securing for all Africans equal rights and opportunities based upon a sound foundation of political and educational advancement.

IV

The revolutions taking place in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique likewise form part of the pattern of

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coalescing crisis in Southern Africa. The leader of the Mozambique nationalist movement, Eduardo Mondlane, has recently expressed the point in clear and simple terms:

> The positions of the United States and Western Europe on South Africa, Rhodesia, and South West Africa are also related [to our struggle for liberation]. If the 14-member U.N. Ad Hoc Committee that has been established to deal with South West Africa fails to propose something radical and effective for the freedom of the people of South West Africa, if the British and the Americans continue to play games on Rhodesia, if the Africans are not able to start any action in Rhodesia, if the big companies in America and Britain and Western Europe continue to pour money into Portuguese banks and economic projects, and if Rhodesia and South Africa continue to get private investment in ever increasing amounts—then it will be more difficult for the people of the Portuguese colonies to gain their independence. These are facts, these are realities.[1]

In common with Rhodesia and South West Africa, the nationalist aspirations of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique (as well as of Portuguese Guinea, further to the north) are being denied peaceful resolution. The U.N. Security Council has demanded that Portugal recognize rights of self-determination and independence and has declared that "the situation resulting from the policies of Portugal both as regards the African population of its colonies and the neighboring states seriously disturbs international peace and security." Yet no action has been taken by the United Nations, or in its name, to achieve the rights or to avert the dangers.

The General Assembly, for its part, has recommended bold measures to those ends. It has urged members to sever diplomatic relations with Portugal, to deny facilities to Portuguese ships and planes, to boycott trade with Portugal and, in particular, to deny arms or other assistance that could be used against black Africans.

As is true of all other areas of Southern Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom hold the key to orderly solutions. Both have eloquently condemned Portuguese policies; both have timidly evaded practical remedies. Their token refusal to supply Portugal with arms destined for "openly repressive use" merely brings condemnation from both sides: the Portuguese brand it as a betrayal; the Africans as a fraud.

The desire to placate Portugal centers upon strategic uses of the Portuguese Azores as a refueling station, and fear that the

[1] "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane," by Helen Kitchen, in *Africa Report*, November 1967, p. 51.

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Portuguese Government might make good its overhanging threat to deny use of this facility in reprisal for actions regarded to be inimical to its colonial policies and interests. Apart from the fact that the Azores base is a diminishing and probably dispensable asset in the age of long-range aircraft, the Portuguese threat contravenes both the spirit and intent of the North Atlantic Treaty. A possible contradiction between our NATO undertakings and our traditional anticolonialist stance was foreseen and settled when the Treaty was under consideration. In 1949, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explicitly resolved the matter by declaring, in its unanimous Report on the Treaty: "Whether the United States will in fact support the colonial policies of any other signatories will depend entirely on our evaluation of those policies under the conditions then existing and not on any obligations assumed under the pact."

It was, accordingly, clearly understood that provision of base and other facilities was designed as a contribution to the mutual security of all, including Portugal itself, and was not a device to compel acceptance of colonial policies contrary to our traditions and detrimental to the sound interests of the United States and of other members of the alliance.

For its part, the United States continues to furnish economic and military assistance to Portugal. Such aid releases other Portuguese resources for the repression of African rights and freedoms. The United States, in effect, is subsidizing the colonial régime, which expends an estimated 42 percent of its national budget for defense and security—the largest part being devoted to its three African territories. The Portuguese economy, certainly no less precarious than Britain's, thus is aided to sustain some 125,000 troops in African colonial wars, while at the same time Britain is compelled, on budgetary grounds, to unshoulder its burdens in neighboring areas of Southern Africa, including Rhodesia, Zambia and the former High Commission Territories.

A major leak in the Rhodesian sanctions program is the shipment of oil, unloaded at the Mozambique port of Lourenço Marques and moved thence to Rhodesia. As a condition of controlling this flow, Portugal insists upon financial compensation to offset her losses. There is no reason for not reckoning U.S. military and economic assistance as part of this account.

Reference has not been made to the extent of present and potential communist penetration into ground made fertile by racial

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exploitation. Warning drums beaten on this issue often have a hollow sound. It remains true, however, that except for military training by Algerians, the bulk of outside assistance to the revolutionary movements in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique has come from the three main communist groupings. Moreover, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have accepted large numbers of students for university and technical training, and, undoubtedly, for other types of training more closely related to ground action.

Western aid, for the most part, has been confined to refugees and a modest number of scholarships. On the other hand, Western investment in Angola and Mozambique continues to increase, in contravention of the General Assembly resolution calling for an embargo. Western support of the authoritarian Portuguese Government—side by side with communist support of the three colonial revolutions against that Government—is eroding the foundations of future Western influence among the nationalist leaders and their successors, who one day undoubtedly will achieve power, no matter how long or arduous may be the struggle for independence of some 13 million inhabitants of Portuguese Africa.

A wide range of political and economic pressures upon Portugal is available. These include increased diplomatic isolation, exclusion from U. N. conferences and the proceedings of specialized agencies, restrictions on tourism and a comprehensive embargo on all shipments of strategic materials. To make such measures effective, at least two prerequisites must be assured. The first of these is the full participation of the United States and the United Kingdom. The second is a clear statement of the objective sought—namely, recognition by Portugal of the right of self-determination and the introduction of effective procedures for giving substance to this right. The painful experience of the French North African colonies furnishes an example of what is to be avoided, as well as what can ultimately be achieved. Although independence obviously has not brought economic salvation or political stability, it has brought to an end the disastrous and bloody conflict which was an enemy to both.

V

South Africa undoubtedly is in the path of the coming storm, by reason of its intolerable racial policies. The characteristics of

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the official doctrine of apartheid, or "separate development," are too well known to require elaboration here. The basic element is, of course, that census classification of each person according to race and color determines his political, economic and social rights and opportunities, without regard to individual capacity or merit.

It is sometimes contended that we should not "stick our nose in South Africa's business." But the United States, along with virtually all other members of the United Nations, has made it plain that it is indeed "our business," when policies of a state violate the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter, create instability and unrest among its neighbors, and threaten the spread of racial conflict to the entire continent, and beyond.

It is also said that "economics works against political theory," and that the demands of an expanding economy for skilled labor must ultimately break down discriminatory barriers, such as the infamous "job reservation" laws, which prohibit employment of "natives" in skilled positions, however competent they may be. Yet after several decades of increasing demand for African labor, measures of repression are continually intensified, political rights and equal economic opportunities insistently denied. As an example of the benefits which the Africans are alleged to derive from the booming economy, a new mine contract was recently "negotiated" (without African representation, since Africans are not permitted to bargain) giving black workers 19 cents an hour —less than one-sixth the average wage of white mine workers.

The United States, as has been pointed out, continues to evade "confrontation" with the Republic of South Africa, despite failure to achieve our announced alternative course: "consultation." The total American investment in that country is estimated to be nearly $750 million, with an average annual return of 15 percent —a tempting premium for acquiescence. We also derive a bonus in a large and expanding trade account.

The United States Government, without serious explanation, has found it impractical or undesirable to impose curbs upon trade and investment with South Africa—at any rate, so long as these were designed to press that country to comply with its international obligations. Recently, however, we have found it expedient, as well as principled, to prohibit all new direct investment in South Africa, as in certain other states, as a means of conserving our foreign exchange.

We may discern here a parable of priorities: measures to re-

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dress the balance of justice, no; the same measures to redress the balance of payments, yes. The contrast illuminates the cynicism underlying our evasion of political and economic actions corresponding to our avowed intention to uphold the Charter and to deflect South Africa from her collision course.

Measures suggested above with respect to Portugal are generally relevant to South Africa as well. Here again, it should be noted that actions ought not to be avoided merely because, viewed in isolation, they might appear inadequate, or merely provocative. As has been said, their cumulative impact may be very effective indeed, certainly greater than reliance upon a sterile hope of "consultation." It is far wiser to embark upon a studied program of political and economic measures, combined with quiet and persistent diplomatic pressures, than to risk a certain confrontation, triggered by unpredictable events, at times and places of no one's choosing.

Over the darkening scene looms the manifest assumption of the communist powers that time is working on their side, and that continued frustration of African hopes for an equal chance and a free choice is preparing the ground for tragic harvest. Ironically, side by side with these communist assumptions, the South African Government, for its part, appears to assume that passage of time favors its own objectives. One of these two speculators in the value of time must lose. By means of a unified and purposeful strategy in regard to the coalescing Problem of Southern Africa, the organized international community has it within its power to assure that both assumptions are wrong, and that the promise of history is paid in the currency of reason and justice.

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TWO REVOLUTIONS

By Datus C. Smith, Jr.

TWO simultaneous revolutions in the developing countries —in education and in communications—can be expected separately and through their interaction to have an impact which is as yet only vaguely foreseen. They promise changes not merely in degree but in kind. As education pushes toward universality, and as the communications network makes more and more sweeping use of printing, broadcasting, film-making and other new methods, the effects will be not only on the economy but perhaps on the basic civic structure of the societies concerned. Whether the long-run political results will be beneficial is another and quite different question. And whether the side effects will strengthen the social fabric is likewise in doubt. But, whether for good or ill, overwhelming changes are going to occur. We should think about them if we are concerned with the welfare of Asia and Africa and Latin America, or with the relations of their societies with the rest of the world.

A look at the size and shape of the educational revolution is necessary before we consider the communications revolution with which it interacts. We start with the proposition that the developing countries should be able to achieve important shortcuts, proceeding directly to new methods of instruction. Ironically, the underdeveloped state of both their education and their communications is a positive boon in that new methods will be far easier to introduce than if there were more substantial vested interests committed to old-fashioned ways of doing things, hence inclined to regard progress along any new lines as a threat. The developing nations should be able to use audio-visual techniques instead of depending exclusively on individual teachers and the printing press. Contact of the best teachers with the mass of the country's pupils should be possible through multiplication by electronics. At least some of the principles of programmed learning can enter the new textbooks. Wide currency can be given to supplementary reading that is interesting to the student instead of imprisoning the mind in the narrowness of one textbook. The oral approach and other new methods of language teaching can replace the formal-grammar systems that have proved so arduous and so ineffective.

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Yet the circumstances in which these developments will take place are so unprecedented and suggest so many reciprocal relations with economics, politics and sociology that the path toward the ultimate goals will be cluttered with obstructions and diverted through many detours. Some examples may suggest how bizarre the circumstances can be.

Think, for instance, of what would be involved in introducing audiovisual methods of instruction into Asian and African schools. Planners can calculate the economic requirements for broadcasting systems and receivers. They can even project the need for training operators of the equipment and for supplying electricity many leagues from any present source. But there is an additional need that is so homespun and down-to-earth that nobody ever thinks of it. For the new systems to work there must be conditions of light and acoustics which probably do not now exist in one in a thousand Afro-Asian school buildings. What chance will McLuhan have in a building with perhaps half a dozen different grades in one room, no partitions, no sidewalls if the school is in the tropics, and with a corrugated metal roof that produces a deafening roar throughout much of the rainy season? It is of course technically easier to remodel or rebuild school buildings than to create a national broadcasting system, but this is a good illustration of the unexpected troubles, arising from the humblest sources, that can block a system in which all the much more sophisticated elements seem to have been accounted for.

For another example of frustrations from extraneous sources, consider the illogicalities in the rules about customs duties. Countries trying to achieve self-sufficiency in one branch or another of the communications industry constantly let their own rules prevent attainment of the objective. Foreign books come in duty-free, but the paper which local publishers need to manufacture their own books is subject to duty. Exposed film or prints may enter without duty while raw film that the local film industry needs for its production draws a heavy tax. Some years ago an infant industry for casting Bengali printing types in East Pakistan collapsed because of high duty on the special metals required, while competition in the form of metal already cast into Bengali type came in free. Such illogicalities are not peculiar to the developing countries. We can cite embarrassing analogues at home. But the Asians and Africans and Latin

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Americans in general have so small a margin for error that they cannot bear the burden of such absurdities.

Turning to another aspect of economics, one of the issues in African educational publishing is whether there should be a competitive system or a state monopoly. That would seem to be a basically African issue, though foreigners might be expected to favor one course or the other according to ideological preference. But it is astonishing to report that the greatest encouragement toward a state system has come from Harold Macmillan, lately Conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain. After leaving Downing Street and returning to the publishing house that bears his name, he undertook a series of African safaris, signing agreements with several countries to coöperate with state publishing enterprises which had been given a theoretical monopoly on educational publishing. Macmillan would no doubt say that he did not invent the trend toward statism in Africa, and that the coöperation of his house should at least improve the quality of the books published. But it is still a fact, wryly noted with special bitterness by Macmillan's business rivals who happen to be Labor-minded, that a Tory enhanced the prospects of socialism in African publishing more than any socialist or any African.

For an example somewhat the other way round: Abdoulaye Diop, publisher of *Présence Africaine,* is the most ardent advocate of Africanism in the continent's publishing. But he has felt it necessary to use Paris as his headquarters and place of publication because jealousies among the possible African centers, such as Dakar and Abidjan, are so intense that French-speaking Africans will accept books with a theoretically objectionable "Paris" on the title page more readily than the name of a city in any African country except their own.

Or, as a commentary on how hard it is to get small capital for components of the communications industry, note the comment of a Middle Eastern banker: "If a publisher has a ton of raw paper, that is perfectly good security on which I will be glad to lend him money. But if he goes and *ruins* that paper by printing words on it, I can't lend him a piaster!"

II

The educational revolution is proceeding apace, but that is not to say that education is getting better and better every-

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where in Asia and Africa. Indeed there has been retrogression in some places. The reasons for this have been varied, some quite irrelevant to education itself. There has been diversion of American foreign aid from developmental to military purposes, and there has been disruption from such causes as the Chinese invasion of India and the Indo-Pakistani war, the Middle East War, civil war in Nigeria, economic prostration in Indonesia. But some of the other reasons relate to the educational revolution itself. There has been too-easy acceptance of foreign schemes not really suitable for the local educational system. New curricula have been handed to teachers whose minds are rooted in the old. Teaching methods absolutely dependent on new teaching materials have been introduced before the materials are available. And, because of the need for a great increase in the number of teachers, too many countries have had a teaching force up to one-fourth of whose members may themselves have had an education no higher than sixth grade.

Many Asian and African educators realize that more deliberate speed in the reforms would have been advisable. But for better or worse the great movement is under way, and its main outlines seem clear:

(1) The reality of the movement toward universal elementary education is beyond question. Even if quality has gone down because too much was attempted all at once, education *has* pushed out beyond the cities to the remotest provinces. To some extent even the nomadic tribes are included, with schools that move back and forth with the seasons. A closely reasoned and statistically responsible projection for the future can be found in a document called "Draft Model for Educational Development in Asia." It was prepared by UNESCO specialists in 1965 in response to a request from the Ministers of Education of the Asian member states. According to that study, seven years of elementary education will be universal—in practice, not merely on the statute books—by 1980 for all of the eighteen Asian countries studied except Afghanistan, Laos and Nepal, and even those three are expected to achieve universality sometime after 1980. At the time of the study the percentage of elementary-age children actually in school varied from 10 percent in Afghanistan through 57 percent in India to 98 percent in Taiwan.

(2) The distinction between continuing and terminal education will be more frankly recognized. The pretense will be aban-

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doned that every little Asian or African presenting himself at school is an eventual candidate for an Oxford D.Phil. The number of students who do in fact continue into higher education will of course increase greatly, but there will be more realism about the others. An effort will be made to serve the real educational needs of the far greater number who will not go beyond seventh grade. Although it would be a sad mistake to shape Afro-Asian education too exclusively in response to the need for technical skills, it is a fact that vocational education is woefully underdeveloped. More intelligent attention can be given to that important subject in the new curricula. There is a real determination to respond to actual local needs and interests rather than to copy something from a British or American school.

(3) New methods of instruction are being tried out in many countries of Africa and Asia. Some of these will prevail, and elsewhere still newer systems will be tried. And new methods require new educational materials and new training of teachers. There are already quite a number of efforts, widely scattered, to adapt some of the recent inventions such as the new mathematics and sciences, new methods of language teaching, some elements of programmed learning and novel forms of student participation.

(4) Meanwhile, the changes in secondary and higher education should also be dramatic, though the trends in each may well be in opposing directions. In high school the changes will be toward satisfaction of local needs. In the universities, on the other hand, there will be an effort toward closer matching of the qualities and standards of higher education and advanced research in developed nations. The UNESCO study indicates that school enrollment in the secondary years in the eighteen countries studied will grow from 12 million to 46 million by 1980, while the growth in what we would call junior colleges will be from 2 million to 6 million.

(5) Education will be increasingly directed toward specific manpower needs. That has both good and bad implications. It is good because the manpower needs are genuine and must positively be filled if a nation is to progress. Also, the practicality of the manpower argument appeals to sister ministries of finance, industry, commerce and economic development from which education seeks support. But there is reason for concern about too much emphasis on technical skills. A projection of manpower needs as a basis for educational planning was introduced by Frederick Harbison in the famous Ashby Report on Nigerian educa-

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tion a decade ago. It proved to be one of the most useful concepts for guiding educational development, and it continues to be of value. As long as the term "manpower needs" is given enough breadth the approach is clearly beneficial. But the danger is the tendency of a narrow manpower specialist to forget that man does not live by bread alone. The need is to educate the whole person, no matter at how low a level the education will stop, and whether the individual is destined for a career as a spindle-tender in a cotton mill or a creative thinker at the summit of the country's intellectual life.

(6) Adult literacy, which excites automatic enthusiasm among developing-country politicians and Western do-gooders, is not of comparable importance. Each country has to decide whether it can afford both full development of school education and a simultaneous effort to save a generation or half-generation of people who had no schooling. If a real job can be done on the new generations as they come along, a developing country would be justified, if forced to it by economic necessity, virtually to forget about the older people.

But if something *is* to be done with the dropouts and the unschooled, then a specially designed effort is required, quite different from anything in the school system itself. Reading materials for adult new-literates need the same language simplicity as primary-school books, but the content must be such as will interest adult minds. Some Asian and African and Latin American countries will undoubtedly reach the negative decision suggested above, but others will make a major production of adult literacy. Because of the numbers involved while the educated new generation is replacing the old, that will be a large order.

III

These revolutionary developments in education need the oncoming communications revolution to make them work. But, in turnabout fashion, the communications revolution depends on education to provide the staff for handling its intricate machinery and to create the mass audience to receive its messages. Unexpected things will no doubt happen as these movements proceed, but predictions can be made about the main lines of development.

First, if there is to be a truly mass system of communication, it will be necessary to develop methods and devices permitting lowest possible unit cost per citizen reached. That, in turn, will

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have critical meaning for all branches of the communications industry. Included will be printing, publishing, broadcasting, filmmaking and the industries producing the needed supplies such as paper, ink and adhesives for printed matter; radio and TV receivers; and batteries and small generators to provide electricity at points remote from power sources. The economic as well as technological by-products of this will be history-making in themselves. In some of these areas Western technology itself must advance; in others, the problem is merely to transfer the existing technology to the developing countries.

Second, the communications system will be "multi-media," whether for the general public or in school use. Many Asian and African and Latin American schools a decade hence may well have not only classroom teachers, not only books, not only radio, not only TV, not only films, but elements drawn from the whole range of modern methods of communicating with masses of people. Electronic and other new media should increase rather than decrease the need for traditional materials such as printed matter. That is not merely because the overall educated public will be enlarged but also because of the need for consolidating and making permanent the powerful though transitory impact of the lesson received through electronics. The need for conventional materials can thus be expected to increase not only in the classroom but also in supplementary school use (notably in school libraries) and in general public use. Introduction of new media will surely cause some economic dislocations, but in the long run there should be many more readers of newspapers, magazines and books and a great expansion of school and public libraries.

Third, there will be a strong incentive to seek multinational solutions of many communications problems. The extent to which the possibilities can be realized will of course depend on political and other considerations, but economic logic clearly points in that direction. It is beyond the economic capability of each small country in Africa, for instance, to have its own full book-publishing industry, its own satellite or even its own full programming for educational TV, its own production of films, its own paper mills, its own manufacture of receivers and batteries.

Every country, no matter how small, must have its own printing plant; yet here too it will not be possible for each nation to support a plant large enough to produce at the low costs that can be achieved only with mass production. Two of the largest print-

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ing plants on the African continent are in Guinea and Ghana. These huge modern establishments, built in Conakry and at Tema near Accra with Eastern bloc assistance, are far larger than the two countries would require even years from now. Each of the two leaders, Sékou Touré and Nkrumah, had the vision of profit through serving the printing needs of all of West Africa, and they were right in the basic thought. Aside from the problem of competition with each other, the two plans were theoretically sound. If politics would permit it, a large modern plant able to capture the economies of mass production should be able to give the region better books at much lower prices. An even smaller country, Kuwait, also has a regionally significant printing enterprise, producing the magazine *Al Arabi,* which has wider general readership than any other publication in Arabic. Still another tiny country, Lebanon, is an active center of book publication and distribution for the whole Arab world.

An even stronger case for regionalization can be made when it comes to newer techniques such as educational broadcasting by satellite. Even aside from the possibility of multi-channel broadcasting in different languages, think of the prospect—politics permitting—of an educational program via satellite serving Latin America in Spanish or one or another of the different parts of sub-Saharan Africa in English or French. And there are equally logical possibilities for reaching Iran and Afghanistan in the Persian language; West Pakistan and parts of India in Urdu; East and West Bengal in Bengali; Ceylon and parts of South India in Tamil; and any one of several groupings of Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

Perhaps politics will prove an insuperable obstacle, but some kind of modus vivendi has been found on comparable issues that seem at least as delicate—for instance, the division of the Nile waters among Uganda, Sudan and the U.A.R. So logical a scheme as regional educational broadcasting might be workable at least with respect to subjects which are not especially sensitive politically—such as mathematics and the natural sciences, including health and agriculture.

A number of projects looking toward regionalism in education have been started. There was a modestly successful project, centered in Cameroun, for joint textbook production with Chad, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville) and the Central African Republic. The organization called SEAMES (Southeast Asian Ministers of

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Education Secretariat) based in Bangkok is barely under way, but a hopeful sign is that the Asian Development Bank has indicated readiness to coöperate with SEAMES for providing capital for educationally oriented facilities for regional use. And attention should be given to the West African Examination Council, a kind of "College Board" that should have significant influence on school curricula. Some degree of uniformity in secondary school curricula is a prerequisite to effective multi-country use of textbooks, films, and radio and TV broadcasts.

The fourth and last of the predictions that might be risked at this distance is that there will be even more intense competition for control of the channels of communication. Many of the motivations will have little to do with education. They will include ideology, nationalism, profit and individual political ambition. That is nothing new in the world, and it is not unknown in our own history. But the temptations will be much greater in Asia, Africa and Latin America because of both the newness and the uniqueness of the pervasive system created for educational purposes but susceptible of use for quite different purposes. And given the huge potential for growth in the communications industry, there will be severe temptations to establish monopolies or otherwise control supplies of component parts of the system.

IV

What will be the effect of all these developments? In the business-industrial field there will be an elaborate series of interconnected movements relating to the needs of the new industries for capital, personnel, equipment and materials. There may be an impact on the construction industry in connection with remodeling schools as well as building new ones. In arranging to meet all those needs the countries may proceed in hit-or-miss fashion, or the requirements may be wisely integrated in overall national plans. Either way, there will be a conflict of values or of desired ends.

One economic question that will recur frequently is whether a country should strive for autarky in providing the continuing supplies, such as paper and batteries, which the communications industry will need. As an example, take the case of paper supply for a country that happens to be sugar-producing. In the long run will it be best for the country to continue bearing the foreign-exchange burden of importing paper? Or should it join with neigh-

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bors in some regional scheme? Or should it create its own paper industry for which the raw material might be bagasse (the fiber remaining after sugar has been extracted from cane)? If the last alternative is chosen, what fuel will replace the bagasse formerly burned as the chief power source for the refining industry?

Another kind of decision relating to the communications industry has to be made with respect to foreign investment. Joint ventures with experienced foreign firms from developed countries may be especially useful not only in bringing in capital and managerial experience but also in supplying patent rights, knowledge about how to train personnel and access to world sources of equipment and raw materials. But even aside from xenophobia and other psychological factors that have brought disaster to some of the joint efforts in other fields, there are delicacies as to the country's foreign-investment laws. And especially careful planning is needed to coördinate company training plans with the public vocational education system. Each tentative answer leads to new questions, and the process seems never-ending. It does appear, however, that national planners in more and more of the Asian and African countries—sometimes even with the help of computers—are now capable of envisaging the full gamut of relationships among the different factors. Too often in the past the new countries have jumped headlong into some project and then discovered that the effect on some other sector was highly adverse. There is now reason to hope that the social and economic side effects of the changes in education and communications can at least be anticipated, even if not in all ways provided for.

One area in which no computer is needed to predict that there will be a change is that of the consumer-goods industries. New markets can be reached, and the desires and interests of the once remote country people will be subject to many of the same influences that affect city folk. That will not be an unalloyed good, but there are observers who view the prospect with favor. They think not merely of the stimulus to the consumer-goods industries but especially of the spur to increased production in the countryside itself, as new incentives and rewards are offered to the mass of the rural population. The hope of someday getting a flashlight or a radio or a bicycle could thus introduce an entirely new factor into the rural economy. Even advertisements of such gadgets could—in this view—have public benefits comparable to the editorial content of the publications or broadcasts.

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The chain reaction will go on and on. Highway development is part of the communications revolution, and it will stimulate other parts. Conversely, improvement in other communications will be among the influences leading to still more highways. And as printed matter goes into the villages there will be requirements for an expanded postal system and for better ways of transmitting small amounts of money. If, as is contemplated in several Asian countries, there is a movement toward "subscription selling" of groups of books, like our method of merchandising encyclopedias, that could have a significant effect on branch banking because of the need for collection points for the installment payments. In fact, a banker in Afghanistan said he would be glad to have his bank make such collections without fee because the system would bring into the bank large numbers of people who might eventually become depositors. As to the postal system, there was a fine example in Iran recently: the fortnightly mass-circulation magazine for new literates was directly responsible for the opening of a couple of hundred new post offices because the publication had the requisite number of subscribers in villages that had never before enjoyed postal service.

V

But will all this tend to snuff out local culture? Will a kind of internationalized Western music, reaching every village by some mass system, drown out the gamelans and sitars and talking drums? Will the flood of second-rate Western cultural artifacts and the dubious messages of our mass media so clog the channels that local culture will have no chance? Even within one country, will the historic subcultures be buried in a banal national uniformity? All that is of course possible. But one of the reasons for thinking the disaster may not occur is the change of attitude, compared with ten years ago, on the part of Asian and African intellectual leaders. The change has been noteworthy in the case of the communications specialists who run the machinery of publishing, broadcasting and film-making. They have given new encouragement to folk music, folk drama, folk dance, poetry-reading in the national language and design motifs from local crafts. Granted that they have multiplied rock and roll at the same time, there has been apparent sincerity in the effort to use modern devices as a means of preserving the traditional culture.

The attitude toward national languages in Asia is especially

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interesting. A decade ago the overwhelming majority of Asian educators snorted at any suggestion that there was a future for national languages in higher education, and in this they were frequently encouraged by foreign advisers. Now, however, in one country after another there has been recognition that the standard of English commanded by most university students is inadequate for intelligent use of English-language textbooks. There have been movements—some of which have progressed quite far—for introducing university-level textbooks in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Bengali, Burmese, Thai and Indonesian; and there is an increasingly successful effort to provide young people with interesting things to read in their own language. Meanwhile, although most people agree that the average quality of English has declined in the last decade, the number of people with some functional command of the language has increased.

One effect of the strengthening of national languages in Asia will be that writers will have a national audience to address. That will be a great encouragement; so often in the past, writers have felt that they had first to achieve mastery of English and then rush their manuscripts off to London or New York, even if the audience they wanted to reach was composed of their fellow citizens at home.

But pessimistic observers will see dire misfortune in civic life, whatever the educational or cultural benefits in formal terms. They think that the communications system will be controlled by demagogues, and that a better system will merely make it easier for malefactors to gain popular support for their evil purposes. That could happen, but there is at least an equal chance that better education and the immediacy of knowledge of what is going on in the country and the world will not only expose demagoguery but provide a curb on corruption, stimulate individual output of energy and useful work, and perhaps in some countries (especially in Africa) create a sense of nationhood which has not so far existed. The simultaneous revolutions may bring results inconceivable at present—such as the universal practice of family planning or a renascence in poetry. We can only be sure that, for good or ill, monumental changes are coming in both education and communications, and that all phases of life in Asia, Africa and Latin America will be affected by them.

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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE PHILIPPINES?

By Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.

A DIPLOMAT, after a seven-year tour of duty in the Philippines, once christened the islands an "enchanting archipelago." Whether he was merely being polite, or had succumbed to government pitchmen, or had himself become enchanted by the lush tropical beauty of the islands, he should also have seen a country wracked by afflictions, some common to all countries engaged in the desperate race to develop, some peculiar to the Philippines.

Purveyors of the rosy picture continue to roll out endless statistics and charts to depict a growing economy, a country on the move. A portion of this view may even be accepted, considering that the Philippines, with all its imperfections, is only 21 years old as a free republic. The trouble is that there is one vital natural resource that has not been properly developed: the people.

Beneath the outpourings of self-serving government data, hidden underneath the trappings of the good life in the big cities, there remains a depressed and dispirited people. Against the yardstick not of statistics but of the quality of life, the Filipino people as a whole are a melancholy—if patient—mass. Their daily diet is monotonous (rice, fish, vegetables), their clothes are threadbare and their homes primitive and crowded. What could they hope to build on a daily per capita income of just over 25 cents? In sum, the blessings of liberty have not included liberation from poverty.

Foreign gadgetry and other luxury goods continue to flood the cities, and more people travel, despite current government restrictions. But this only serves to dramatize the great disparities and chronic inequities of Filipino society. Indeed, the Philippines is a land of traumatic contrasts. Here is a land in which a few are spectacularly rich while the masses remain abjectly poor. Gleaming suburbia clashes with the squalor of slums. Here is a land where freedom and its blessings are a reality for a minority and an illusion for the many. Here is a land consecrated to democracy but run by an entrenched plutocracy. Here, too, are a people whose ambitions run high, but whose fulfillment is low and mainly restricted to the self-perpetuating élite. Here is a land of privilege

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and rank—a republic dedicated to equality but mired in an archaic system of caste.

Caste spells bondage. Of this the contemporary Filipino is well aware. And to break through—to rise out of this bondage into the next higher social stratum—is the ambition of the *tao*, the Filipino common man. For him, education appears at first the ticket to his aspirations, and parents sell their last worldly possessions, even go deep into debt, to see a son or a daughter through college. But each year, no less than 65,000 swell the ranks of this army of the discontented, educated unemployed. Unemployment runs up to a million, while the under-employed represent 20 to 25 percent of the population, largely in the rural areas. The upsurge of the communist Huks in Central Luzon is but one chilling manifestation of peasant disillusionment. Another is the recent wave of crime which has converted the country into a land of terror in time of peace.

Add to this a government which is financially almost bankrupt, state agencies ridden by debts and honeycombed with graft, industries in pathetic distress, prices in a continuing spiral, and there is good reason for the Filipino to feel sapped of confidence, hope and will. The new, young Filipino leaders who exhort their peers to be activists, and not to give up, are greeted with apathy and indifference.

In the early thirties, Manuel L. Quezon, as he led the fight for independence, once raged: "I would rather have a country run like hell by Filipinos than one run like heaven by the Americans." The father of his country did not live to see this preference realized, but his political heirs have. Since independence, Philippine presidents have logged a grand total of fourteen national plans and all they have to show for them is a nation that looks, sounds and feels discouraged. It is confused by the multiplicity of its cravings and concerns, floundering in haphazard attempts to modernize and innovate.

Government apologists predictably will disagree with these conclusions. Great strides have been made, they will maintain, and they can indeed produce the required statistics to back up their claims. But the assertion that development is accelerating is only partly correct. "Orderly growth and evolution require delicate synchronization," Filipino economist Sixto K. Roxas has cogently argued. And this is precisely what is wanting in Philippine economic planning.

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The truth is that there has been no organized, no methodical overall economic planning. At best, all that our previous planners have trotted out have been limited programs which, tragically for the people, have bred individual hustling and pushing while the overall economy ran inconclusively in every direction. The result has been an impasse in the development of critical sectors of the economy such as the metal, chemical, wood, plastics and food industries.

For a people who at independence set out to pursue the American way of life as the ideal, the Filipinos—21 years later—are nowhere near the mark. "We are," one Filipino declared in self-reproach, "a people with champagne tastes, operating on a beer income." Actually, quite a number of Filipinos cannot even afford beer.

The annual real per capita income is less than $100, lower than Communist China's today and equal to Japan's only way back in 1910. The gross national product grows between 5 and 6 percent per year, but is offset by a ballooning population increasing at a rate of 3.4 percent per year, one of the world's highest. The GNP growth, in fact, is hardly enough to absorb the backlog of unemployed and under-employed, to say nothing of improving the people's standard of living.

II

Who's to blame?

Fault, if it must be fixed, belongs not to any single man or people. It lies in the fabric of the society—and in what went into its making. Too many Filipinos are without purpose and without discipline. They profess love of country, but love themselves—individually—more. When then Senate President José Avelino, in an expansive mood, exclaimed, "What are we in power for?", and when much later President Carlos P. Garcia defended a cabinet member's right to "prepare for his future," these leaders were articulating a common outlook.

The responsibility belongs also to those who came, conquered and ruled—to America as much as to Spain. For all the good they did (Spain welded and Christianized the people, America democratized them), they are responsible for the worst in the Filipino. While bleeding them, they molded the Filipinos in their own images, Spain Hispanizing and America Americanizing the natives. Almost half a century of American rule bequeathed to the

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Asian Filipino a trauma by making him uncomfortably American in outlook, values and tastes. What was left was a people without soul.

Filipinos are bewildered about their identity. They are an Asian people not Asian in the eyes of their fellow Asians and not Western in the eyes of the West. They are in Asia, but they know more about the Statue of Liberty than about Angkor Wat in Cambodia; more of the lyrics of Whitman than of Tagore or of their own Nick Joaquin; more of Patrick Henry's soul-stirring liberty-or-death oratory than of the ageless wisdom of Confucius or Lao-tze. Lately, they have taken to insisting they are Asian, but they are so American-oriented that—by reflex—they still react and respond like little brown Americans.

Except for the hyper-nationalists, the Filipinos actually take pride in their community—if not identity—with the Americans. When President Johnson applauded President Marcos as his "right arm in Asia," there was some derisive reaction from nationalist quarters but, in the main, the people took it as a badge to wear proudly on their sleeves. GI Joe at Clark, at Mactan, at John Hay, at Subic and at Sangley, America's military bases in the Philippines, remains a symbol of American protection. Herein lies the bigger Filipino problem.

Too many Filipinos are given to dodging their responsibilities, running to others for help when they should be on their own feet. This, too, is a legacy of the West. The writer Renato Constantino has put it well: "As a people, we have been deprived for centuries of responsibility for our destiny. Under the Americans, while ostensibly we were being prepared for self-government, for self-reliance, actually we were being maneuvered by means of political and economic pressures to defer to American decisions [and] being conditioned by our American education to prefer American ways. The result is a people habituated to abdicating control over basic areas of their national life, unaccustomed to coming to grips with reality, prone to escape into fantasies."

Some conjecture that a more tragic fate might have overtaken the Filipinos if Spain had not stumbled upon them in 1521—a fate perhaps, some shudder, like that which befell Indonesia, Indochina or the Congo. There is nothing to support this speculation; the fact is, the navigator Fernando Magallanes found on these islands well-ordered societies with their own culture. He was slain on Mactan island by a Filipino, Lapulapu, the first

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Asian to fight and defeat a Western invader. But the Spanish king and Cortez were bent on empire and, in historian Arnold Toynbee's words, "The Philippines was held for Spain by a handful of soldiers, administrators, and friars after the fashion of the Spanish empire of the Indies."

With the cross and the sword, Spain stamped out the native culture, commerce and government. The people's codes and laws, their weights and measures, their literature and even their alphabet were destroyed. There were, of course, periods in Spain's 377 years of domination when liberal governors ruled, but in the main, Spanish rule was oppressive. No less than two hundred revolts marked the Spanish rule; the last—the Katipunan Revolution of 1896—finally broke Spain's reign with American military help.

Filipino jubilation was short-lived, however. A republic was proclaimed by the victorious revolutionaries on June 12, 1898, but the Spanish-American War had already cast its shadow over the Filipino destiny. In the Treaty of Paris of 1898, defeated Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States for $20 million over vociferous but futile Filipino protests. "The Filipino freedom-fighters," comments Toynbee, "now found that they had fallen out of the frying pan into the fire."

From the very beginning, Washington officials denied any ambition of empire. They rationalized their Pacific acquisition as a humane and civilizing job. President McKinley, so it is recorded, dropped on his knees and prayed to God for guidance. "And one night," he said, "it all came to me this way—that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them."

Hokum or truth? A good number of Filipino patriots rejected America's proclaimed benevolence and kept up the guerrilla fight for independence not only in the mountains but also in their newspapers and literature. In their struggle, they drew moral backing from diverse foreign powers including imperial Japan, which gave sanctuary to fleeing Filipino rebels.

After "pacifying" the islands (except the hinterlands of Muslim Mindanao), America set out to refashion the Filipino. In this there was method as well as design. American teachers came first, followed by American missionaries, then by American public officials. So successful were they that the Filipinos were soon thinking, acting and living American. And so proud was the

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United States, it was soon calling the country America's "showcase of democracy" in Asia. The Filipinos liked the label too, such had been the degree of their Americanization.

Filipinos, indeed, have much to thank the United States for. With "the happiness, peace and prosperity" of the Filipinos as the official colonial policy, America gave the Filipinos a new language, schools, free trade, government and laws. It strove to curb disease. It also gave the Filipinos a vigorous journalism, something Filipinos point to with pride. Branded as irresponsible at times, the Philippine press none the less has been the unofficial loyal opposition, the strongest deterrent to unbridled graft. And most important, perhaps, the United States kept the regionalistic and volatile Filipinos from breaking up.

What if the United States had not come and the First Republic in 1898 had not been aborted? Philippine Ambassador to Washington Salvador P. Lopez, who, as foreign secretary, charted the Philippines' dramatic turn away from the United States and back toward Asia, answered this way: ". . . the Philippines would have developed a political system resembling, on the one hand, the self-perpetuating oligarchies of Latin America and, on the other, the 'guided democracy' of Indonesia. In addition, the young republic would have been confronted almost immediately by challenges to its authority, in particular by serious separatist movements in the Visayas and in Moslem Mindanao and Sulu." American colonial rule, he affirmed, moderated all these and permitted a new "Philippine society to develop along more democratic lines."

What the United States fashioned, in fact, is a democratic plural society, a society that finds unity in its diversity. It is a society, some say, as American as the United States itself. It may not have the dollars, but it certainly has the tastes and habits, the wheelings and dealings, the idiosyncracies and neuroses of its recent mentor. And it is—or has been—committed four-square to America, to what America stands for—more than the United States itself, perhaps. In its anti-communism, for example, Manila is more rigid than Washington.

In three wars, the Philippines has stepped forward and fought with the United States—against the Japanese in the epic holding battles of Bataan and Corregidor, against the North Koreans and Communist Chinese in Korea, against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese now. Clearly, President Marcos voiced the Filipino

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sentiment when he explained why he brought the Philippines into the Viet Nam war: because, he said, the United States was already in the fray.

III

Increasingly, however, there are signs of disaffection from the United States. Where it was almost unthinkable to criticize America ten years ago, more and more Filipinos speak out today against Americans, if not America itself. The change is seen in anti-American demonstrations and in the search for new partners in Asia and in Europe. Behind it, too, is a renaissance of Filipino nationalism and a growing awareness of where the country is—in Asia. But the main reason is the failure of the United States —in Filipino eyes—to give meaning to the vaunted special relationship; American performance falls short of the promise.

In this atmosphere, the negative aspects of U. S. policy are surfacing. Approval of parity—equal rights for Americans in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources—is now seen as imposed by the United States on a people left prostrate by World War II, as a condition for American war-damage funds. "The net effect of parity," Education Undersecretary Onofre Corpus warned the United States recently, "has been an erosion of the Filipinos' belief in the United States' capacity for fair dealing with her friends and allies."

Filipinos in growing numbers now believe that the independence granted by the United States in 1946 had built-in strings designed to perpetuate American economic dominance—or "colonialism," as the ultra-nationalists call it. And they point to the trade agreement which has kept the Philippines a supplier of raw materials for America's mills and a market for American goods. Of course, the onerous provision of the original agreement was rewritten in the Laurel-Langley Pact of 1956, but very few Filipinos understand this refinement.

Some Filipino ultra-nationalists—not too many, but well-positioned and very articulate—would sever all special relations with the United States, putting the Philippines on the path of nonalignment. This, of course, is foolhardy. With a nuclear-armed and power-minded Communist China casting a covetous shadow over all of free Asia, the Philippines needs the United States more than ever; the only other choices left to her are to go Red or fall dead.

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One truth persists here: the Philippines, like the rest of free Asia, needs America's continued military presence in the area. Like the others, she needs America as dam and shield against the Chinese Communists. This need has never been more urgently felt than since President Johnson's dramatic announcement at the end of March and the beginning of negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Will the United States pull out, as the French and British have done? This is the common fear of free Asians. For the Filipinos, with a million Chinese unassimilated in their midst, it is more than a fear; it is a spectre.

The Philippines today needs to make bold efforts to break away from the fetters of the past. She must review and revise her so-called special relationships with the United States, taking into account the world as it is, and ceasing to live on the myths and heroics that so welded and so sustained her in the past. The Filipinos ask simply for dignity in their relations with the United States and equality with others in the American-led community of nations. They resent the fact that Japan, a former enemy, has obtained more from the United States than has the Philippines, and that Spain, a totalitarian state, has a more favorable military bases agreement with the United States.

The Filipinos must purge—now, with finality—the cause of their past shame: U.S. puppetry. What they must seek is partnership with the United States, not wardship. If a fresh viability can be forged out of the old tissues of past kinship, so much the better. But this should be farthest from both the Filipino and American minds. A New Spirit must be infused into the Filipino-American relations of the 1970s and the years beyond. It will have to be applied to the new U.S.-Philippine treaty which will replace the Laurel-Langley preferential trade agreement expiring on July 4, 1973; and it must be applied to the new mutual defense and military bases agreements. These are the main problems that have vexed Filipino-American relations so much in the sixties; approached with a fresh outlook, they could yield a more durable Filipino-American relationship.

Happily, despite the growing swell of anti-American criticism in the Filipino press, there is no hatred for whites on the islands. This is because, it would seem, Americans neither tyrannized nor brutalized the Filipinos in their 48-year rule. In fact, Filipinos—in the main—fondly remember the Big Brother gestures and kindnesses of the GI who liberated the islands in 1945. Out in the

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country especially, the *Americano* is still as much a symbol of help, friendship and good will as ever. As before, this is a good augury.

IV

There is much to be done at home. In addition to breaking away from America's economic dominance, the Filipinos themselves must outgrow the colonial attitude which now impedes the modernization process. Fortunately there are many latent forces which can be energized. Anyone who has lived in the Philippines will attest to the flexibility of the Filipinos and, most of all, to their great social mobility. There is, on the whole, an openness in the society, the creation no doubt of the egalitarian ideals of the Revolution of 1896 that have slowly seeped into the whole fabric of Philippine life during the last six decades. And this can be ascribed to the public school system which the Americans themselves started, to the system of government which the Americans installed but which the Filipinos have molded to fit their own psyche and needs. We have, after all, been having democratic elections since 1911; many governments have come and gone without the chaos and bloodshed of revolutions and coups d'état.

There are perhaps more trained technicians in the Philippines today than anywhere else in Southeast Asia, but the industrial growth that can absorb these technicians has not come. Moreover, the Philippines' natural resources are among the richest in Southeast Asia, yet we are fast falling behind such countries as Malaysia and Taiwan in industrial development. Here, again, the oligarchs must be made to move, to invest, to industrialize. They can be captains of industry, but instead they have elected to dig in their heels on the land.

Stirring the entrenched oligarchs into accepting the urgency of land reform is also one of the aims of the younger leadership which wants the Philippines to surge upward. Up to now, however, the forces of reaction have made government efforts in this direction largely meaningless. What a few years ago was a mere revolution of rising expectations has grown to the point where some fear revolution itself. It could be sparked, not by the left, the communist-inspired Huk ideologue, but by the disillusioned, depressed and dejected educated unemployed. Clearly, the Filipino élite—the corrupt and corrupting, the irresponsible and un-

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responsive old leadership—must face up to the need for reform or be swept away.

The new-generation Filipino must also shake and awaken the Catholic Church, which has long ignored the need for social reform and become flabby in its position of revered irrelevance. Because the Church has grown remote from the masses, quasi-religious fanatics have banded together and prospered in the countryside. Last year 31 of them—members of the *Lapiang Malaya* (Freedom Party) sect—were slaughtered when they demonstrated in Manila and charged the constabulary dispatched to contain them. This was as much a failure of the Church as of the government.

The government itself must be made to respond to the demands of the middle class—the innovating, the modernizing class—for a mass market. The archaic and regressive tax structure must be revamped. The wealth that the oligarchy rapaciously covets and hoards must get down to the masses in the form of roads, bridges and schools; these are what the *tao* understands as good or bad government.

Philippine democratic institutions, President Marcos feels, are on trial. "And they may not," he has warned, "have a second chance to prove and sustain themselves." The Filipino, he stresses, must realize his salvation lies within himself. With this, the opposition cannot disagree. Indeed, great dedication and great labor are demanded of the new Filipino.

All these are Filipino aspirations and frustrations that Americans must clearly understand. It is they, after all, to whom the Filipinos have always turned for guidance and assistance. In handling the Philippine problem, it will be well for the United States to remember that methods and postures that have repeatedly failed in contemporary Asia cannot any longer work in the new Philippines either. Equally, the Filipinos will do well to keep in mind that invoking the dead—if epic—past will no longer work in this age of rapid evolution. For them sentimentally to rest their future and fortune on the special Filipino-American bonds and other myths of the past is likely to be fatal.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE DISCIPLINE OF POWER: ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN WORLD STRUCTURE. By George W. Ball. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1968, 363 p. $7.50.

In this sane and balanced book, the new United States Ambassador to the United Nations suggests that America has tended to use her power not arrogantly, but exuberantly. In his quest for a new world power balance, Ambassador Ball's central concern is the need for progress toward European unity.

CRISIS NOW. By James M. Gavin in Collaboration with Arthur T. Hadley. New York: Random House, 1968, 184 p. $4.95.

The author focuses his attention on two crises: Viet Nam and the American cities. He proposes to end the Vietnamese war through the enclave strategy and then suggests that the money thus saved be spent on the search for solutions to the problem of "the human environment" in the United States.

HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Louis Henkin. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 324 p. $7.50.

In these excellent and closely argued essays, the author demonstrates the importance and application of law in the day-to-day dealings among nations and weighs its successes and failures in helping to keep the peace in the face of divisive political pressures.

PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COERCION. By B. S. Murty. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 310 p. $10.00.

An excellent and exhaustive study exploring the manifold problems of regulating propaganda. The author draws for his conclusions on political science, sociology, psychology, communications research and law.

PROGRESS AND DISILLUSION: THE DIALECTICS OF MODERN SOCIETY. By Raymond Aron. New York: Praeger, 1968, 230 p. $5.50.

An impressive though unnecessarily prolix examination of the relationships between the individual and political and social institutions in modern technological societies.

DEATH IN LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA. By Robert Jay Lifton. New York: Random House, 1968, 594 p. $10.00.

NOTE—By special arrangement with World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain, *post free*, any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, with check or money order, to Desk FA, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

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The author treats a terrible subject with brilliance, compassion and restraint. Hiroshima, in his view, was an "end of the world" experience for its survivors. For us, the survivors in a larger sense, it signifies the "last chance" to learn.

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR: FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION TO THE KOREAN WAR, 1917–1950. By André Fontaine. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 432 p. $10.00.

This is a tendentious book by a "cold warrior" who sees the cold war as a struggle against "Communist contagion." (French edition appeared in 1966; noted here January 1967.)

SANITY AND SURVIVAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WAR AND PEACE. By Jerome D. Frank. New York: Random House, 1968, 330 p. $5.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A welcome effort to build a bridge between psychiatry and international politics. The author presents many provocative ideas, but the general treatment suffers from a lack of depth.

THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP. Edited by Richard N. Gardner and Max F. Millikan. New York: Praeger, 1968, 498 p. $9.50.

A symposium dealing with problems of international agencies and economic development.

THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Edited by Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press (in coöperation with the American Society of International Law), 1968, 633 p. $15.00 (Paper, $3.95).

A collection of readings and documents by scholars and international lawyers on the legality of the U.S. involvement in the Viet Nam war and its consequences for world order.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN ORGANIZING WORLD. By William L. Tung. New York: Crowell, 1968, 604 p. $8.75.

A scholarly treatment of the subject.

LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. By C. Wilfred Jenks. New York: McKay, 1968, 164 p. $7.95.

A series of lectures on international law delivered by the author in twelve world capitals during 1965 and 1966.

THE BRAIN DRAIN. Edited by Walter Adams. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 273 p. $6.95.

A symposium analyzing the causes of the brain drain from developing countries through a number of case studies. (French language edition, "L'Exode des Cerveaux," Lausanne: Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1968, 309 p.).

ILLUSTRIOUS IMMIGRANTS: THE INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION FROM EUROPE, 1930–41. By Laura Fermi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 440 p. $7.95.

This is the story, movingly told, of Hitler's rejects who replenished America's intellectual arsenal in virtually every field of human endeavor during the 1930s.

THE ACTIVE SOCIETY: A THEORY OF SOCIETAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES. By Amitai Etzioni. New York: Free Press, 1968, 698 p. $10.95.

An important landmark in social science theory.

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INTERNATIONAL REGIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECOLOGY. By Bruce M. Russett. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967, 252 p. $8.50.

An effort to apply quantitative and mathematical models to regional groupings.

CONTAINMENT AND REVOLUTION. Edited by David Horowitz. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967, 252 p. $5.95.

Leaders of the New Left attempt to prove in this polemic that the United States has followed an imperialist path during the last half century.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY. By William E. Connolly. New York: Atherton, 1967, 179 p. $5.95.

A fine essay on empirical theory, casting some complex concepts into readily understandable terms, yet without oversimplification.

VIETNAM FOLLY. By Senator Ernest Gruening and Herbert Wilton Beaser. Washington: National Press, 1968, 664 p. $8.95.

A complete catalogue of arguments against the American involvement.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE WEAPONS CULTURE. By Ralph E. Lapp. New York: Norton, 1968, 230 p. $4.95.

The author, a distinguished nuclear physicist, suggests that "America, the beautiful" has become "arms-maker and arms merchant to the world." A powerful, though politically slightly naive, indictment.

NATO: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS. By Harald von Riekhoff. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1967, 170 p. $3.50.

An intelligent analysis by a Canadian scholar of NATO's possible contributions toward East-West détente in Europe.

HELL OR HIGH WATER: MACARTHUR'S LANDING AT INCHON. By Walt Sheldon. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 340 p. $7.95.

The author, in this fast-paced narrative, attempts to prove that MacArthur not only swayed the President and the Pentagon to go along with the Inchon landing, but that the military operation itself overcame the most formidable natural and geographical handicaps.

THE FALL OF BERLIN. By Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, 261 p. $5.95.

A refreshingly frank, though somewhat self-serving account, highly critical of Zhukov and Rokossovski.

ARMED FORCE AS POWER. By Brigadier General Wendell J. Coats. New York: Exposition Press, 1967, 432 p. $10.00.

A broadly conceived essay on the theory of war.

THE ROOTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. By Douglas Hyde. London: Bodley Head, 1968, 159 p. 15/. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, $3.95).

Some timely observations on guerrilla warfare in Asia and Latin America, based on travels and first-hand experience.

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A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR. By Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 629 p. $7.95.

A searing indictment of United States China policy during World War II by the commander of the U. S. Navy's guerrilla forces in China. Prepared by Hawthorne Daniel from the original manuscript.

PEACEFUL CONFLICT: THE NON-MILITARY USE OF THE MILITARY. By Edward Bernard Glick. Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1967, 223 p. $6.50.

A case for the involvement of the military in constructive civic action programs, especially in developing countries.

THE WARS OF AMERICA. By Robert Leckie. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 1,052 p. $12.50.

This book, a masterpiece of compression, traces American military involvements from colonial times to Viet Nam. The factual exposition is generally accurate, the analysis frequently controversial.

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS. By Colonel James A. Donovan, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1967, 246 p. $5.95.

A frankly admiring history of the Corps, its famous battles, doctrines and traditions.

General: Economic and Social

LE DÉFI AMÉRICAIN. By Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Paris: Denoël, 1967, 342 p. Fr. 18.

To avoid becoming an economic satellite of the United States, Europe must emulate, not exclude, American business. To do so requires more integration, the right governmental policies, and a degree of mobility that the author thinks is more likely to be provided by men of the left than of the right.

THE ECONOMICS OF CRISIS: WAR, POLITICS, AND THE DOLLAR. By Eliot Janeway. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968, 317 p. $10.00.

Interesting, sometimes controversial, history that stresses the place of war in expanding the American economy and provides a basis for comment on our present ills and condemnation of the involvement in Viet Nam.

CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION. Edited by John H. Adler with the Assistance of Paul W. Kuznets. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 497 p. $12.50.

Excellent papers from many countries.

TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMIC POLICY. By Sir Roy Harrod. New York: Kelley, 1967, 70 p. $5.00.

The eminent Oxford economist prefers import controls and export incentives to deflation if international monetary reform does not provide enough liquidity to permit Britain to make full use of its resources without running into balance-of-payments difficulties.

PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Richard Bailey. Baltimore: Penguin, 1968, 201 p. 95 cents (Paper).

Very good survey with an emphasis on technology.

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ECONOMICS: AN AWKWARD CORNER. By Joan Robinson. New York: Pantheon Books, 1967, 86 p. $3.95.

The state of economic understanding, Britain's awkward corner, and some drastic proposals for more equality, by a famous Cambridge economist.

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: FREE VERSUS FIXED EXCHANGE RATES. By Milton Friedman and Robert V. Roosa. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1967, 192 p. $4.50.

The record of a classic debate.

LES PROBLÈMES MONÉTAIRES INTERNATIONAUX. By Robert Mossé. Paris: Payot, 1967, 318 p. Fr. 19.

A French expert wants to move away from gold toward a true international clearing system.

MONETARY REFORM AND THE PRICE OF GOLD: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES. Edited by Randall Hinshaw. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 180 p. $6.95.

Debate among highly articulate protagonists helps sharpen some much-discussed issues.

THE MACHINERY OF FINANCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF STERLING. By A. T. K. Grant. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 189 p. $6.00.

Full of interesting analysis and suggestions, by a Cambridge economist with more than twenty-five years experience in the British government.

THE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: THREE ESSAYS ON IDEOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT. By Raymond Aron. New York: Praeger, 1967, 183 p. $4.95.

Includes some perceptive and balanced comment on the rich and poor nations and what we do and don't know about development.

BUILDING THE AMERICAN-EUROPEAN MARKET: PLANNING FOR THE 1970's. Edited by Gene E. Bradley. Homewood (Ill.): Dow Jones-Irwin, 1967, 272 p. $8.95.

This broad and rather optimistic review of the major transatlantic economic issues contains some interesting nuggets of fact and opinion. (Prepared for the Atlantic Council of the United States).

AMERICAN MARKETING IN THE COMMON MARKET. By Vern Terpstra. New York: Praeger, 1967, 168 p. $12.50.

How American firms have coped with their European opportunities.

MONEY AND CONQUEST: ALLIED OCCUPATION CURRENCIES IN WORLD WAR II. By Vladimir Petrov. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (in coöperation with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University), 1967, 282 p. $8.50.

A critical view of the planning and execution of allied policies.

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH. By Guy Arnold. New York: Pergamon Press, 1967, 184 p. $5.50.

Economic links "are not sufficient reason for the Commonwealth's existence." Its long-term justification must rest on the contribution it can make to race relations.

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IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES FROM LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By Hal B. Lary. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968, 286 p. (Columbia University Press, distributor, $8.50).

The most careful study yet of a major economic problem. Original statistical work focuses on the possibilities of developing exports of labor-intensive goods from the poor countries.

FAMINE—1975! AMERICA'S DECISION: WHO WILL SURVIVE? By William and Paul Paddock. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, 276 p. $6.50.

Convinced that a Time of Famines lies ahead and that the United States will be the only major source of free grain, the authors combine their agricultural and diplomatic experience to propose guidelines for American decisions as to who shall starve and who be fed, and add some thoughts as to how this plight may be turned into a "catalyst for American greatness."

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. Edited by Herman M. Southworth and Bruce F. Johnston. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, 608 p. $12.00.

Thoroughgoing and authoritative analyses.

AGRICULTURE ET ACCESSION AU DÉVELOPPEMENT. By Robert Badouin. Paris: Pedone, 1967, 228 p. Fr. 35.

On the important place of agriculture in development, and the consequent changes that are necessary in agriculture.

The United States

THE FACES OF POWER: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO JOHNSON. By Seyom Brown. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 397 p. $8.95.

In this valuable book, the author, a RAND Corporation analyst, examines the uses of power in the foreign policy decision-making processes of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.

AMERICA'S POLITICAL DILEMMA: FROM LIMITED TO UNLIMITED DEMOCRACY. By Gottfried Dietze. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 298 p. $7.95.

A learned though somewhat turgidly written essay by a European scholar who argues that American democracy has strayed from the original ideas of the Founding Fathers and that the price may be executive dictatorship.

THE REAL CIA. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 312 p. $6.95.

This is the definitive book on the CIA to date. The author, formerly the No. 3 man in the Agency's high command, blends scholarship and personal experience.

THE ART OF DIPLOMACY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE. By Thomas A. Bailey. New York: Appleton, 1968, 303 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.50).

A charming and witty collection of maxims culled from the entire range of the American diplomatic experience. This reviewer's favorite: "It is difficult for big nations to have small wars."

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THE WORD WAR: THE STORY OF AMERICAN PROPAGANDA. By Thomas C. Sorensen. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 337 p. $6.95.

In the author's view, propaganda, in the best sense of the term, is a continuing necessity. This book tells the story of American propaganda abroad since World War I. The hero is Edward R. Murrow.

SECOND CHANCE. By Robert A. Divine. New York: Atheneum, 1967, 371 p. $8.50.

A good description of the successful struggle waged by individuals and groups in the United States during World War II to prepare the ground for American participation in a new world organization. The struggle, the author shows, was not between internationalism and isolationism, but over the form that internationalism would take.

THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM. By Archibald Cox. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 144 p. $4.95.

The author, who was Solicitor General of the United States from 1961 to 1965, acclaims the Warren Court's record on civil rights, criminal procedure and political democracy. A fine analytical survey.

ANNA ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: THE EVOLUTION OF A REFORMER. By James R. Kearney. Boston: Houghton, 1968, 332 p. $5.95.

Until Mrs. Roosevelt's private papers at Hyde Park are accessible to scholars, this clear-sighted and objective study may be considered definitive.

WHILE SIX MILLION DIED: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN APATHY. By Arthur D. Morse. New York: Random House, 1968, 420 p. $6.95.

This is a deeply tragic book. Its thrust is that the White House and the State Department, though largely aware of the fate of the Jews under Hitler, failed to alleviate the horror by opening wide the doors of sanctuary.

POLITICS BATTLE PLAN. By Herbert M. Baus and William B. Ross. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 399 p. $7.95.

A fascinating though somewhat breathless account of campaign management at the top political level.

INSTITUTIONS IN MODERN AMERICA: INNOVATION IN STRUCTURE AND PROCESS. Edited by Stephen E. Ambrose. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 145 p. $5.95.

Four essays dealing with the labor movement, the pattern of modern politics, the large industrial corporation and the rise of military power. Leuchtenburg's analysis of modern American politics is excellent.

DECISIONS FOR A DECADE: POLICIES AND PROGRAMS FOR THE 1970s. By Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 222 p. $4.95.

A *tour d'horizon,* by the youngest United States Senator, of the problems that, in his view, will confront America in the coming decade.

CAN WE WIN IN VIETNAM? By Frank E. Armbruster and others. New York: Praeger, 1968, 427 p. $7.95.

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A debate among Hudson Institute staff members, specialists in political and military affairs with diverse, sometimes opposing viewpoints. Three find for the affirmative; the two for the negative suggest how the U.S. can withdraw and still salvage something for its efforts. The participants were Frank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gastil, Herman Kahn, William Pfaff and Edmund Stillman.

THE KOREAN DECISION: JUNE 24–30, 1950. By GLENN D. PAIGE. New York: Free Press, 1968, 394 p. $6.95.

A University of Hawaii specialist interviewed Truman, Acheson and other major participants to reconstruct this hour-by-hour account of the U.S. decision to support the United Nations "police action" in Korea.

The Western Hemisphere

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES—THE SECOND HUNDRED YEARS. By STANLEY R. TUPPER AND DOUGLAS L. BAILEY. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967, 189 p. $5.95.

The authors urge the citizens of both countries to educate themselves about each other.

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. By GERALD M. CRAIG. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 376 p. $7.95.

In this addition to the American Foreign Policy Library, the author argues that success in strengthening American-Canadian ties will depend on an appreciation of differences as well as similarities between the two nations.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. EDITED BY ROBERT W. GREGG. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968, 262 p. $6.95.

Thoughtful essays critically examining the inter-American system as well as the dominant role played by the United States in hemispheric relations.

THE LATIN AMERICAN TRADITION. By CHARLES WAGLEY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 242 p. $6.75.

Reflective essays on cultural patterns within Latin America. The emphasis is on continuity rather than change in traditional attitudes and values.

LATIN AMERICA: REFORM OR REVOLUTION? EDITED BY JAMES PETRAS AND MAURICE ZEITLIN. Greenwich: Fawcett, 1968, 511 p. 95 cents (Paper).

Penetrating studies from the left; the mood is pessimistic, the ideological theme that of necessary conflict.

NACIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. By FELIPE HERRERA. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1967, 224 p.

The President of the Inter-American Development Bank discusses the broad national and international problems which must be overcome before Latin America can achieve its much-needed economic integration.

LA INTEGRACIÓN ECONÓMICA DE AMÉRICA LATINA. By MANUEL FUENTES IRUROZQUI. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1967, 280 p. Ptas. 200.

A Spanish economist calls for the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in Latin America's plans for economic integration. Appendix includes existing regional economic treaties.

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TOWARD STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. By John C. Honey. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968, 175 p. $5.75.

Regional and national agencies are proposed in this study dealing with the administrative problems of political socialization and development. Case studies focus on Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela.

REFORMA AGRARIA Y ECONOMÍA EMPRESARIAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA. By Antonio Garcia. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1967, 305 p.

Statistics and pertinent bibliography back up this solid interpretive study of traditional and modern systems of land tenure.

THE MEASUREMENT OF MODERNISM: A STUDY OF VALUES IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO. By Joseph A. Kahl. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1968, 210 p. $6.00.

An empirical study, based on random samplings, of the impact which industrialization has had upon the worker.

MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERNITY. By Charles C. Cumberland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 394 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.50).

An excellent and much needed survey of Mexican history, strengthened by a selected bibliography.

EL NACIONALISMO MEXICANO Y LA INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA. By Miguel S. Wionczek. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1967, 314 p.

"Mexicanization," the gradual absorption of foreign-owned industries by the government, is studied in historical perspective in the sugar, electric and extractive industries.

COLOMBIA: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT. By T. Lynn Smith. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967, 389 p. $12.50.

The first of a projected three-volume series, this scholarly study by a respected sociologist examines Colombian systems of land tenure and their social ramifications.

JOURNAL D'UN GUÉRILLERO. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1968, 124 p. Fr. 9.50.

Fervent recollections of a committed Colombian revolutionary now fighting in the backlands.

A STRATEGY FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL POLICY. Edited by Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, 384 p. $15.00.

A result of a long-term coöperative project initiated in 1963 between M.I.T. and Venezuela's Central University, this first volume of "The Politics of Change in Venezuela" spells out the techniques to be used in structuring a rational approach to Venezuelan development.

THE RISE AND FALL OF PROJECT CAMELOT: STUDIES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PRACTICAL POLITICS. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, 385 p. $12.00 (Paper, $2.95.)

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An analysis of the incredible and short-lived project—financed by the U.S. Department of the Army in 1964—aimed at assessing attitudes toward social change (and revolution?) among the Chilean people.

POLITICAL TRENDS IN BRAZIL. By Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968, 184 p. $6.00.

A knowledgeable account of contemporary Brazilian politics, centering upon the Quadros, Goulart and Castello Branco régimes.

THE BRAZILIANS: THEIR CHARACTER AND ASPIRATIONS. By José Honório Rodrigues. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968, 186 p. $6.00.

A perceptive analysis by a respected historian. A welcome translation.

BRAZIL: THE LAND AND PEOPLE. By Rollie E. Poppino. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 370 p. $7.50.

A concise survey of Brazilian history and institutions, supplemented by an up-to-date bibliographical guide.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A HANDBOOK. Edited by Claudio Véliz. New York: Praeger, 1968, 840 p. $25.00.

These essays, by some eighty specialists, are encyclopedic in extent. A basic reference work, supplemented by statistical and bibliographical materials.

IN THE FIST OF THE REVOLUTION: LIFE IN A CUBAN COUNTRY TOWN. By José Yglesias. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 307 p. $5.95.

A fascinating account of life in Cuba based on the author's experiences in the town of Mayarí in 1967.

REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND THE CUBAN WORKING CLASS. By Maurice Zeitlin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 306 p. $8.50.

Drawing on random samplings taken during the summer of 1962, the author concludes that socialization of industry and overall revolutionary ideology has had a profound and positive influence upon the Cuban working class.

HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. By Rayford W. Logan. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1968, 220 p. $6.00.

A comparative political history of the two disparate countries which share the island of Hispaniola.

RAPID DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL ECONOMIES: THE EXAMPLE OF EL SALVADOR. By David R. Raynolds. New York: Praeger, 1967, 124 p. $12.50.

El Salvador's experience stimulates a former U.S. embassy official to think about the advantages of small economies.

Western Europe

AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1945–1964. By M. M. Postan. London: Methuen, 1967, 382 p. 42/. (New York: Barnes and Noble, distributor, $6.75; Paper, $3.50.)

Drawing together a great body of recent literature, a leading British economic historian has produced a remarkably comprehensive and valuable book. He examines alternative explanations of growth and other economic developments, emphasizes the differences in national performance, stresses management and explores the social aspects of economic changes.

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REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. By Willard N. Hogan. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967, 246 p. $5.95.

Theoretical and practical considerations on how democratic, representative control can be added to transnational political authority, with contemporary Western Europe as the main focus.

EUROPEAN UNITY: A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS. By Michael Palmer, John Lambert and others. London: Allen and Unwin (for Political and Economic Planning), 1968, 519 p. 63/.

A useful survey of the origins, evolution and present functioning of the chief European organizations.

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE WORLD. By Werner Feld. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 184 p. $4.95 (Paper, $2.45).

A very good survey by a close student of the subject.

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: GROWTH AND PATTERNS OF TRADE AND PRODUCTION. By Ingo Walter. New York: Praeger, 1967, 212 p. $12.50.

Statistical analysis of the impact of the Common Market on trade among its members.

COLLISION IN BRUSSELS: THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS OF 30 JUNE 1965. By John Newhouse. New York: Norton, 1967, 195 p. $5.00.

A detailed account, with much inside information, of the background and working out of a crisis that changed life in the Common Market.

RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. By Burton Paulu. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967, 290 p. $7.50.

A useful survey of most aspects of the subject. Eastern Europe is included.

ESSAYS AND SPEECHES. By Roy Jenkins. New York: Chilmark Press, 1968, 288 p. $5.95.

A fine collection on many themes from aviation and crime to politics and politicians, by the most literate and, for many, the most appealing member of the British Government. Gaitskell, he wrote, left "a memory which is a standing contradiction to those who wish to believe that only men with cold hearts and twisted tongues can succeed in politics."

THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH. By Crane Brinton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 305 p. $6.75.

A seasoned and deeply knowledgeable historian of France depicts her present state which "is in so many ways so different from the France of twenty years ago that under any form of government, under any rulers, its stance, its policies, in international relations could not possibly be what they were in 1947." An elegant essay that merits wide attention.

L'ORGANISATION GÉNÉRALE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE EN FRANCE DEPUIS LA FIN DE LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE. By Bernard Chantebout. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1967, 500 p. Fr. 57.90.

A painstaking study of the postwar French defense establishment in all its aspects.

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THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT: POLITICS IN THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. By Philip M. Williams. New York: Praeger, 1968, 136 p. $5.75.

The Gaullist parliament, analyzed and compared to French antecedents and English experience, by a lucid student of French politics.

THE CATHOLIC AVANT-GARDE: FRENCH CATHOLICISM SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Jean-Marie Domenach and Robert de Montvalon. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, 245 p. $5.95.

In the postwar years before *aggiornamento* French Catholic writers sought new paths in thought and action. This volume offers a valuable selection from their writings.

HISTOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE DE LA FRANCE ENTRE LES DEUX GUERRES. II: DE PIERRE LAVAL À PAUL REYNAUD. By Alfred Sauvy. Paris: Fayard, 1967, 626 p. Fr. 43.88.

Chronicle and interpretation of the economic policies of right and left in depression France.

THE TRIAL OF MARSHAL PÉTAIN. By Jules Roy. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 263 p. $6.95.

The day-by-day reconstruction of Pétain's controversial trial, by a well-known writer who, once a follower of the Marshal, is now critical of him and his judges.

THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS. By Arend Lijphart. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, 222 p. $5.75.

A political scientist explains the reasonably successful workings of Dutch democracy despite sharp social cleavages. Encouraging implications for other countries.

ENTMILITARISIERUNG UND WIEDERBEWAFFNUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 1943–1955. By Gerhard Wettig. Munich: Oldenbourg (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1967, 683 p. DM. 75.

How the wartime allies disarmed Germany and how the cold-war antagonists for their own purposes rearmed the two Germanys. A sober study, set in the context of East-West relations.

DAS FOLGENSCHWERE MISSVERSTÄNDNIS: BONN UND DIE SOWJETISCHE DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK 1949–1955. By Klaus Erdmenger. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1967, 177 p. DM. 18.

A perspicacious and provocative analysis of West German response to Soviet initiatives, by a young political scientist. Particularly through his critical examination of anti-communism as a form of political self-deception, he contributes to the present controversy concerning the cold war.

NAZI GERMANY AND THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE, 1933–1941. By Alton Frye. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 229 p. $6.75.

A well-documented study of Nazi subversive efforts in the Western Hemisphere, epitomized by the campaign to defeat Roosevelt in 1940: "One of the most massive interferences in American domestic affairs in history." Also a thoughtful assessment of Hitler's likely—malevolent—intentions had he won the war in Europe.

STAATSMÄNNER UND DIPLOMATEN BEI HITLER. Edited by Andreas Hillgruber. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1967, 699 p. DM. 58.

The German protocols of Hitler's conversations with foreign statesmen from the outbreak of the European war to Pearl Harbor, on which he congratulated the Japanese Ambassador: "You gave the right declaration of war!" An indispensable source.

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LEBENSERINNERUNGEN EINES BOTSCHAFTERS. By Hans Kroll. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1967, 611 p. DM. 25.

The excessively long memoirs of a professional German diplomat who during his tenure in Moscow, from 1958 to 1962, attracted attention—and aroused Western concern—by his zealous efforts to promote better Russo-German relations. Interesting in some particulars, but disappointing in general.

STAAT, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK IN DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HEINRICH BRÜNING. Edited by Ferdinand A. Hermens and Theodor Schieder. Berlin: Duncker, 1967, 507 p. DM. 68.

A collection of historical essays and personal memoirs concerning Brüning's government and Weimar politics—in honor of the eightieth birthday of the unsuccessful statesman.

WILLI MÜNZENBERG: EINE POLITISCHE BIOGRAPHIE. By Babette Gross. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (for the Institut für Zeitgeschichte), 1967, 352 p. DM. 19.60.

An intimate companion depicts the life of the mastermind of Central European fellow-traveling, the Comintern's best organizer. In the late '30s he broke with Stalin and in 1940 died under mysterious circumstances.

THE LAST DAYS OF MANKIND: KARL KRAUS AND HIS VIENNA. By Frank Field. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 280 p. $10.00.

The life and times—both hard—of Vienna's eccentric, brilliant satirist. A commentary on Viennese culture from 1900 to Hitler's conquest, particularly illuminating for World War I.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ITALY. By Lloyd Saville. Durham: Duke University Press, 1967, 191 p. $7.00.

Detailed proposals for an approach applicable to a number of regions, including developed ones, not just the much-written-about South.

PEASANT COMMUNISM IN SOUTHERN ITALY. By Sidney G. Tarrow. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 389 p. $8.75.

A political scientist analyzes the role of the communists in the impoverished part of Italy and the relations between Marxist ideology and prevailing peasant conditions. A study combining sensitivity and vigor.

FRANCO. By Brian Crozier. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968, 589 p. $10.00.

A well-written, somewhat superficial account of Franco's career, by an English journalist whose feelings for Franco while writing the book "changed from antipathy to grudging admiration."

INFLATION ET POLITIQUE MONÉTAIRE: LE CAS DE LA SUISSE. By Peter Tschopp. Geneva: Éditions Générales, 1967, 226 p. Swiss Fr. 24.60.

How Switzerland coped with domestic and international inflationary pressures in the '50s and '60s.

MALTA'S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE. By Edith Dobie. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967, 286 p. $5.95.

A brief history of Maltese politics and British responses, particularly since the Second World War.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET SOCIETY. Edited by Allen Kassof. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 586 p. $10.00 (Paper, $3.95).

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A comprehensive inquiry into many aspects of Soviet life, from politics, economics and the military to science, social attitudes, the family and the literary scene. Despite the variety of the subject matter, editor and authors have combined it to give the book a real unity.

THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS: SOVIET RUSSIA 1917–67. By Ian Grey. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967, 558 p. $10.00.

A reasonably sympathetic and cautiously optimistic survey of the course of Soviet history.

DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES SOWJETISCHEN AUSSENHANDELS MIT DEN EUROPÄISCHEN OSTBLOCKSTAATEN SEIT DER GRÜNDUNG DES COMECON (1949–1963). By Miklós Vásárhelyi. Aarau: Keller, 1967, 221 p. Swiss Fr. 20.

Detailed review of trade among the communist countries of Europe, stressing Soviet domination of their coöperative measures. Statistics by product and country to 1963.

THE SOVIET QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: ISSUES, CONTROVERSIES, AND REFORMS. By George R. Feiwel. New York: Praeger, 1967, 420 p. $15.00.

A monograph on "the Soviet industrial planning system and its reform."

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN THE U.S.S.R. Edited by Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1967, 203 p. $6.25.

THE POLITICS OF IDEAS IN THE U.S.S.R. Edited by Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1967, 175 p. $5.25.

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN PRACTICE. Edited by Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1967, 160 p. $5.25.

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM. Edited by Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1968, 144 p. $5.00.

"The Contemporary Soviet Union Series: Institutions and Policies" aims at presenting factual, concise, documented but not documentary summaries of various aspects of Soviet life and rule. The books have an editor and collaborators but no authors are named.

SELBSTKRITIK DES KOMMUNISMUS. By Günther Hillmann. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1967, 251 p. DM. 4.80.

A useful collection of documents, with connecting commentary, concerning oppositional currents in communism since 1917—in Russia and various other countries and in the international movement.

BOLSCHEWISMUS 1917–1967: VON DER WELTREVOLUTION ZUM SOWJETIMPERIUM. By Ossip K. Flechtheim. Frankfurt/Main: Europa Verlag, 1967, 255 p. DM. 14.80.

A general survey and interpretation of German communism by an able historian.

I. V. STALIN: WORKS. Edited by Robert H. McNeal. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967, 3 v. $20.00.

It has been left to the Hoover Institution to round out Stalin's collected works. The texts, here given in the Russian original, cover the years 1934 to 1953. The majority of the documents are available in English translation in earlier anthologies of Stalin's works.

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THE YOUNG STALIN: THE EARLY YEARS OF AN ELUSIVE REVOLUTIONARY. By Edward Ellis Smith. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967, 470 p. $8.50.

An ambitious effort to reconstruct Stalin's early life—from his birth in 1879 to the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. In the author's view Stalin in these pre-revolutionary years also served as a police agent; the argument is still by inference rather than demonstration.

BEYOND THE URALS. By Violet Conolly. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 420 p. $13.50.

A most welcome and extensive survey of Soviet economic resources, achievements and goals in Asiatic Russia.

YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 1966. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 766 p. $25.00.

This is the first volume in what is designed to be "continuing publication in English on the international political activities of the various communist parties, or on the relations among communists themselves." A quite hefty contribution, useful as a reference.

DIPLOMAT IN BERLIN, 1933–1939. Edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 679 p. $17.50.

Józef Lipski, who died in 1958, was Polish Ambassador to Germany from 1933 to 1939. The translation and publication of his papers for those years—reports, instructions from Warsaw, documents, lectures, etc.—provide an important source for Polish-German and international relations in the 1930s.

LATVIJAS VĒSTURE 1914–1920. By Edgars Andersons. Stockholm: Daugava, 1967, 754 p. Kr. 75.

A detailed survey of the complicated military, political and diplomatic events in Latvia during World War I and its immediate aftermath.

LATVIA: COUNTRY AND PEOPLE. Edited by J. Rutkis. Stockholm: Latvian National Foundation, 1967, 681 p.

An informative survey of Latvia and its people, with particular emphasis on Latvian life during the period of national independence. The treatment is topical.

GREECE: THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM. By Stephanos Zotos. New York: Crowell, 1967, 194 p. $6.95.

A Greek journalist, formerly Director of the Information Service of the Greek Embassy in Washington, reviews the tragic period between the Italian attack in October 1940 and the 1949 failure of the communists in the civil war.

THE DEATH OF A DEMOCRACY: GREECE AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE. By Stephen Rousseas and others. New York: Grove Press, 1967, 268 p. $6.50.

A vehement indictment of the military coup in Athens of April 21, 1967, by a professor of economics at New York University, a strong partisan of Andreas Papandreou.

The Middle East

LES RÉGIMES POLITIQUES DES PAYS ARABES. By Maurice Flory and Robert Mantran. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1968, 469 p. Fr. 18.

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A combined handbook and history, packed with information and bibliographical references, of the Arab world from Morocco to Muscat.

BITTER HARVEST: PALESTINE BETWEEN 1914–1967. By Sami Hadawi. New York: New World Press, 1967, 355 p. $4.95.

Half a century of the Palestine problem described by a Christian Palestinian Arab, whose feelings of outrage over the Zionist intrusion and bitterness at Western policy provide the theme.

ISRAEL: POLITICS AND PEOPLE. By Leonard J. Fein. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968, 338 p. $6.95.

An attempt, in general successful, to apply the methods of modern political science in describing Israel's political system and society: parties, coöperative institutions, the West-East gap, the generational gap and the nature of the "establishment." It is not a mechanical treatment and gives a real taste of the subject's infinite complexity.

THE CASE FOR ISRAEL. By Frank Gervasi. New York: Viking, 1967, 258 p. $5.50.

Israel's story from the Balfour Declaration to the Six-Day War. The writing is lively, the argument strictly partisan.

ISRAEL AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEW APPROACHES TO COOPERATION. By Leopold Laufer. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967, 298 p. $6.00.

A straightforward description of Israel's wide-ranging technical assistance operations, followed by brief chapters on the actualities and possibilities of such coöperation among developing countries.

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN JORDAN: A STUDY OF THE ARAB LEGION 1921–1957. By P. J. Vatikiotis. New York: Praeger, 1967, 169 p. $7.50.

The Arab Legion's military structure and political role during its evolution from an élite corps to a national army. Mr. Vatikiotis, author of an earlier work on the Egyptian army, provides the best account yet of the crisis of the 1950s involving the King, the Legion, the Arab nationalists and the forces pressing on Jordan from outside.

YEMEN AND THE WESTERN WORLD: SINCE 1571. By Eric Macro. New York: Praeger, 1968, 150 p. $6.50.

A chronicle of Yemen's episodic relations with the West over the centuries. The treatment of recent decades is casual, but is good on the military and other problems of the Aden-Yemen frontier.

THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNISM IN TURKEY. By George S. Harris. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967, 215 p. $7.00.

This account of the early years of the communist movement, told for the first time in revealing detail, throws light on the broader questions of Turkey's politics and its relations with Russia.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS. By Gunnar Myrdal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 3 v. $8.50 (Paper); Twentieth Century Fund, $25.00.

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Economic conditions in South and Southeast Asia described in their demographic, social and political setting, together with an account of the prospects for development and the main policy alternatives facing the governments.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIBES, MINORITIES, AND NATIONS. Edited by Peter Kunstadter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 2 v. $22.50.

Papers from two 1965 conferences, concentrating largely on Thailand and limited to rural rather than urban minorities.

INDIA'S QUEST FOR SECURITY: DEFENCE POLICIES, 1947–1965. By Lorne J. Kavic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 263 p. $7.95.

The Nehru government's defense policy: how it was conditioned by India's resources and by the thinking of its leaders and the response to it internally and externally.

THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA. By Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, 306 p. $8.75.

The authors' conviction is that modernity and tradition are not so diametrically opposed as is generally believed but instead infiltrate and transform each other.

THE SWATANTRA PARTY AND INDIAN CONSERVATISM. By Howard L. Erdman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 356 p. $9.50.

The background, emergence and growth of the right-wing political party, founded in 1959, now the leading opposition in the Indian national parliament.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE KASHMIR PROBLEM. By H. S. Gururaj Rao. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967, 379 p. (Taplinger, distributor, $7.75).

The author charges that those endeavoring to solve the Kashmir dispute—one of the earliest and most controversial problems put before the Security Council—have ignored its legal aspects in favor of political tactics.

BRITISH INDIA 1772–1947. By Michael Edwardes. New York: Taplinger, 1968, 396 p. $13.95.

The political ideas of the British and their effects on Indian culture and society. Attention is also given to the attitudes and extra-official activities of the British community.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

DEFEAT IN THE EAST: THE MARK OF MAO TSE-TUNG ON WAR. By Michael Elliott-Bateman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 270 p. $6.40.

The author urges the West to discard traditional tactics and to adopt Mao's military philosophy which has been successfully applied by smaller forces to win over larger ones in Southeast Asia.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM. By Franklin W. Houn. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 245 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.45).

A leading Sinologist neatly examines the economic, cultural and social policies and accomplishments of the Peking régime since 1949.

ENEMIES AND FRIENDS: THE UNITED FRONT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY. By Lyman P. Van Slyke. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, 330 p. $8.50.

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The development of the united front, a principal element of Mao's strategy and one which figures prominently in the Chinese communist movement.

THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–1963: AN INTRODUCTION. By Jerome Alan Cohen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 706 p. $15.00.

Professor Cohen of Harvard places emphasis on the criminal process itself, but gives much attention to substantive criminal law as well as to the modes of its application. Excerpts from legal documents, a glossary and a lengthy bibliography appended.

ECONOMIC POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN: GROWTH VERSUS ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY. By Kozo Yamamura. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 226 p. $6.95.

The nature, rationale and result of the Occupation's economic democratization. The author has doubts and criticisms about Japan's present economic framework.

CONVERSATIONS IN JAPAN: MODERNIZATION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE. By David Riesman and Evelyn Thompson Riesman. New York: Basic Books, 1967, 371 p. $7.50.

Discussions of a Harvard sociologist and his author wife with some of Japan's most gifted intellectuals, revealing the ideas and prejudices that are shaping Japanese thought and attitudes today.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. By A. V. H. Hartendorp. Manila: Bookmark, 1967, 2 v.

A Philippine editor's history, written in secret during his three-year imprisonment, of the Santo Tomas Internment Camp and of Japanese rule of the country as told to him by people entering the Camp. A portion of this work was published in 1964 ("The Santo Tomas Story," 446 p.) and was noted here April 1965.

AFTERNOON LIGHT: SOME MEMORIES OF MEN AND EVENTS. By Sir Robert Gordon Menzies. New York: Coward-McCann, 1968, 384 p. $7.95.

A "series of vignettes of people and events" as the former Prime Minister of Australia saw and experienced them. Partially autobiographical.

Africa

LE MAGHREB ENTRE LES MYTHES: L'ÉCONOMIE NORD-AFRICAINE DEPUIS L'INDÉPENDANCE. By André Tiano. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1967, 623 p. Fr. 48.

The myths and the slogans of the new leaders of the three Maghreb countries—economic independence, self-management, Algerian socialism, etc.—in the light of the realities. The author's picture is grim but he is not pessimistic; specific kinds of planning constitute the major element in his prescriptions.

REBIRTH OF A NATION: THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF MOROCCAN NATIONALISM, 1912–1944. By John P. Halstead. Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1967, 323 p. (Harvard University Press, distributor, $3.50, Paper.)

A description of the nationalist movement in its early reformist phase, prior to the development of a strong political separatist movement. Especially good on intellectual influences, Eastern and Western, and their adaptation to conditions in Morocco.

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AFRICAN INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION. Edited by Arthur Hazlewood. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics and the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1968, 414 p. $12.00.

While most of the essays in this volume concern aspects of political and economic integration between states, several deal with similar internal problems.

THE POLITICS OF AFRICAN TRADE UNIONISM. By G. E. Lynd. New York: Praeger, 1968, 198 p. $12.00.

An expert on international labor affairs makes a comprehensive survey in English-speaking Africa up to 1965. He finds that unions have real opportunities to engage in bargaining with governments and political parties, even in the one-party states where unions are ostensibly part of the party structures.

THE PRESS IN AFRICA: COMMUNICATIONS PAST AND PRESENT. By Rosalynde Ainslie. New York: Walker, 1967, 264 p. $7.50.

A study of government-press relations throughout the continent.

THE LONG VIEW. By Alan Paton; Edited by Edward Callan. New York: Praeger, 1968, 295 p. $6.95.

A collection of Paton's essays, some written as long as ten years ago, and most of them originally published in the South African journal *Contact*. The editor provides an introductory biographical sketch of Paton and his political and literary activities.

EDUCATION IN AFRICA. By Abdou Moumouni. New York: Praeger, 1968, 319 p. $8.00.

The author, a professor in Bamako, Mali, urges a radical restructuring of educational systems in black Africa to rid independent African societies of neo-colonialist influences. Recent reforms in Guinea and Mali are his favored models.

FIRST AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GUINEA. By John H. Morrow. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1968, 291 p. $9.00.

The experiences of an academician who was President Eisenhower's Ambassador to Guinea from 1959 to 1961.

MY FIFTEEN MONTHS IN GOVERNMENT. By Moise Tshombe. Plano (Tex.): University of Plano, 1967, 117 p. $4.00.

The former Prime Minister makes a highly personal defense of his attempt to restore order and central control in Congo-Kinshasa in 1964–65.

ZAMBIA: THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1957–1964. By David C. Mulford. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 362 p. $8.80.

The development of political parties is described in relation to major constitutional changes.

RHODESIA: THE ROAD TO REBELLION. By James Barber. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1967, 338 p. $6.75.

An analysis, by a University of Exeter political scientist, of European politics in Rhodesia and of Anglo-Rhodesian relations from the beginnings of Federal dissolution in 1960 until the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965.

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES. Edited by William A. Hance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 171 p. $6.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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Two excellent essays on recent developments in European and "non-European" politics in South Africa, an assessment of the advisability of U.S. disengagement from South Africa, and a short survey of U.S. policies in southern Africa more generally.

RACE, PEACE, LAW, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: BACKGROUND PAPER AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH HAMMARSKJÖLD FORUM. By Rita F. Taubenfeld and Howard J. Taubenfeld; Edited by John Carey. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications (for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York), 1968, 211 p. $7.50.

Discussions in December 1967 on political and legal questions in southern Africa revealed predictably conflicting views among two American legal scholars, two South African experts and the Ambassador of Sierra Leone to the United Nations.

AFRICAN OPPOSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE FAILURE OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE. By Edward Feit. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967, 223 p. $7.50.

A University of Massachusetts political scientist argues that African opposition to the removal program in the Western areas and to the Bantu Education Act failed because of poor leadership, deficient physical resources, faulty strategy and an inability to induce increasingly prosperous Africans to risk reprisals.

"A VERY STRANGE SOCIETY." A JOURNEY TO THE HEART OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Allen Drury. New York: Trident Press, 1967, 465 p. $6.95.

This well-known journalist's interviews with the European "establishment" in South Africa, and with a limited number of Pretoria-approved Africans, leads him to speak with the voice of a slightly liberal white South African: he captures their mood; he accepts their account of the facts; he shares their sense of helplessness; and he reflects accurately their very limited perspective.

SMUTS: THE FIELDS OF FORCE, 1919–1950. By W. K. Hancock. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968, 589 p. $12.50.

The second and final volume of a major biography of Jan Smuts written by the eminent Commonwealth historian.

VERWOERD. By Alexander Hepple. Baltimore: Penguin, 1967, 253 p. $1.25 (Paper).

The major events of the late Prime Minister's political life are recounted in this little volume by a former South African M.P.

THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AFRICAN THOUGHT. By Robert W. July. New York: Praeger, 1968, 512 p. $10.00.

A series of intellectual portraits of nineteenth and twentieth-century African thinkers, comparing their responses to Western ideas and influence. Written by the Assistant Director for Humanities and Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation.

A LAND FULL OF PEOPLE: LIFE IN KENYA TODAY. By John S. Roberts. New York: Praeger, 1968, 240 p. $6.50.

A British journalist with considerable African experience presents an informal introduction to life in contemporary Kenya.

THE ECONOMY OF TANGANYIKA. By Gilbert L. Rutman. New York: Praeger, 1968, 190 p. $12.50.

The author, a professor at the University of West Virginia, believes Tanzania's economic plans are unrealistically ambitious. His somewhat cursory description is limited to mainland Tanzania.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 10022. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 10027. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 90th Congress, 2nd Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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